PROGRESSIVE

50 CENTS

LATIN AMERICA

DYNAMITE

ON OUR DOORSTEP

a first-hand report by Morris H. Rubin

Office memo

Several of the many hundreds of subscribers who have taken advantage of *The Progressive's* special spring subscription offer included the name of John F. Kennedy as a recipient of a new subscription. Actually, the President has been a *Progressive* reader for many years. So are many of those who serve on his administrative staff.

But *The Progressive* is not everywhere on such familiar ground as in the White House. We have already received several letters from Americans whose first introduction to the magazine was a special spring subscription gift. Almost without exception these new readers express delight in "discovering" *The Progressive* and emphasize a resolve to become permanent subscribers.

But it is to the readers overseas that *The Progressive* comes as a revelation—"a ray of light in the dark," is the way one French reader put it. Long accustomed to the large-circulation, conservative American magazines, our foreign friends find in *The Progressive* a whole new—and refreshing—view of progressive thinking in the United States. A great many of these overseas readers would never have had the opportunity of seeing *The Progressive* regularly but for the thoughtfulness and generosity of our subscribers here at home.

This year, there is a reward for these generous subscribers—a free copy of the informative and exciting autobiography of Robert M. LaFollette, Sr., who founded *The Progressive* fifty-two years ago. Because subscribers are responding so enthusiastically to this unusual opportunity, we are keeping this special offer open.

You may send The Progressive to three new readers, anywhere in the United States or abroad, for five months for a total of five dollars. You will receive promptly for yourself a free copy of LaFollette's Autobiography.

Because of space limitations we were unable to include a special order form in this issue. But the back covers of the April and May numbers carry an easily-detached form for your convenience. If neither is at hand, just jot down three names on a sheet of paper, enclose five dollars, and mail to *The Progressive*, Madison, Wisconsin. Your free copy of LaFollette's Autobiography will be sent to you promptly.

If you prefer, we will provide the names of new readers from lists compiled by our traveling editors and writers.

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During the summer months an unusually large number of our subscribers change their address, either temporarily or permanently. The circulation department has asked us to make an urgent appeal to subscribers to **include both the old and the new addresses when notifying us of a change.** Our subscription files are maintained geographically, and it is virtually impossible to locate a subscription record without the address.

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The Progressive makes no attempt to exact complete conformity from its contributors, but rather welcomes a variety of opinions consistent with its general policies. Signed articles, therefore, do not necessarily represent the opinion of the management of the magazine.

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Latin America: Dynamite on Our Doorstep

by Morris H. Rubin

I recently returned from a 20,000-mile journey through parts of Latin America. It was a journey of exploration and discovery, for I had never before traveled south of the border. I am not an expert on Latin America. My crash program of Spanish proved more of a hindrance than a help, so I relied largely on interpreters in my encounters with Latin Americans who knew no English. I strove diligently to overcome these handicaps by putting in long days and nights, for seven weeks, searching for the truth in this troubled and long neglected area of the world scene. I talked with hundreds of individuals on every side of every major problem, and out of it all I have distilled the report which begins on this page and runs through most of this issue of The Progressive. *I traveled in only eleven countries, among some of the islands and in Central and South America, but I believe, from my reading and my talks with more experienced students of the area, that what I have to say is, in most significant respects, representative of Latin America as a whole.*

—M.H.R.

MOST LATIN AMERICANS are born on dead-end streets and are doomed to live there until the day they die.

This is the central fact of life with which I collided almost everywhere I went on a recent journey through eleven countries south of the border. This central fact, when fused with another and newer reality—the revolution of rising expectations now surging through most of the under-privileged portions of the world—goes far to explain the explosive character of society throughout all Latin America.

Lives of grinding poverty and voiceless desperation are still the norm, but outside the drab, waterless huts where millions of Latin Americans struggle to exist, and just beyond the walls of ignorance which imprison the illiterate majority, the fuses of revolution are sputtering ever more closely.

Latin America is dynamite—some of it already exploding—right on our doorstep.

Communism and Castroism are not to blame; they are effects, rather than causes, of the deep-running discontent that has invaded and enveloped those dead-end streets throughout all the hemisphere south of the United States. Communism and Castroism are exploiting the tensions and troubles of a dying order; they did not create them.

Invasion of Cuba, even if more successful than the monumental fiasco of mid-April, will do nothing to relieve Latin America's illness.

Latin America is mortally sick because of its own failures—and our neglect. Latin America, whose 200,000,000 people occupy a rich land mass more than two-and-a-half times that of the United States, is plagued by one-crop economies, crippled by dependence on exports, riddled by illiteracy, hunger, and disease, afflicted with shockingly low per capita incomes, harried by mounting inflation and falling world prices, rampant with tax evasion, and most of all torn asunder between the few enormously rich who usually control the country and the once silent but now stirring poor.

Consider some of the cold statistics:

Less than two per cent of the people of Latin America own more than fifty per cent of all its wealth. In Chile, for example, one per cent of the people control forty-three per cent of the land. In Paraguay five per cent of the farm units account for ninety-four per cent of the total acreage.

Eighty per cent of the people have nothing but the dreary shacks in which they huddle, often on the unpredictable suffrance of the government or the wealthy landowning class that owns them.

Per capita income in Central

America ranges from a high of $320 per year in literate, relatively prosperous Costa Rica to $186 per year in dungeon-like Nicaragua.

During 1960, Latin Americans, most of them already underprivileged, increased in population five times more rapidly than they increased their total production of goods and services.

Illiteracy is appallingly high, averaging more than fifty per cent for all Latin Americans of reading age, and reaching eighty-nine per cent in the dictatorship of Haiti and seventy per cent in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Honduras. The United Nations has estimated that Latin America needs 500,000 more primary teachers and as many new classrooms if it is to make primary education available for the 19,000,000 children waiting to begin their education.

More than half the people of Latin America are undernourished, more than half suffer from some infectious or dietary disease, more than half do not sleep in beds, and more than half are working—when they work—under semi-feudal conditions of land tenancy that provide no escape corridor to a better and more hopeful life.

Most Latin Americans go through life beyond the reach of a doctor or nurse or pharmacist.

The impoverished countries of Latin America are saddled with staggering budgets for military operations — ranging as high as fifty per cent — in large measure because of U. S. pressure to build an anti-Communist force. In the dictatorships, the military establishment has little if any part to play in "stopping Communism;" it is used to keep the people in check.

Latin American population doubled from 1920 to 1956 and is increasing now at the rate of 2.5 per cent a year — highest in the world.

The average life expectancy is less than forty-five years. In the United States it is seventy.

But these statistics cannot begin to tell the whole story. They cannot chronicle the despair that lives in the dingy hovels, or the enormous gulf between the ruling oligarchies that dwell in luxurious splendor and the rest of mankind in Latin America, or the bitterness with which so many contemplate the vast profits earned by foreign investors exploiting the rich natural resources of these countries, or tell of the brilliant facades of the great cities of Latin America that conceal the heartbreaking reality of the misery of the mass of people.

Nor do these statistics reveal that social and economic conditions are

deteriorating still further even now. United Nations specialists recently concluded a survey showing that Latin American food production is lagging behind growing needs; that no sustained economic development is currently in sight; and that its rapid growth is becoming unmanageable. With a few exceptions, like Costa Rica and Mexico, and our commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Latin Americans can expect for the rest of this year lower production, higher inflation, declining income, more poverty and suffering—in short, almost every ingredient of the dynamite that the Communists dearly love to play with.

What is urgently needed in Latin America is a new social structure, for in most of the countries south of the border the prevailing structure is hopelessly out of date and seems little more than an economic treadmill. It cannot endure, as Senator Mike Mansfield, one of the Senate's foremost authorities on Latin America, has pointed out, for the simple reason that it does not deliver enough education, enough food, shelter, and clothing, enough medical care, enough of the conveniences of life, and, most important of all, "it does not provide for a sufficient number of people that intangible but essential element of prideful participation in the present and hope for the future which are the keystones of political stability."

Most of all, the present structure of society is not producing a pool of trained and educated personnel to staff the multitude of technical and administrative positions demanded in any progressive reform, however modest.

Almost everywhere I traveled I encountered an awakening consciousness of the urgent need for more schools and teachers, but the pace of progress is pitifully slow, except in Cuba, where I saw a push-button dictatorship order and get action in a hurry. Elsewhere in Latin America, children reach school age faster than schools are built and teachers are trained to accommodate those who have been waiting their turn for from one to ten years. "Each year," said a Guatemalan official, "Latin America falls farther behind in meeting the need for schools and teachers."

The slow pace is in large measure the direct consequence of resistance by the ruling oligarchies to paying higher but more equitable taxes. The young democracies are still too weak to enforce their enlightened will on the powerful elite of wealthy landowners and urban entrepreneurs. And in the dictatorships I visited, aside from Cuba—Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua — little thought and even less money go into the building of new schools. "Most of our children cannot even aspire to enter the first grade," a Haitian business man told me.

The United States has contributed little to the development of this vital sector of the social community. The whole subject of U. S. assistance is a raw sore with most articulate Latin Americans. They feel, and quite rightly, that they have been shamefully neglected since the end of World War II. The statistics tell the story: Latin America has received less than three per cent of the total aid the United States has given around the world from July, 1945, to July, 1960. Europe received 41.1 per cent, the Far East, 17.2 per cent, and the Near East, 11.3 per cent.

These figures help to explain the deep-running resentment throughout Latin America over U. S. neglect of her southern neighbors. "You have persisted in taking us for grant-

ed," a foreign minister complained to me. Said another Latin American official: "For a decade you have behaved toward us like a cold-blooded banker interested only in his profit."

Even more fundamental than the general indictment of indifference, neglect, and, sometimes, arrogance, is the more specific charge — and well documented it is — that the United States, especially under the Eisenhower Administration, either ignored or actually opposed the recent historic surge toward democracy in strategic areas of Latin America. Jose Figueres, former President of Costa Rica and one of the wisest statesmen in Latin America, a warm and devoted friend of the United States, put it to me this way:

"One of the great tragedies of the recent past was the way the United States turned its back on the rising tide of democracy in Latin America. We have had a genuine democratic revolution in major areas of the hemisphere, but the United States was cold and indifferent when it was not in fact opposing the rise of free government to replace tyranny. You preferred to play with the dictators, and I do not think it would be too much to say that much of what we have achieved in replacing dictatorship with democracy, we have achieved *despite* the United States.

"You were decorating the dictators with medals and awards when we were fighting for freedom, and worst of all, your people in some of the embassies and in Washington blackened the reputation of some of our best men, who were fighting for democracy and social reform, by calling them Communists when, in fact, they were just the opposite. Merely because they stood for agrarian reform, social security, and the like, you called them Communists, and thereby made their task more difficult, and incidentally, helped the Communists by identifying them with the reform so many demand so urgently."

I was to encounter this point of view everywhere I went in Latin America among articulate, enlightened spokesmen for democratic social reform. In several countries they complained passionately that Americans, in government and business, had little contact with anyone except the ruling clique that cracked a brutal whip over the masses of people.

The business administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower, and its representatives in some of our embassies in Latin America, often could not distinguish between genuine social reform under democratic controls and the total regimentation of Communism — they could not distinguish the difference between the non-Communist left and the Party line.

We have paid a staggering price for this blindness. We have paid a high price, too, for our wretched failure to encourage, support, and identify ourselves with the recent march of democracy in Latin America—an historic movement away from dictatorship toward free government—which is one of the most significant developments of life in the recent history of Latin America. A Colombian professional man who sees the U. S. press quoted approvingly from a recent statement by Adlai Stevenson: "The Eisenhower Administration was basically concerned with making Latin America safe for American business, not for democracy."

Much of this mood is changing now, although slowly. Everywhere in Latin America, except in Cuba, there is—or at least was, until the abortive invasion of Cuba in April — deep satisfaction with President Kennedy's initial utterances on the problems south of the border and his new appointments to key diplomatic posts. "He knows the difference between a Social Democrat and a Communist," one Venezuelan diplomat commented hopefully. "Mr. Kennedy wants us to be a neighbor and partner, not a poor relation," exulted a Colombian technician. "He is appointing men who know Spanish and know and understand and sympathize with the plight of Latin Americans," said a Panamanian official with deep satisfaction.

Herblock in The Washington Post

"No More Manana, Senor"

But far and away the greatest influence on the changing U. S. attitude toward Latin America is the fact of Castro's Cuba. "Thank God for Castro!"—I heard that refrain over and over again in my travels, often from moderates and conservatives who meant simply that the Cuban revolution had succeeded in frightening the United States into paying attention to Latin America's problems for the first time in more than a decade, and emphasizing in the United States the urgent need for social reforms to prevent, with American assistance, violent revolution—and perhaps Communist-style dictatorship.

Latin Americans know, moreover, that we recently decided to make $500,000,000 available for Western Hemisphere development only because we were alarmed by the inroads of Castroism. And we know it, too. Senator Mike Mansfield said in August, 1960:

"It is no secret, after all, that we are engaged in a serious and bitter dispute with Cuba at this time. It is no secret that this dispute is to be aired with the other American Republics . . . within a matter of days . . . I am positive that the Administration had no desire to tie together the two matters . . .We must ask ourselves, in all honesty, how does this coincidence look to the rest of the hemisphere? . . . It looks like a callous attempt to purchase favor . . . It suggests that dollars, are being dangled before Latin America in the same manner that the Russians of late have been waving rubles before Cuba."

But whatever the reason, Latin America desperately seeks aid from

the United States. And its people are convinced they are entitled to it. Dr. Ezequiel Padilla, the distinguished Mexican statesman and diplomat who has served his country in the cabinet and as ambassador, expressed it this way:

"In the development of the wealth and industrial progress of the United States there is incorporated the work, the life, the contribution of entire generations of Latin American laborers to produce in agricultural fields and from the bottom of the mines the raw materials indispensable to North American industry. Millions of our poor people have worked hard and suffered greatly for decades to contribute to the economic expansion of the United States. It is, then, not difficult to understand that Latin America resents the lack of continental economic policy to organize production, prices, and the industrialization of our united peoples, so that those who make sacrifices may receive a corresponding share of the benefits."

American business interests have made fabulous profits in Latin America — usually at the expense of downtrodden native labor — but a new type of American businessman is appearing on the Latin American scene. His breed is not yet numerous, but he holds out genuine hope that, side by side with newly enlightened U. S. government policy, he will play a far more constructive role in the life of Latin America than has been true until now.

Because he seems to me to represent this moderately hopeful new development in the business community, I want to record briefly the observations and experiences of John F. Gallagher, vice president for foreign administration of Sears, Roebuck & Company.

Gallagher had lived in Venezuela for three years when the hated dictatorship of Perez Jimenez was overthrown in 1958. The United States had not only befriended but also decorated the brutal dictator. When he fell, a great wave of pent-up anti-Americanism swept over Venezuela. Gallagher was there when Vice President and Mrs. Nixon were spit upon and stoned by hysterical mobs who hated the Eisenhower Administration for aiding and honoring one of the most vicious and corrupt tyrants in the long and bloody history of their country.

The Sears, Roebuck executive stayed on during the year of provisional government and into the first year of the democratic regime of President Betancourt. Here, in essence, is how he tells the story of that roaring period:

"During those last two years, we did a great deal of soul-searching for the answer to the violent anti-Americanism that was a part of this transition from dictatorship to democracy. We talked with Venezuelans of all walks of life to get their opinion and reactions. We found that they were disturbed because the U.S. government had decorated and praised the Dictator Perez Jimenez. They resented his being permitted to enter and live in the United States.

"They did not understand our great concern over Communism and our apparent lack of concern over their social and economic problems. They questioned whether many U. S. companies and individual Americans had the best interests of Venezuela at heart — and used as examples, American lack of understanding of Venezuelan history and culture, lack of Spanish language training, lack of social interchange, lack of contact with the people of Venezuela. They also complained about U. S. restrictions on the importation into the United States of

their main export product — oil.

"We listened, and at first we were quite resentful over what appeared to be many inaccurate views of our attitudes and beliefs — and at the apparent lack of appreciation for the contribution that most businessmen believed their companies had made to Venezuela.

"Our thinking was clarified one day when one of the Americans who had lived in Venezuela for many years said: 'Perhaps we should look at this situation through their eyes. Suppose that we were natives of the state of Texas and that cattle raising was the state's main industry. Let us assume that the cattle industry was owned and managed by 40,000 Venezuelans who were living in Texas in a very comfortable manner as compared with the majority of us. And then,' he asked, 'do you suppose that we hypothetical natives of Texas would have been considerate and courteous to those Venezuelans as they have been to us over the years that we have lived and worked in their country?'.

"As we studied the situation further, we found that there was much that we could do."

Out of this creative searching by Gallagher and his associates came a deepening awareness of the need to share with Venezuelans, to get to know them better, and to help them in person-to-person activities. American business men subscribed more than $200,000 the first year to finance two hundred projects designed to improve understanding, foster friendship, provide scholarships and recreational opportunities for Venezuelan youth, and make available affirmative materials on democracy and free enterprise to the communications media of the country.

The program is significant in reflecting a changing point of view among some American businessmen in Latin America, and the Venezuelan concept has been exported to other Latin American countries. The State Department approves because the establishment of such projects is viewed as potentially helpful in the struggle against Communism — although the program itself is carefully set forth as an affirmative action and not specifically anti-anything or anybody.

It would be pleasant to be able to report that the concept is flourishing, but this would not be accurate. It is achieving modest results in Venezuela, but I talked with both Americans and Latin Americans who felt that in too many cases the program, however well-meaning, is hemmed in by goals that are both too limited and unappealing to Latin Americans. Richard Dudman, who

has recently roamed nearly all of Latin America for the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch*, had greater opportunities to observe the program than I did, and he came up with just about the same conclusion.

"Despite its emphasis on good works and cultural exchanges," he reported, "the program's real motive seems to be to protect private property against expropriation and against additional taxation and labor legislation.

"The concepts of free enterprise and 'people's capitalism,' however attractive they may sound in the United States, have little appeal in Latin America. Those who have turned against Fidel Castro because of ties with international Communism and his police state methods nonetheless often tend to sympathize with his seizure of foreign investments.

"Preference for dictatorship and distrust of democracy as applied to Latin America is a belief that runs strongly through American business communities in these countries. The private opinion is heard repeatedly that business was better under [Dictators] Perez Jimenez in Venezuela, Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, and Manuel Ordia in Peru."

There are distinguished exceptions, to be sure, like Gallagher of Sears — and Thomas J. Watson, president of International Business Machines Corporation — who see the compelling need for social reform for Latin America. But, unhappily, too many other U.S. businessmen are so short-sighted as to be unable to grasp the essential fact that democratic social reform is the swiftest and surest way to build stable, viable economies that can stand up against the promises and threats of Communism and Castroism.

Moderately left-wing democratic parties like *Accion Democratica* in Venezuela and the Liberal Party of Colombia are clearly our best bets against violence and extremism, but their reform programs are "socialist poison" to many American businessmen who are unable to distinguish between democratic reform and regimented Communism.

In clinging to right-wing concepts in left-wing countries, the American business community plays squarely into the hands of the Communists and *Fidelistas*, who are quick to exploit this American resistance to urgently needed reforms. Moreover, by opposing these democratic social reform movements, U.S. business interests find themselves aligned with the



detested wealthy elite who are forever maneuvering for a return of rightist-army dictatorship to "maintain order," which in their terms is best translated, "Keep the profits flowing and the people pauperized."

In the showdown struggle with Communism — and its current ally, Castroism — time is not on our side, except as Communism and Castroism play into our hands with self-defeating excesses. I returned from my Latin American travels with the conviction that Fidel Castro's stock has slumped sharply in all the countries I visited, but it has not evaporated, as some wishful-thinkers would have us believe.

There are rumblings that are deep and persistent as millions of Latin Americans yearn to vault their way from Sixteenth Century feudalism to Twentieth Century opportunity. Victims of conquest and colonialism for half a millenium; victims, too, of corrosive poverty, hunger, and disease: they are stirring restlessly, unsure of their direction, but determined to do better for themselves and for their children — by whatever name the change is known.

As a people who have nothing to lose, least of all hope, Latin Americans are not scared by terms like "Communism" or "Castroism." They are interested in results. The emphasis of U.S. business interests and diplomats on "free enterprise" leaves them absolutely cold.

Ironically, the appeals of Communism make greater headway among those for whom life has grown somewhat better in recent years, for they now have the means and the media through which to listen and observe. Dudman put it well when he wrote: "This opportunity for the Communists comes, not when grinding poverty is at its worst, but as roads are built, literacy spreads, radios and newspapers reach rural villages, peasants move to the city, an occasional student has a chance to enter a university — in short, as people learn of a better life and hope to achieve it."

The first stage of emancipation from feudalism is a delicate and dangerous one. The people have the means to know of a better life, and impatient as they are and have a right to be, they are easily intoxicated by the dazzling allure of short-cuts as preached by the Communists. It is only if the next step is taken quickly enough — the adoption of meaningful agrarian reform, the passage of hope-instilling social legislation for urban workers, and the development of a middle class with a genuine stake in society — that the new order can be stabilized along democratic lines.

This, of course, is precisely what the Communists oppose. Except when the party line changes temporarily and they become identified briefly with popular front movements, the Communists, like so many of our American business interests, oppose the agrarian and social reforms of the moderately left regimes in countries like Colombia and Venezuela. The Communists insist these reforms do not go far enough; the American business community is convinced they go too far.

The Communists are bent on frustrating every evolutionary approach to the problem of Latin America. This is their immediate goal — to keep chaos alive and hunger widespread — until they can be strong enough to maneuver for power. Often, precisely because they are so opposed to reform, Communists are secretly invited into

positions of power in the government or in the labor unions, such as they are, by the surviving tyrants of Latin America.

The Communists in Latin America, as elsewhere, are indefatigable workers, dedicated souls—and cynical manipulators with an immense capacity for sacrificing means to ends. Their devotion to the cause is staggering — and enviable. They draw heavily from the restless and idealistic youth of Latin America, from older intellectuals, and from the more impatient individuals in the labor and agrarian reform movements. They do not spin the complicated theories of Marxist ideology to the untutored ears of peasants and workers, but rather proclaim themselves a force for radical reform, holding out hope to the impoverished masses by preaching land reform, social justice, progressive taxation, industrialization, and anti-Americanism.

This last ingredient of the Communist appeal, anti-Americanism, is pressed on the Latin Americans with relentless fury. Every fault of American diplomacy and American business enterprise — and, unhappily, there have been many — is exaggerated and exacerbated by the Communists, often with telling effect. Communists, for example, have made great capital of the abortive "invasion" of Cuba in April. The story of how our Central Intelligence Agency financed and directed the crude attempt to destroy Castroism has been graphically presented as a new and chilling episode of "Yankee imperialism."

Numerically, the Communists do not represent great power. Senator Wayne Morse's Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Latin American affairs recently estimated that there are about 225,000 members of the Communist Party in a total Latin American population of nearly 200,000,000 — a substantial decline below the total of a decade ago. But several Latin American officials warned me against assuming that this meant a significant decline in Communist strength.

"Their tactic at the moment," said one well-informed Venezuelan who once followed the party line, "is to function with rather small, highly organized, well-disciplined, tightly controlled units that are extremely active and mobile. Many of them have been trained in the school of Marxist-Leninism in Moscow. They move swiftly, and sometimes effectively — through printed propaganda, their influence in certain labor unions, and other means — to oppose effective social reforms that might give the people a feeling that they belonged and were wanted and could hope to improve their lives. The Communists seem rather well financed, especially considering how few sources they can tap for money here in Latin America."

A priest in one of the countries I visited — a genuine social reformer in the democratic spirit — emphasized a theme I was to hear recurringly on my journey. "The Communists," he said, "have developed a Latin American strategy that is simplicity itself. Their immediate goal is to prevent the passage or effective implementation of agrarian reform, labor legislation, social security, and educational expansion. By doing this, they hope to create or magnify tensions and discontent to the explosive point where the right-wing and military forces will take over to 'maintain order and stabilize the country.' This is what they want — right-wing, military dictatorship of the Batista type in Cuba. Then they will be ready for their longer-range goal, which is to launch a Castro-type guerrilla warfare in the mountains and the villages that would culminate in a Castro-style society closely aligned with Moscow.

"The Communists know they are not strong enough to move directly now. They know that genuine social reform would bar their way to power, for the people would then not listen to them. So they sabotage reform, maneuver secretly for rightist dictatorship, and hope this will pave the way for their revolution. Remember, and tell your friends in the States, that if rightist, military dictatorship comes to power again in Latin America, the people's hopes for democratic reform will be crushed, and they will turn, because there will be no place else to turn, to the extreme left of Communism or Castroism."

Castro is still regarded affectionately by a fair number of Latin Americans as a bearded Robin Hood who steals from the rich to feed the poor. He is admired among those who have grievances against the United States, some of them legitimate, for the aggressive manner in which he talks back to the giant of the north. He is acclaimed in some quarters for the speed and thoroughness with which he has achieved his kind of agrarian reform, built schools and homes, destroyed the ruling oligarchy, and broadened the distribution of Cuba's wealth. And more recently, he has won applause for repelling the invasion financed and directed by the Goliath of the north.

Castro's admirers, however, do not constitute a majority, or anything near it, now. There was a time when the revolutionist and what he stood for commanded the support of some ninety per cent of the people of Latin America. Less than two years ago Castro was doubtless the most popular public figure in Latin America. But the excesses of the Castro regime — its firing squads, suppression of liberties, and tight ties with the Kremlin — have taken a steady toll, especially of the moderate left. For example, leaders of democratic left parties met recently in Lima and resolved that Cuba's "revolutionary process, justified at the beginning, has been deflated by its present agents, converting a brother country into an instrument of the cold war, separating it, with suicidal premeditation, from the community of interests of the Latin American people."

While Castro's following has now shriveled to a small fraction of its earlier strength, Castroism retains a great potential in Latin America. If the moderate left is not allowed to press forward with its reform program; if Latin America fails *soon* to put its house in order; and if the United States continues to neglect Latin America, right-wing military dictatorship could take over again and Castroism could once more become the symbol of hope for the common man of Latin America.

A Mexican saying sums it all up: "Eat first and be a Christian afterward."



THE TRAGEDY OF CUBA

NO COUNTRY in Latin America has progressed so rapidly in the past two years in the social and economic fields as has Cuba. No country in Latin America has retrogressed so rapidly in the past two years in the fields of individual freedom and civil liberties as has Cuba.

This is a two-sentence summary of what I saw and heard in Cuba during my travel there this spring. I spent nearly three weeks in Castro's Cuba, traveling some 2,000 miles by car through five of the six provinces of yellow-green fields and blue-green mountains caressed by a friendly sun. I talked with hundreds of people, both pro- and anti-Castro. I inspected factories, state-owned farms, private farms, schools, hospitals, stores, government agencies, military barracks, and homes.

I was treated everywhere by everyone with unfailing courtesy and kindness. In those three weeks and 2,000 miles, no one laid a rough hand on me. I discovered early that *"Cuba si, Yanqui no"* is a slogan in the abstract designed to convey total rejection of American corporate domination of Cuba, not of Americans as people. Two experiences may help illuminate this point:

On the day I arrived in Havana, I was told there would be a student demonstration at the Belgian Embassy to protest the murder of Patrice Lumumba. I went to the embassy by taxi. When we reached the scene of the demonstration, a swirling mob of teen-agers surrounded my cab, waving fists and shouting insults. Some of the leaders began to rock the car. It was a most unpleasant feeling. My driver locked me in the car and went out to talk to the leaders. It turned out that they thought I was a member of the Belgian Embassy staff. When they heard I was an American journalist interested in finding out the truth about Cuba, their wrath turned to smiles; they invited me to come out and meet them, and when I did, they asked me to head their picketing procession. I declined with thanks, but I chatted with them for an hour. They were anxious to make amends for their earlier behavior, determined to tell me about their "glorious revolution," and eager to get the names of potential pen-pals in the United States with whom they could correspond "so we can tell your people the truth about us."

Days later, in the central province of Camaguay, I attended a mass-meeting at which the principal speaker was the provincial leader of the agrarian reform program. A young, handsome man, who had fought and been wounded in the revolution, he embarked at once on a fiery tirade against North American imperialism. The crowd loved it. When the program ended, the people in the hall snake-danced their way out, chanting *"Cuba si, Yanqui no."* I was slightly alarmed and wanted to melt into the walls. I thought there might be trouble if they spotted me as a *Yanqui*. They spotted me all right, as they passed me, but they grinned and winked as if to say, "Don't take this personally." I was taken to the platform to meet and talk with the speaker. Perspiration was still rolling down his face after his frenzied effort. But he embraced me, Latin style, told me the province was mine to explore any way I wanted to, and he pleaded with me to send more Americans "so that more of you can see and understand our revolution."

This pattern of cordiality prevailed throughout all my travels in Castro's Cuba. Whenever and wherever my driver and I stopped to ask directions or inquire about a suitable hotel, the word would pass quickly that an *Americano* was in the car, and a crowd of people would collect quickly, all of them eager to be friendly and all of them reluctant to part with me.

In this respect, Cuba was much like the Iron Curtain countries in which I have traveled. The people of Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany were most kind and cordial to me when I visited those countries several years ago—despite the relentless barrage of anti-Americanism loosed on them by press and politicians. In Cuba, the grin and the wink that accompanied *"Cuba si, Yanqui no"* told much the same story. People simply refuse to hate, especially the sunny people of sun-drenched Cuba, many of whom have happy relatives in the United States.

The fact that Cubans do not accept Fidel Castro's anti-Americanism does not mean they do not accept Fidel Castro. They do. Or at least a solid majority does. This is one of

the few facts about Cuba of which I am unshakably confident. Certainly the failure of the recent abortive invasion to spark uprising within Cuba confirms the depth of Castro's support.

Everywhere I asked the question—"How large a following does Castro command after two years of defections and disillusionment?" The answers varied greatly, but I came away with the conclusion that Castro still holds the support of some fifty-five to sixty per cent of the Cuban people. He is weakest in Havana and other urban centers where the middle class is being destroyed through expropriation and nationalization; the cities are hotbeds of anti-Castro counter-revolutionary sentiment. But out in the small towns and villages and along the rippling fields of sugar cane, where Castro has brought homes and work—and most of all, hope—there is militant enthusiasm, and something resembling love, for the curious character who leads the Cubans.

Why? How does one account for Castro's hold on the majority if everything or anything we read in the American press is true? The first answer, of course, is that our press has done a miserable job of reporting Cuba. Herbert Matthews of the New York *Times* said it all in a frequently quoted observation: "In my thirty years on the New York *Times* I have never seen a big story so misunderstood, so badly handled, and so misinterpreted as the Cuban revolution."

I talked with virtually all the American correspondents in Havana—and the correspondents of Canadian, British, and German newspapers as well. I came away convinced that they are far more torn by doubt about Castro's Cuba than their dispatches would indicate. For example, one correspondent who has been strongly anti-Castro in his commentaries confessed he was confused, that there was much good mixed with the bad, although he emphasized the latter in his reports "because that's what they seem to want back home."

Typical of press coverage of Cuba before the April invasion was this depressing incident:

Cuba's Foreign Minister Roa sent a note to the various Latin American embassies. The note contained the usual tirades against North American imperialism, but the heart of its contents was a plea to the Latin American governments to use their good offices to explore the prospect of negotiations between Cuba and the United States.

An American correspondent heard of the note forty-eight hours before it was released to the public. He cabled a story to his newspaper, emphasizing the revival of official Cuban sentiment for negotiation with the United States. But the newspaper killed the story, preferring for its Cuban coverage that day a wire service report that two Catholic nuns had been arrested and detained for six hours. The management of the newspaper cabled its Havana correspondent a sour message pointing out that it was not especially interested in interpretative stories of the kind filed on Cuban willingness to negotiate—although it was a clear scoop on a story that was to break in all the papers in a day or two—and that it was interested only in "hard, headlineable news"—stories of bombs going off or nuns being arrested by Castro's police.

American press and radio management has made clear it prefers stories of violence and defection to interpretative reports of social and economic progress in Cuba—or Cuba's

occasional desire to talk things over with the United States with the view to reaching a settlement of outstanding differences. For what it seems to want out of Cuba, the American press would do better to staff its Havana offices with police reporters rather than with foreign correspondents.

Perhaps the best explanation of Castro's hold on the majority of Cubans comes from an enlightend, thoroughly anti-Castro American business tycoon, Thomas J. Watson, Jr., president of the International Business Machines Corporation. Speaking to the Life Insurance Association of America earlier this year, Watson said:

"Castro took a group of hungry and illiterate Cubans—most of the population—and offered them something better than was being provided by the five per cent of the population that was governing Cuba under Batista. The five per cent, who should have been spending part of their time finding ways and means of making the lives of the people broader and more fruitful, were actually involved in rigidly controlling the wealth of the country and serving their own selfish interests.

"Our own policy toward Cuba has been a stagnant policy of doing very little and hoping to have a government there oriented in a friendly way toward the United States."

So friendly were the dictatorships of Cuba to American business interests that by 1956 the United States controlled eighty per cent of the Cuban public utilities, ninety per cent of the mines, ninety per cent of the cattle ranches, forty per cent of the sugar industry, and, with the British, virtually one hundred per cent of the oil industry. Profits ranged up to twenty-three per cent per year—one hundred per cent of the investment in little more than four years.

And so friendly was the American government to the Cuban dictators that at least one, bloody Batista, who killed more than 20,000 Cubans, was acutely embarrassed by the U.S. ambassador's gestures of affection and adoration.

The ambassador was Arthur Gardner, a businessman who was selected by President Eisenhower to be our ambassador to Cuba as a thank-you gesture for campaign assistance. Gardner was so effusive in showing his veneration for Batista that the dictator squirmed in embarrassment. R. Hart Phillips, long-time New York *Times* correspondent, wrote in her book, *Cuba: Island of Paradox*, that Batista said on one occasion: "I'm glad Ambassador Gardner approves of my government, but I wish

he wouldn't talk about it so much." Gardner was photographed one day hugging Francisco Tabernilla, Batista's butcher-murderer.

Gardner's successor, Earl E. T. Smith, was thought at first to represent a basic change in U.S. policy toward Batista. But just at the moment when Cuban public opinion veered sharply toward Fidel Castro, then fighting his way through the Sierra Maestra mountains, Smith decided to embrace Batista. In the last months of his tenure the American ambassador tried desperately but vainly to arrange an election under Batista's auspices which was widely considered a cloak to maintain the substance of Batista's fall.

It is noteworthy in this connection that although we were released from our obligation by mutual agreement, the United States continued to pour arms into Batista's military establishment until March, 1958—Batista fell in January, 1959—and that even after cutting off aid, our military mission stayed on, training Batista forces until the very end, thus in great measure wiping out the effect of the arms embargo.

Castro's triumph over Batista was well received in the United States. Today he is widely and deeply detested in the United States as a sinister charlatan who has betrayed his promises and sold his country into bondage to the dark forces of Communism.

What happened in these two short years? No one who pores over the record, it seems to me, can escape the judgment that there is blame enough for both sides, although one would suspect from reading the American press that Castro & Company are wholly at fault, just as one would be convinced from reading the Cuban press that the United States is solely responsible for the present miserable situation.

As recently as last fall, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., one of our ablest and most thoughtful students of Latin America and currently President Kennedy's task force chief south of the border, wrote in *Foreign Affairs:*

"Factually, for a substantial period of time, the aggregate morale of the Cuban revolution was *democratic, anti-dictatorial, and anti-Communist.* That force *could and should have been encouraged, canalized, and in the hour of its success, given every assistance.* A liberal democracy as well as drastic social reform was what Cuba wanted when it revolted against Batista. It is what a great majority of Cubans want now." (Emphasis added.)

Herblock in The Washington Post

"Cuba Si, Yanqui Nyet!—Oops—"

But the U.S. government did nothing—absolutely nothing—to encourage, canalize, and assist the Cuban revolution in its democratic, anti-dictatorial, anti-Communist first phase.

The melancholy story begins in April, 1959, three months after the victorious entrance of the revolutionary forces into Havana. Fidel Castro decided to pay a visit to the United States. We proceeded to commit our first fatal mistake. President Eisenhower, who thought there was something unclean about Castro and his crowd, decided to get out of town when Castro reached Washington in order to avoid receiving him.

This was the same President who had pampered Latin American dictators and lavished decorations on them, the same President who had gone hundreds of miles out of his way to shake Franco's bloody hand. Here was a visitor then at the high tide of his popularity, acclaimed throughout all Latin America as the greatest hero since Bolivar, and yet the President skipped town when he reached Washington.

Castro was not even formally received by the State Department—on the idiotic pretext that his visit was not official. I have talked with Cuban counter-revolutionaries in New York City, Washington, and Miami who insist that Castro secretly preferred to have it that way, that he was even then anti-American and preferred to go home an empty-handed martyr. Ernest Betancourt, then strongly devoted to Castro but now a militant rebel, told me, for example, that he accompanied Castro on his trip to Washington and had the next hotel room. "Fidel didn't want to be received formally, and he was determined not to seem to be a lackey of American capitalism. He balked for a time at going even to such functions as had been planned for him, and conducted himself in every way as a man who didn't want to get along with the Americans."

This may be true. However, an American correspondent who covered Castro during his entire American visit does not believe this version of Castro's attitude is accurate. "At the very least," he told me, "It is exaggerated. Castro was not that standoffish. Each side was waiting for the other to make the first move on the all-important question of loans. It was a sort of comic opera affair, or more properly, Greek tragedy, because neither would move. The result was disastrous for all concerned."

This, clearly, was the moment to which Berle referred when he contended that we should have encouraged, canalized, and assisted the revolution when it was still democratic, anti-dictatorial, and anti-Communist. But we did nothing but express a series of nagging complaints as the revolution took shape and it became clear that drastic reforms were to be undertaken—some that were long overdue but which might disturb the sanctity of the twenty-three per cent profits of American investors.

The need for reform, or more accurately, revolution, was great and urgent. Under Batista's corrupt regime, a small number of wealthy landowners, powerful entrepreneurs, and foreign investors lived in royal luxury while the rest of the 6,500,000 Cubans, except for a modest if growing middle class, barely managed on the ragged edge of subsistence. Under Batista's crooked tyranny, twenty-five per cent of the people were per-

manently unemployed, nearly thirty-five per cent were illiterate and another one-third semi-literate, and nearly fifty per cent were plagued by disease and malnutrition.

A one-crop economy—sugar—provided only three to four months employment during the year for tens of thousands of *campesinos* who spent the rest of the year struggling to stay alive on what they had earned in the cane fields. The glittering but vulgar facade of Havana, with its lush hotels, gambling casinos, lavish restaurants, and luxurious houses of prostitution, concealed from most American tourists the grim realities of absentee landlordism, almost profitless sharecropping, gouging company stores, and the brutality of a corrupt soldiery trained in the ways of torture. "A man," said Thomas Wolfe in the Washington *Post*, looking back on the Batista period, "might have to go three miles for water . . . forty miles for a doctor, and ten miles to bury the dead. He had no radio and no daily newspaper. There were no schools and no church. . . . The government did nothing but harass you with soldiers, rural guards, and taxes."

Many thousands of acres of tillable land—seventy-three per cent, in fact—were not cultivated but were denied to those who longed to have a piece of land of their own. There was, according to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, "a pent-up mass hunger for land, understandable in a country where less than one-tenth of one per cent of the farmers own one-fifth of all agricultural land, and eight per cent own seventy per cent of the land."

Dependence on the one crop of sugar was staggering: more than one-third of the nation's gross national production and more than eighty per cent of its exports were involved. Equally significant was Cuba's dependence on one country, the United States. This country has traditionally taken sixty to seventy per cent of Cuban exports and supplied seventy to eighty per cent of Cuban imports. In fact, this little island country became our sixth largest customer. As Senator John F. Kennedy, then a Presidential candidate, pointed out last fall, American investors dominated the Cuban economy—and, I add, controlled it and shaped it to their purposes.

Adolf Berle summed it up when he said that the chief result of the economic relationship between the United States and Cuba was "great luxury for a relatively small group

in Havana and a small rise above the starvation level for the masses." Herbert Matthews of the New York *Times* noted that another result was the development within the Cuban people of a strong sense of being a colony of the United States.

This last point is far more significant than most Americans realize. Almost every Cuban I encountered, whether pro- or anti-Castro, expressed resentment over the colonial status assigned Cuba by the United States. They are ruffled by the fact that the United States claims credit for victory in the Spanish-American War, whereas they believe we entered the war when it was already won and almost ended. They resent even more deeply the fact that we refused to let Cuba be represented at the peace treaty in Paris, and that we subsequently foisted on them the Platt Amendment, which assigned the United States the right to intervene in the affairs of Cuba whenever it felt that Cuban independence or "the maintenance of government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty" was threatened.

Under the Platt Amendment we intervened three times with military forces, usually to protect property, never to preserve individual liberty. The Platt Amendment was abrogated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1934, as part of his Good Neighbor Policy, but our economic control remained unshaken. Sidney Lens, an unusually able observer and interpreter who visited Cuba recently, had this to say by way of summary:

"The effects of our materialist policy were two-fold: on the one hand it created a class of corrupt Cuban politicians and hangers-on who looted the country and kept it stagnant; on the other, it kept the great mass mired in poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and disease. Only nine per cent of rural homes had electricity, only two per cent inside piping for water, only three per cent toilets. . . . In the farm sections ninety per cent of the people suffered from worm diseases . . . dysentery or anemia."

This landscape of what Cuba was like under Batista should help Americans understand why so many Cubans responded to Castro's revolution; why an initial force of only twelve men, eventually increased to 6,000, was able to triumph over Batista's army of 46,000 men trained and equipped by the United States; why Cuba's middle class, which was eventually to be destroyed by Castro's revolution, supported him enthusiastically until its own doom was decreed by the Marxist turn of events.

What precisely was this Marxist turn of events and what caused it? Here the traveler runs into a mass of conflicting testimony which ranges from Cuba's best-foot-forward, homegrown socialism with a Marxist tinge, to the official U.S. position, as expressed in a recent "White Paper" of the State Department, that Cuba today is a Soviet-style dictatorship influenced if not dominated by the Kremlin.

The facts are hard to come by. My own judgment, after wrestling with the problem for several weeks and after hearing and reading just about everything said and published by both sides, is three-fold:

One—On the social and economic level, Castro's Cuba has borrowed heavily from Marxism, but has transplanted the seeds it borrowed to Cuban soil, with the result that it is a domestic, Cuban variety of the original seed.

Two—In the area of individual freedom and civil liberties, the Cubans emulate almost completely the Soviet pattern of total suppression and regimentation.

Three—Much of what has happened under points one and two, which most Americans despise, are in part the direct consequence of hostile American policy toward the Cuban revolution when it was still, in Berle's words again, "democratic, an-

ti-dictatorial, and anti-Communist."

I want now to examine these points.

Adolf Berle's conviction that the first phase of the Cuban revolution was democratic and anti-Communist is paralleled by his equally firm insistence that the current phase is totalitarian, collectivist, and pro-Communist. "For all practical purposes, Cuba is just as much a Communist satellite as Hungary or North Korea," he has said. "I mean that a few Communists, or men controlled by them, whose policies and tactics are directed either by Moscow or Peking . . . are in control of Cuba's resources, its territory, and its voiceless people."

The AFL-CIO, through its executive council, has asserted that "the latest manifestations of the Castro regime have revealed unmistakable signs of a definite trend toward a totalitarian state. . . . The destructive activities of the Cuban government can no longer be lightly dismissed as the outburst of inexperienced youthful leaders swept by the upsurge of economic nationalism. They have all the earmarks of a well-planned strategy designed to make Cuba an advanced outpost of the Soviet Union's drive to infiltrate the New World."

Both statements seem to me to be slightly exaggerated—but only slightly. As I traveled about Cuba, I became increasingly convinced that Cuba is heading toward collectivism, that it has acquired many of the trappings of a totalitarian state, and that it is ardently pro-Communist in all its international relations. But I do not believe that Cuba is "just as much a Communist satellite as Hungary or North Korea;" the Soviets have simply been too shrewd to insist on this kind of relationship. I do think that Cuba is an "advanced outpost" not so much for the Kremlin's "drive to infiltrate the New World" as it is for the export of the Cuban type of revolution, rather than the Russian or Chinese. The difference may not seem great, but it strikes me as having some significance.

I found striking similarities between the Cuban practice and the practice of the Communist countries I visited in Europe. There is, for example, only one party—the Communist Party. Many government agencies, including the Central Planning Board, the Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA), the National Bank of Cuba, the Ministries of Economy, Health, Education, Communication, Labor, and Public Works, are staffed in their middle and in some cases in their upper echelons either by avowed Communists or by individuals whose ideology is hardly distinguishable from that of Communism.

Moreover, as in avowed Communist countries, there is a widespread secret police and an informer system. The agrarian reform program, keystone of Castro's revolution, is modeled in some respects on the Soviet system of state farms. Civil liberties have all but been abolished. Anyone who is anti-Communist is branded a counter-revolutionary.

But Castro is not a Communist. Of this I feel reasonably certain. He is temperamentally unable to accept any discipline. His is a fuzzy form of socialism that springs more from the heart than from any mastery of dialectical materialism. He seems to have a genuine passion for the poor. His speeches, which Cubans find moving and eloquent but I thought grating and lugubrious, often reveal his deep concern for the plight of the underprivileged. Castro, incidentally, regards his interminable speeches to live and television audiences as a form of, or substitute for, the more traditional instruments of democracy. The speeches to him are, in effect, state of the union messages, and the inevitable wild applause the mandate to proceed.

Carmack in The Christian Science Monitor

Larger and Larger

My notion that Castro is not a Communist is, or was, shared by our own Central Intelligence Agency. Testifying before the Senate Internal Security Committee at the end of 1959, General C. P. Cabell, deputy director of the CIA, had this to say:

"We know that the Communists consider Fidel Castro as a representative of the bourgeoise, and were unable to gain public recognition or commitments from him during the course of the revolution." General Cabell added the other two members of the ruling triumvirate are strongly pro-Communist. "Fidel's brother, Raul, and his close adviser, Ernesto ('Che') Guevara," he said, "are both strong friends of the Communist Party," but "we believe Fidel Castro is not a member of the Communist Party, and does not consider himself to be a Communist."

Raul Castro and Guevara are indeed strong friends of the Communist Party although neither will own up to carrying a card. The subject infuriates Raul, but Guevara, an Argentine-born professional revolutionist with enormous gifts, is less reluctant to discuss his ideological identification, however evasive he is on occasion.

In Moscow, last December, for example, Guevara, the bearded boss of Cuba's economy, lauded "as one of the most important events of recent times" the just-approved declaration of eighty-one Communist parties detailing an ideological program for achieving world Communism. "We whole-heartedly endorse the statement adopted by this conference," he told a cheering throng of Muscovites. "We are threatened every minute with American warships, planes, and marines. But the friendly hand of the Soviet Union, extended to us, shields us from the enemy as an invisible armor."

Guevara guardedly stated his views in a retent interview:

QUESTION: "It has been speculated that you are a Communist. How would you classify yourself?"

GUEVARA: "I have never worried about how I should be described

politically. However, I do think that socialism is a science which includes a number of objective facts which no one can deny."

QUESTION: "Would you please elaborate?"

GUEVARA: "Marx was right in certain things. Capitalism can either go peacefully or it can go out with a struggle, which would be horrible. It is clear nowadays that the decision up to the United States is whether it is to go peacefully or not."

Guevara's views are important not only because he is the second or third most powerful figure in Cuba, but also because he occasionally says things which Fidel Castro believes but prefers not to say. Castro himself, when he first seized power, sought to give his revolution a name by calling it "humanism" to distinguish it from both Communism and capitalism. "Capitalism," he used to say, "may kill man with hunger. Communism kills a man by wiping out his freedom." Humanism, he was fond of saying, provides "liberty with bread without terror."

Castro does not talk this way anymore. His view of capitalism remains unchanged, but he is unmistakably soft on Communism. There is bread in Cuba, but there is terror too. Liberty is all but extinguished.

¶ Press, radio, and television are completely under the thumb of the government. These media spew out a torrent of "hate America" propaganda—which the people take in stride—and glorify almost everything the Sino-Soviet bloc does. And yet during the military phase of his revolutionary struggle, Castro made an "absolute guarantee" of "full and untrammeled" freedom of public information and all communication media.

¶ Free elections are nowhere in sight. And yet before he came to power Castro frequently made a "formal promise" that the "prime duty" of holding "free and honest elections" would be met in twelve months. Sometimes he said six months.

¶ The jails are full of political prisoners, many of them held incommunicado indefinitely.

¶ Virtually all significant dissent, including resistance to ever-tightening ties with Communism, is treated as counter-revolutionary.

¶ Habeas corpus has been suspended for those arrested on charges of counter-revolution.

¶ The firing squads have been more numerous than many Cubans believe necessary.

¶ Vigilante organizations have been established to pry and spy in an effort to wipe out pockets of resistance to the Castro regime, especially among the middle class.

¶ The independence of the judiciary has been destroyed by the purge of 120 Cuban judges on charges of counter-revolutionary attitudes or immoral conduct.

¶ Youth has been militarized in the *Patrulla Juvenil*, which seems designed to develop chauvinism in Cuba's children and to draw them away from church and church-related organizations.

¶ While some of the Cuban refugees in Miami, New York, and elsewhere are rich, arrogant reactionaries, many of those who have fled are earnest supporters of social reform who could no longer tolerate the suppression of freedom and the choking off of all forms of dissent.

¶ The *Prensa Latina* news agency, which now monopolizes the news in Cuba, undeviatingly follows the Communist Party line in all its interpretations of world affairs.

¶ There is only one political party in Cuba, as in Communist countries—the Communist Party (PSP).

¶ All conflicts within the labor movement are resolved in favor of the Communist bloc.

The Communists are a shrewd and able lot, zealous, hard-working, and dedicated, but they are rent by internal strife between the older Stalinists who have more ideological kinship with Communist China than with the Soviet Union and the younger group that finds its philosophical source in the competitive coexistence creed of Khrushchev and the Kremlin. Perhaps the best interpretation of Communist strategy in Cuba was written recently by Max Frankel of the New York *Times*, a seasoned observer of Communist ways who, because of this report, was refused reentry into Cuba when he sought to return after a swing through parts of Latin America.

"The leaders of Cuba's Communist movement," wrote Frankel, "are confident that they have won the battle for Fidel Castro's mind and are striving, under his protection, to convert the Cuban people to their ideology.

"After a bitter fight within their own ranks, the Communists have decided to consolidate their position of great influence here and to forego an open bid for total power. They are confident that Premier Castro's nationalistic revolution is only a transitory stage on the way to Communist rule in Cuba and the rest of Latin America.

"This assessment of the Communists' situation in Cuba represents the substance of interviews with many Cubans and foreign observers in Havana. The information was confirmed in almost every detail by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the Communists' leading ideologist, in a long conversation.

"The disciplined Communist Party, which counts itself a true member of the international Communist movement, is content to stand behind the banner of Cuban nationalism and to lend its considerable organizational and political talents to Premier Castro.

"The Cuban Communists who advocate this strategy do so because it conforms to their estimate of the progress of history. But they also fear that a premature bid for greater power would alienate the Cuban people, possibly arouse the wrath of the *Fidelistas* and almost certainly cause military intervention by the United States and possibly other Latin countries to destroy the Castro regime and its Communist adherents."

There is mounting evidence today that the Communists may be ready now to make their move toward more formal consolidation with the remnants of Castro's 26th of July movement—which takes its name from

the date in 1953 when Castro and 170 of his followers launched their first abortive efforts against the Batista regime with an uprising against the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba.

Last summer, at the Eighth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, its secretary-general, Blas Roca, appealed for the "fusion" of all the revolutionary forces "in a single movement." Several months later, the youth division of Castro's 26th of July movement and the official Communist youth organization joined forces to form the *Jovenes Rebeldes* (Youth Rebels).

Several months after that, in February, 1961, Castro, in an interview with *l'Unita,* the Italian Communist organ, was in a rare mood to be contrite, penitent, and apologetic—on the subject of his former relationship with the Communist Party—and boldly affirmative regarding his present feelings.

"What," the Italian correspondent asked Castro, "is your opinion of the *Partido Socialista Popular,* the party of the Cuban Communists?"

"It is the only Cuban party," Castro replied, "that has always clearly proclaimed the necessity for a radical change of structure, an absolutely correct structure, of social relationships. It is also true that at first the Communists distrusted me and us rebels. It was a justified distrust, an absolutely just position, ideologically and politically.

"The Communists were right to be distrustful because we of the Sierra, leaders of the guerrillas, were still full of petty-bourgeoise prejudices and defects, despite Marxist lectures. The ideas were not clear to us, although we wanted with all our strength to destroy tyranny and privileges. Then we met; we understood each other and began to collaborate. The Communists have given much blood, much heroism, to the Cuban cause. Now we continue to work together, loyally and fraternally."

This story of disenchantment with democracy and kinship for Communism has its other side—a side which does not pretend it isn't true but rather attempts to explain why and how it happened. The gulf is indeed great between Berle's estimate of the Castro revolution as democratic, anti-dictatorial, and anti-Communist, and his subsequent evaluation, hardly a year later, that Castro's Cuba was a satellite of the Soviets. There must be some explanation for this startling change in so short a time. And there is, as many a voluble Cuban who

isn't even faintly pro-Communist will tell you, given half a chance.

Before they embark on an explanation, Cubans point out, rather bitterly, that when Fulgencio Batista played around with the Communists and called them "genuine democrats," American politicians and the American press, now thundering against Communist influence in Castro's Cuba, were totally silent. This is true. Even as the current crop of dictators in Latin America—in Haiti, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Paraguay—play ball with the Communists when it suits their fancy, so did Batista.

It was Batista who first permitted the Communists to found a daily newspaper, *Hoy,* which began publication on May Day, 1938, and flourishes today under Castro. It was Batista who called in newsmen to announce: "The Communist Party, according to its constitution, is a democratic party which pursues its ends within the framework of a capitalist regime and renounces violence as a political means, and consequently it is entitled to the same status as that of any other party in Cuba." It was Batista who then proceeded to legalize the Communist Party.

As a result, the Communists captured ten seats in the Chamber of Deputies in the elections of July, 1940, and a Communist was elected mayor of Santiago de Cuba, second largest city in Cuba. In March, 1943, Juan Marinello, a major Communist figure, was invited into the national government as minister without portfolio. He was the first Communist to attain cabinet rank in any nation of the Western Hemisphere. Batista, moreover, allowed the Communists to infiltrate the labor movement and even to exert significant power in the Ministry of Labor. And all this happened when Fidel Castro was a schoolboy specializing in basketball. There was no protest or critical comment in the American press.

Recently, the U.S. State Department issued what is in effect a "White Paper" on Cuba in whose preparation President Kennedy took a deep interest. The document skillfully seeks to identify the United States with the social aspirations of the original revolution, but it is unsparing in its denunciation of the course the revolution has taken.

"What began as a movement to enlarge Cuban democracy and freedom," the paper notes, "has been perverted . . . into a mechanism for the destruction of free institutions in Cuba, for the seizure by international Communism of a base and a bridgehead in the Americas . . .

"It is the considered judgment of the United States of America that the Castro regime offers a clear and present danger to the authentic and autonomous revolution of the Americas—to the whole hope of spreading political liberty, economic development, and social progress through all the republics of the hemisphere."

Only once, and with noteworthy brevity, did the document acknowledge that we too might share a bit of the blame for what has gone wrong in Cuba, and even here it was not clear whether reference was being made to events in the history of Cuba before Castro or during Castro's regime. "The people of Cuba remain our brothers," said the State Department paper. "We acknowledge past omissions and errors in our relationship to them." That was all on this theme.

I have already discussed the first [illegible]—President Eisenhower's disappearance from Washington when

Castro came to town in April, 1959—and the first omission—our failure to hold out a helping hand to the infant regime at a time it desperately needed help and at a time, too, when we were aiding every despicable dictatorship in Latin America.

The next development came the following month when the Castro government embarked on its greatest adventure—the Agrarian Reform Law of May 17, 1959. More drastic and deep-going than any such program in the Western Hemisphere, the Cuban law inevitably provided for the expropriation of vast land estates; some of the largest of these were owned by American investors. The law specified that the land seized was to be paid for in twenty-year bonds bearing 4.5 per cent interest. None of the bonds has yet been distributed.

The U.S. government formally complained. It emphasized that payments should be "prompt, adequate, and effective" and that "the views" of U.S. investors should be heard. Cuba was too bankrupt to pay promptly, adequately, and effectively, but we threatened, nevertheless, to "seek solutions through other appropriate international procedures" if the Cubans did not pay up.

Castro insists that the United States really wanted Cuba to pay cash, which it didn't have, and at prices set by U.S. owners, which it couldn't afford. This attitude, he maintains, forced him on behalf of the Cubans to "choose between an agrarian reform and nothing." He chose the former.

There is nothing in the record to show why the United States did not offer to help Cuba finance her land reform program. After all, we have done this for several Latin American countries and for Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines. I turn again to President Kennedy's chief troubleshooter in Latin America, Adolph Berle:

"It would have been perfectly possible . . . to offer Castro (assuming he did not choose to be an enemy of the United States as apparently Castro has done) a means of financing his agrarian reform and his state-owned program of industrialization. The United States should be able to work in entire cordiality with any kind of social system which does not insist on being its enemy. American so-called capitalism is not a religion or a dogma; it is a way of getting things done which works extremely well in the United States—and may be quite inappropriate in many other situations."

Yet, the fact persists that we demanded that Cuba hear or heed "the views" of the powerful corporations and individuals owning vast estates in Cuba, and that she pay up "promptly, adequately, and effectively," which she could not possibly do. Another fact persists that we made no effort to help Cuba finance our proposed scheme for paying up. Investigation of the files of American newspapers of the period will show that it was at this time that the press began to take a surly view of the Cuban revolution and started to create a public opinion hostile to the Castro regime.

The story of Cuba has been the story of sugar. The world's largest producer of sugar cane, Cuba is always searching for new markets, but historically, the Cuban sugar industry has always been dependent upon the U.S. market. Cuba, for many years, had provided the United States with about one-third of its raw sugar. These shipments represented Cuba's quota under the U.S. sugar act which prorates the market among domestic producers and certain foreign producers. It is worth noting that while Cuba benefited greatly by receiving a price above the world market price, the American price for Cuban as well as all other foreign sugar was set at a high level *to protect our domestic sugar industry.*

The conflict over Cuba's sugar quota came before Congress early in 1960. What happened is crisply set forth in an unusually able report prepared for the American Friends Service Committee, and based in great measure on the official documents of the U.S. government.

"When the Sugar Act came up for renewal in 1960," the report notes, "sugar lobbyists, both domestic and foreign, began to argue against the Cuban subsidy. Congressmen began to question the size of the Cuban quota in light of Cuba's belligerence and seizure of American-owned properties."

The bill, as finally passed, extended the Sugar Act to March 31, 1961, and gave the President complete authority to determine Cuba's share of U.S. sugar imports. President Eisenhower promptly wiped out twenty-six per cent of Cuba's quota for the year, and in December he announced that the United States would not import any more sugar from Cuba under the existing legislation.

Cuba, not unnaturally, turned to the Soviet bloc to find markets for its sugar. The uproar in the American press was wild and long-lasting, but nobody bothered to point out that there was nothing else Cuba could do if she hoped to survive. Far and away her largest source of foreign exchange was at stake. Without that income, Cuba faced collapse.

Alfred E. Kahn, chairman of the economics department at Cornell University, asserted that "the suspicion will be very strong" that the United States slashed and then abolished the Cuban sugar quota in reprisal for the Cuban seizure of the Esso and Texaco oil refineries in Cuba.

The petroleum incident was part of the game of tit-for-tat both sides have played so disastrously. Shortly before the Sugar Act controversy, the Cuban government had asked the Esso, Texaco, and Shell oil refineries in Cuba to process Soviet oil. The Cuban government felt obliged to make this request because the Venezuelan oil normally used by the refineries cost dollars, which are mighty scarce

in Cuba. Russian oil came in barter, involved no expenditure of precious dollars, and was cheaper.

The refineries refused to process the Soviet oil. The Cuban government accused them of arbitrarily violating the Cuban law and seized their property at the end of June. The U.S. government hurled a counter-accusation that Cuba's action was "arbitrary and inequitable" and another example of a "pattern of relentless economic aggression by the government of Cuba . . . designed to destroy Cuba's traditional investment and trade relations with the free world."

The Cuban government used much the same language, in reverse, when it retaliated soon thereafter with a law expropriating any property owned by U.S. citizens "when deemed necessary for the national interest." The preamble of the new law described the American policy on sugar as an attitude of "constant aggression, with political aims, against the fundamental interests of the Cuban economy." It called the power granted the President to cut the sugar quota "a weapon of political action against Cuba" which "obliged the revolutionary government to adopt without hesitation all the measures that it considers pertinent for the defense of national sovereignty and of free economic development."

American politicians and the American press were especially wrathful over Cuban willingness to trade with the Soviet bloc. They seemed unmindful of the fact that most of our major allies trade with the Communists, as do several other Latin American nations with whom we have cordial relations, including Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina.

I think it is no exaggeration to suggest that if we did not actually push Castro into Soviet arms, we at least greased the wheels that carried him there. Under President Eisenhower's businessman's Administration, the only question seemed to be how fast and fully Cuba would pay for what she took. When she did not or could not pay, when she nationalized American property, we retaliated, childishly, with a series of reprisals



Herblock in The Washington Post

"Who Would Have Thought that the Revolution Contained So Many Traitors?"

that choked Cuba's lifelines. Cuba turned, with classic inevitability, to the Soviet bloc. Castro is now no longer a free agent; he has tied himself tightly to the Soviet apparatus, partly because of what he said and did.

Herbert Matthews put it moderately when he said:

"Once Castro turned toward the Soviet bloc for economic and then political help, his freedom of action was jeopardized. He is now economically dependent upon Russia and the Communist powers. Without them, the economy of Cuba would utterly collapse. He is gambling on getting economic help without having to pay a political price, which is what Nasser did.

"Historians will have to ask themselves how much the American attitude and policies forced Fidel Castro into this position. If this is what he wanted all along, there is nothing the United States could have done to prevent it. If he did not, as many of us believe, then the position taken from the beginning by the American press, radio, television, Congress, Pentagon, State Department, and business world, and so forth, helped to build up Communism and drive Cuba irresistibly into the Communist corner."

Many Cubans, who are otherwise pro-Castro, are greatly disturbed over the regime's deepening kinship with Communism. But they are quick to rationalize this development and earnest in their plea to Americans to try to understand. Typical of this considerable group was Dr. Gustavo Torroella, professor of psychology at the University of Havana and director of the National Institute of Applied Psychology, with whom I talked for several hours.

I asked him how, as a supporter of Castro, he accounted for the failure to hold free elections as promised so frequently and solemnly.

"It is important for Americans to understand," he replied, "that the people do not feel betrayed on this account. For them parties and elections symbolize corruption and the pay-off because these were the characteristics of the major political movements in Cuba before the revolution. You have only to know the recent history of Cuba to know how absolutely corrupt these elections were. Democracy, in your American sense, does not command much prestige in Cuba, for we had so little of it and know less about it."

Identifying himself as a John Dewey type of instrumentalist, Dr. Torroella argued that while democracy is the goal desired, Cuba is not ready for it and must work with whatever instruments are at hand, including the Communists, to ride out the first and decisive stage of the revolution.

"For the moment we must work through the chief of state and those he selects to share leadership with him," the psychologist argued. "You Americans don't seem to realize that we are still at war, that we face the threat of counter-revolution which you are encouraging. We must remain on a war footing until we have achieved our sovereignty and the threat of counter-revolution is destroyed. This means crisis government, rather than democracy, so long as the crisis lasts.

"Our whole approach is pragmatic and instrumentalist. We are not wedded to a specific blueprint or ideology—except that we are determined to banish poverty, disease, and illiteracy by whatever means work best for us.

"You have made our task vastly more difficult than it might have

been by mistrusting us, calling us Communists, and seeking to array the whole world against us. It was you who pushed us ever closer into the arms of the Soviets. You refused to help us. You took steps to strangle us economically. The choice for us became one of death or survival. The fact that we turned to the Soviets for help, when you refused to come to our assistance, does not mean we are Communists. Far from it."

Dr. Torroella expressed deep disappointment over President Kennedy's sharp criticism of the Castro regime. "Let us have an end of recriminations," he pleaded. "Why can't there be an informal committee of American and Cuban citizens to explore the possibilities of later negotiation at a round-table conference? This would officially commit no one, but it might lay the ground work for later formal negotiations."

I suggested that perhaps it was already too late, that Americans—certainly the U.S. government—were convinced that the Castro regime was irrevocably aligned with the Sino-Soviet bloc and had become a hopeless pawn of the Kremlin and Peking in the cold war struggle.

"Nothing is irrevocable," he replied. "It is never too late for men of good will. We have nothing to lose by trying and a world of peace and hope to gain."

I encountered much the same mood in Santa Clara, a provincial city on the road from Havana to Santiago de Cuba, where I met an unusually articulate apologist for the Castro government—Eloy Soto, an American-trained teacher of English and counsellor to the students.

"The Cubans," he said, "are not an ideological people. They don't care what the system is called as long it helps defeat hunger and misery. I am the leader of the revolutionary group here; my wife is a devout Catholic who hates Communism. And yet we have no difficulty understanding together the urgency of our problems and the need for affirmative action, by whatever name it goes."

When I asked about the dominance of Communists in the government, he made no effort to minimize the extent of Communist penetration, but he sought to explain it in these words:

"You must remember that it was Batista who made the Communist Party the force it became. It was he who legalized the party and paved the way for its subsequent strength. You said nothing then. The Communist Party became a brilliantly organized force. When Castro came to power, the Communists were the only party in Cuba and the only organization capable of action. We Cubans desperately lacked technical and

organizational ability to mobilize for the affirmative phase of the revolution.

"Members of the Communist Party were highly skilled and ready to work hard. They didn't look for soft positions; they didn't keep looking at their watches or care about rain or mud if there were work to be done today, whatever their long-range goals may have been."

"Why," I asked, "is the Communist Party the only party in Cuba?"

"It was in existence when the Castro regime took over," he replied. "It was the only party to survive. The Castro government decided not to dissolve it but rather to let it fade out by itself."

"But it hasn't faded," I protested. "It is more powerful than it ever was before."

"I don't think so," he responded. "Of course there are some Communists in the government, but the party as such is not gaining, but rather losing strength."

"But the Communists," I argued, "have powerful positions in the government and do much to shape both domestic and foreign policy."

"There is not the least possibility of the Communists dominating the government," he said with infuriating serenity. "The Communist Party wins only where misery, hunger, and illiteracy are dominant. We are facing up to our problems, doing much today and planning still more for tomorrow. In that way the Communists fall behind in their appeals and slogans. They are jumping on our bandwagon, not we on theirs, because we are more progressive and aggressive than they are."

I complained to Soto about the strident, almost hysterical tone of the Cuban press and its hate-America theme so reminiscent of the press I had encountered in out-and-out Communist countries.

He gravely nodded as if in agreement, and then hastened on with his explanation:

"You must remember we are only a tiny country that feels so helpless and insecure beside the powerful United States which is seeking to destroy our revolution by aiding and arming the counter-revolutionaries in Florida and elsewhere. Speaking softly would not work. It was necessary to instill revolutionary spirit in the people, to whip them up to work and sacrifice ever harder so they would understand the danger of the counter-revolution.

"We now have a half million men and women in the militia, each with automatic arms. There has been little time to prepare the spirit of the people. That is why the press has been used to incite people to an understanding of the perils that confront us and the need to be ever vigilant. Like you, I do not find some of our press pleasant, but I understand that it is necessary because we are still at war, almost daily facing the threat of invasion."

I had been told by critics of Castro in Havana, men and women of great integrity, that the new Cuban textbooks were heavily larded with anti-American and pro-Communist propaganda. Soto denied this emphatically, but went on to add:

"Of course we are revising textbooks in history and the social studies to emphasize the significance of the revolution and provide our children with objective accounts, not Communist propaganda, of Cuban and world affairs. Actually we are taking the reactionary propaganda out of the school books. Most of our textbooks of the past were written in Spain by Spanish priests who presented a completely reactionary viewpoint."

English, he told me, is an extreme-

ly popular subject in the schools. Cuban youth greatly admires American clothes, music, and movies. There were a number of American films showing in Santa Clara when I was there, as there were in most of the other communities I visited. At the Santa Clara University library, I saw a number of American books, including Karl Menninger's *The Human Mind,* Carl Sandburg's *Abraham Lincoln,* Irwin Edman's *John Dewey,* Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr.'s *Path to the Present,* the *Encyclopedia Americana,* and a volume of plays by Rodgers and Hammerstein.

I had an unusual opportunity to be exposed to the thinking of revolutionary Cuban youth in Santa Clara. Walking through the corridors of the high school one evening, I came upon a room where half a dozen students were arguing earnestly. I asked if I might come in. They said, "Of course, come in; we love to talk with Americans." Word of my visit spread through the school, and soon there were twenty students, then about forty-five, and finally, when our two-hour talk came to an end, I noticed the room was packed to the door.

The boy who served as spokesman for the student council was Osmundo Betancourt, a seventeen-year-old senior who is going on to college to study chemical engineering. An earnest, almost humorless young man, he seemed too grim and unsmiling for his age—although I found him far better prepared to argue Cuba's case than most American boys of seventeen are to defend the American position. Often as he talked, he and his friends would look up to the wall on which hung the portraits of their classmates who had been killed by Batista's men in the revolution.

At first the talk was largely a tirade against the economic stranglehold long held by American corporate interests. Osmundo recited a remarkably complete catalogue of American sins since Cuba won technical independence nearly six decades ago. I told the boy and his friends that I was quite well acquainted with the history of this dark period in American relations with Cuba and that many well-informed Americans knew and were ashamed of that sad story, but Osmundo and his classmates persisted in wanting to uncover and hold up for inspection every last sin of U.S. exploitation of Cuba. Finally I was able to get them to discuss what they thought could be done to improve Cuban-American relations today. The boys' leader said:

"**One**—Stop helping the counter-revolutionairies. It is they and their plans for invasion that maintain the crisis atmosphere here. You are bound by international agreement not to interfere in our affairs, and yet you and your CIA are doing everything in your power to destroy the regime which is so popular with the people of Cuba.

"**Two**—Stop calling us Communists. It is the United States, with its sanctions, embargoes, and finally, the break in diplomatic relations, that drove us to seek help from the Soviets.

"**Three**—Give us back Guantanamo. This land, which you took from us for a naval base when we were too weak to protest effectively, belongs to the Cuban people. It is a humiliating insult to the sovereignty of Cuba to have a slice of our country occupied by your military establishment. This hurts us more than you Americans realize.

"**Four**—Lift the prohibition against American travel in Cuba. The only way we have to show the truth of what we are doing is to have Americans come here and see for themselves. In the words of Fidel Castro, we have no error to hide.

"**Five**—Restore diplomatic relations between the two countries, but this must be done on a basis of equality; in other words, there would be no favored status for the United States, as there has been for sixty years, and no favored status for any other country. We students are willing to make any sacrifice to reestablish relations between our countries on the one condition that it will not lessen our personality as a grown-up nation. Every time we try to negotiate, the United States treats us as children. We feel grown up and want to be treated as such."

When I asked what Cuba could do to improve the situation, the youthful leader said the Castro regime "stands ready at all times to negotiate with the United States on a basis of equality." That was all.

Like the Cuban adults with whom I talked, the boys complained bitterly that "the United States hasn't given us a chance—the chance we needed to get our revolution off to a good start. So we had to turn elsewhere. The Soviet Union offered help and we took it. We just couldn't sit and wait to die. And yet you Americans are so thoughtless as to criticize us, by calling us Communists, because we turned to the only door that was open to us."

Quite a different viewpoint, naturally enough, was expressed by the anti-Castro Cubans with whom I talked. (Incidentally, I found pro-Castro and anti-Castro spokesmen equally excitable, equally emotional, and equally given to a rush of passionate speech when given the opportunity to confer with an American editor.) One professional, who spoke to me only after receiving my solemn assurance that his name would not be used, snorted at the notion that America's negative policies had forced Castro to seek help from the Communists.

"Absolute rubbish," he said, "and the proof is that Castro tolerated the Communists in his regime and made an economic deal with Mikoyan even before the United States took its first reprisals against Castro.

"There are only three courses open

to the United States now: 1) recognize and work with Castro; 2) support the counter-revolution; or 3) send the marines to invade Cuba. The second will lead, inevitably, to the third, and that is as it should be if we hope to rescue the Western Hemisphere. It is unthinkable that the United States should allow this Communist beachhead in Latin America to stand unmolested. Your Central Intelligence Agency managed to get rid of the pro-Communist Arbenz regime in Guatemala a few years ago, and you must now do the same for Cuba if you want to preserve democracy in the hemisphere."

This Cuban, who holds clandestine conferences with others who share his view, begged me to see that "if you allow Castro to survive and flourish, you will open the floodgates to Communism through all Latin America. There can be only one realistic answer: immediate American destruction of the Castro regimentation."

Another critic I interviewed had occupied a rather high place in the Castro regime until he was fired at the very moment he planned to resign. It was his feeling that far from having been too tough on Castro, the United States has been much too patient.

I asked him if he were under surveillance. He replied that "there are strange cars parked in the neighborhood that come and go." "I feel rather certain," he said, "that there is a widespread, almost block-by-block system of surveillance, that telephones are tapped, and that this is now a police state without the one hundred per cent efficiency of other dictatorships."

This Cuban expressed complete revulsion over the program of indoctrination of school children. "Look," he said as he reached for a book, "this is a textbook for very young children or illiterate adults learning the alphabet. Here under the letter 'K' it says that in the United States 'K' stands for Ku Klux Klan, which means race hatred, and in Russia it stands for Khrushchev, Cuba's friend."

The United States, he insisted, "cannot afford to ignore the fact that this is not Cuba. It is Cuba plus Russia, plus Czechoslovakia, plus China. The technicians in charge, who have been imported from behind the Iron Curtain, are not thinking of what is best for Cuba, but rather what is best for the Communist camp throughout the world. Cuba has now become a Communist stronghold, used for propaganda and the indoctrination of revolutionary leaders for all Latin America. Cuba now sends hundreds of her children to the Soviet Union for training and education. All this makes the whole problem much more than just a Cuban problem."

Cuban counter-revolutionaries are hopelessly divided on what kind of regime should succeed Castro's if and when he falls. They range from Batista's butchers on the far right to genuine social reformers on the democratic left. This man was a true believer in social and economic reform along democratic lines.

"It is vital," he said, "for your President Kennedy to see to it that what comes afterward does not represent a setback in social and economic terms."

There is a significant undertone in the last comment by the man I have been quoting. There is tacit acceptance of the fact that, with all its faults and excesses, the Castro regime has achieved a measure of social and economic progress. This is endlessly true, as I was soon to discover when I took to the road for my 2,000-mile journey through little Cuba. I am obliged to rely rather heavily in this phase of my report on personal impressions rather than on official statistics, for the latter are inadequate, inaccurate, and often out of date before they are published.

Saturday Review

"Shave It Off! I'm Changing My Whole Philosophy of Life"

Not the least of Castro's achievements is the new moral tone that permeates Cuba today. Gone are the widespread graft and corruption of Batista's time. Castro himself sets a high standard of incorruptibility and his regime is relentless in ferreting out waywardness and extreme in meting out punishment. I saw thousands of militiamen in my travels but not one who was drunk. The militia itself is unique—a national army said to number a half-million men and women equipped with automatic arms, most of whom work in factories or on farms between military assignments.

There are still remnants of the old traffic in prostitution, but it has been reduced greatly. Havana, once the Caribbean capital of sin, with its widespread pattern of bribery, its gambling casinos run by American gangsters, and its heavy traffic in prostitution and dope, has been cleaned up drastically. One evidence of the new moral climate is that many thousands of common law marriages have now been legalized. Many couples did not get married in the past because they could not afford the fee. The revolutionary government has abolished all fees. Often now there are mass weddings, so great is the demand for legalization.

Another intangible, impossible to evaluate statistically, is the spirit of hope that rides through this sun-drenched island. James N. Wallace, a *Wall Street Journal* correspondent who spent a year in Cuba, returned with strong anti-Castro convictions but cheerfully conceded that Castro has "given many Cubans a genuine sense of national consciousness for the first time."

This spirit of hope and national consciousness does not apply to those who have suffered greatly under the Castro regime—the upper class and much of the middle class—but it does extend to the great mass of poverty-stricken *campesinos* and factory workers who have never had it so good.

I spent an hour at the Julio Reyes Sugar Mill in Jovellanos watching the sugar-making process. As I was about to leave, I was introduced to the mill's chief fabricator. I asked him if he cared to compare conditions now with those prevailing before the revolution. Tears came to his eyes as he replied:

"I have worked in this mill for fifty-two years, ever since I was eleven years old. We used to work under slave labor conditions. Now we are the bosses, and we are proud, and we work hard, and we work overtime, and we know it is for us, the people, and not for some wealthy Cuban lying by his swimming pool or a foreign investor living on our sweat and profiting from our hopeless conditions. Mister, I can't find the words to explain the improvement." But he had, vividly.

For the urban worker there has been a slash in rents and utility services, a home-building program that will enable tens of thousands of Cuban workers to own their homes, increased wages in some cases, steady prices, many new schools, greatly improved and less expensive medical services, and a network of playgrounds, beaches, and yacht clubs for the poor.

There is no doubt in my mind that the poor in Cuba are immeasurably better off than they were—and this goes especially for the rural folk.

Agrarian reform is the heart of the Cuban Revolution. It is operated by the *Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria* (INRA). Its operations are so wide-ranging—land reform, shipping, home building, school construction, factory operation, credit financing, commercial fishing, and a host of other activities—that it is a state-within-a-state. The land reform program itself is more widespread and runs more deeply by far than any I encountered in my travels through ten other Latin American countries.

Under the agrarian reform, INRA has seized all sugar fields and all estates of more than 990 acres. On lands on which there were tenant farmers and sharecroppers, INRA has turned the land over to them—in parcels running up to sixty-six acres. On land belonging to the confiscated great estates, the *latifundias,* INRA has settled thousands of new farmers who belong to what are known as cooperatives but more realistically are state farms in the Soviet manner. The forty or so per cent of cultivated land which was tilled by small farmers before the revolution remains in their private hands.

One of the most striking features of the agrarian reform is crop diversification. For years before the revolution, the Cuban peasant worked three or four months of the year in the sugar fields, and was thrown on the scrap heap for the rest of the year. Although Cuba grew and exported vegetables before the revolution, there is now a greatly magnified diversification which provides nearly year-round employment for many thousands of agricultural workers. I saw on farm after farm, as far as the eye could see, vast fields of tomatoes, potatoes, beans, rice, peanuts, corn, and other produce that provide food for the table, cash income, and year-round employment.

On the vast state farms, INRA builds low-cost housing, schools, recreational facilities, medical centers, stores, and libraries. INRA provides, on credit, the plans, the materials, the manpower, and the supervision for all the projects. On these so-called cooperatives, farm hands work for wages. Theoretically they are supposed to share in profits at the end of each year—but it will be years before there is anything to distribute, so deeply are they in debt to INRA. Management personnel to supervise the farms is provided by INRA. In fact, INRA is everywhere. The INRA store is a fixture now in rural Cuba. It sells almost everything—from nails to nail polish—and at prices that often run twenty per cent below those in the private store.

There has been waste and duplication, poor management resulting from a lack of trained personnel, and often a harsh policy of land seizure—the success of the program rests in some measure on the very fact of confiscation. But the program in general has worked remarkably well. It has instilled hope and self-confidence in many thousands of peasants and farm workers. It has provided them with better jobs, better homes, better medical services, and better schools for children than they ever dreamed they would have when they were the forgotten families of Cuba.

I visited a number of these INRA establishments and found an extraordinary pride of achievement and sense of belonging among many farm families. These are the people who love Castro—and will fight for him and what they think he stands for. The varied unease one finds in the cities, among those of the middle class who feel that Castro's will is drawing them inexorably toward Communism, is absent in rural Cuba where there is little thought and less concern about ideology.

One of the most dramatic experiences I had in Cuba happened in Manzanilla, in the foothills of the Sierra Maestra mountains of Oriente Province. It was a dismal scene that confronted me when I arrived. Manzanilla is a tiny fishing village whose people are wholly dependent on their catches. The fishing community consists of 400 to 500 squalid *bohios* huddled together near the sea, with docks so rotten they are near collapse, and a fleet of rotting boats that have long been cheating Davey Jones' locker. The families of the villages live on the ragged edge of despair. I saw their children running around naked in the afternoon sun; their bloated bellies told the cruel story of malnutrition.

The *bohios* in which the families exist look as if they were too dilapidated to stand much longer. I visited four or five of them, including one in which twelve people lived in a single room, somehow using cloth partitions and one thing and another to provide a modicum of privacy for the grownups and make their sordid home look tolerably decent. They had no plumbing, inside or out; the sea accommodated their needs.

We left this dying village and drove several miles down the road that curves along the green-blue

Caribbean. Suddenly, there loomed on a hillside acres of neatly terraced new homes—500 of them, of five rooms each, of varying colors and designs, all with lighting, plumbing, and kitchens. These new buildings, each with its own little plot of land, were to become the homes this spring of the fishing folk we had just left behind in their miserable *bohios*. Nearby, there are new shipways building, new docks, new boats—everything new to make a fresh life for the fishermen and their families. The contrast was awesome; it was like traveling a thousand years in time from a medieval dungeon to a new modern concrete home complete with garden.

Many of the new boats were to be ready for the fishermen as soon as the move was completed in May, but twenty of them stood in the ways—unfinished. They were awaiting, the men told me bitterly, the fiberglas that would not come from the United States. INRA has organized the men into a fishing cooperative, INRA provides the homes and the boats which will belong to the fishermen when they pay INRA back. Ninety-five per cent of the families are illiterate, so INRA is building a school. Nearly all the families need medical care, so INRA is building a medical center.

Apart from the agrarian reform and the massive program of home building, I was most impressed on the affirmative side, during my journey through Cuba, with the great development in education. I laboriously collected masses of statistics at the Ministry of Education, but most of them are hopelessly out of date by now. Schools are springing up everywhere, teachers are being trained at a phenomenal rate, and a crash program designed to abolish illiteracy this year is now in operation. I have doubts about the success of the crash program, for it is all being done in strident, almost hysterical fashion. I felt from what I saw and heard that there was more propaganda than preparation. Thousands of young students, with little or no training, have been released from school this spring to teach illiterate adults. Much of the content, I suspect, will be heavy laden with government propaganda. Still, there is a remarkable spirit of service and dedication among the young and they may do a better job than I believe they will.

THE FOUND GENERATION
by MILTON MAYER

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I come now, in my conclusion on Cuba, to the most difficult part of my assignment—an attempt to suggest what U.S. policy should be toward this tragic island. I am painfully aware of the fact that the American press and American politicians have so conditioned the thinking of the American people that it would be quite improbable if not impossible to crack the wall of resistance to a more affirmative policy than we are currently pursuing. As someone wisely observed in *Manas* sometime back, our trouble is that "we want a clean, simple identification of good and evil in the Cuban revolution and we cannot have it." The real dilemma is the long-building pressure within us to look at other peoples as either *for* or *against* the Communists, or *for* or *against* us. But life is vastly more complicated than that, especially in dealing with a young, proud, sensitive, revolutionary regime like Castro's.

I was told repeatedly by Cubans, including many middle-of-the-roaders, that the heart of Cuba's concern, the cause of her frenzied accumulation of Soviet weapons, and the source of much of the hysteria and intransigence could be found in the fear of imminent invasion from the United States or Latin America. "If you lived under the daily threat of invasion from a powerful enemy," said one schoolteacher in Oriente Province, "you too would behave as we do."

When I argued that the threat of invasion had been grossly distorted and suggested that it was being used to whip the people of Cuba into making greater sacrifices, I was told to wait and see. Hardly a month after I left Cuba the blow they had feared came in much the manner the Cubans had predicted—except, of course, for the extraordinary ineptness that accompanied the invasion attempt in mid-April.

For a year or more U.S. officials had derided Cuban charges that we were assisting exiles in their plans to invade the island. Our spokesmen in the United Nations countered Cuban accusations by giving solemn assurances that we were in no way involved in invasion plans, if indeed there were any. We scoffed repeatedly at specific Cuban allegations of U.S.-led rebel forces training in Florida and Guatemala.

Now, virtually every Cuban charge during the past year has been confirmed by the shocking disclosures that followed the ill-fated invasion in April. It is true, as the Cubans had charged, that we had built invasion airfields in Guatemala. The nonsense that they were built for purely defensive purposes has now been confirmed for the lie it was. It is true, as the Cubans had charged, that our Central Intelligence Agency was master-minding the plans for invasion—so much so, it turned out, that when the hour to strike came, the *Cuban* leaders of the revolt were held incommunicado in Florida while the CIA took complete command. It is true, as the Cubans had charged, that the invasion plans were in the making for more than a year, for the evidence is conclusive now that the Eisenhower Administration turned the CIA loose on the invasion project a year ago this spring. Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower has now admitted this.

It may seem superfluous at this point to nail down the role we played in the disastrous invasion scheme, but for the record it may be well to quote from a few of the major American anti-Castro sources, all of which relied on the off-the-record briefings of high Administration officials.

Time put it this way: "Through the offices of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon, the United States had done everything to assure success [of the invasion] short of providing an air cover or sending

in the marines. The invaders—all Cubans—were trained by the United States, supplied by the United States, and dispatched by the United States to carry out a plan written by U.S. military experts. President Kennedy knew D-day in advance, and had approved."

The New York *Times* reported in a series of dispatches: "Their [the rebels'] activities were directly supervised by the CIA. . . . The exiles were trained by U.S. military specialists and armed with U.S. ground, sea, and air weapons. . . . The CIA, a division of the government operating under the President and the National Security Council, helped organize, train, finance, and arm the recent unsuccessful efforts of the Cuban refugees to overthrow the Castro government. . . . The CIA masterminded the operation for the American government, first during the Eisenhower Administration and then under President Kennedy."

The St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* put it this way: "The CIA . . . helped organize, train, finance, and arm the Cuban refugees. . . . Many rebels accuse the CIA of monumental mismanagement. They say the CIA precipitated the attack without adequate coordination with the Cuban underground and without including groups experienced in guerrilla tactics. The whole operation was based on the false assumption that a popular uprising against Premier Castro would follow the first landing."

The Castro charge, made long before the invasion attempt, that the whole scheme was largely a CIA show, was confirmed when the invasion came. As *Time*, the New York *Times*, and other publications revealed, leaders of the Cuban rebels were kept under guard in Florida so they could not meddle in CIA operations. The New York *Post* reported:

"The CIA held the six leading members of the Cuban Revolutionary Council incommunicado near an abandoned airfield somewhere in Florida while the 'invasion' was under way. They were not permitted to join the rebel forces or speak in their own name. Statements were issued in their behalf of which they had no knowledge. Only after it was clear the invasion was going to fail were they consulted by top-ranking U.S. officials."

Castroists were to be proven right in their predictions on other counts. An editor in Havana had assured me that the U.S. is "playing around in Florida with the least progressive of those who oppose Castro." After the abortive invasion, the New York *Times* disclosed that the most socially forward-looking of the anti-Castro forces, the People's Revolutionary Movement, "is reported to have received no financial support and almost no equipment." The CIA preferred to play with the more conservative rebels in Florida—the generation that had failed in Cuba—decent democrats perhaps, but Cubans who had ceased to represent anything significant in their homeland. And finally, the Castro spokesmen had assured me that "when the invasion comes, the people of Cuba will show their devotion to Fidel by refusing to join in the rebellion." This, too, proved an accurate prediction.

As I think over my talks and arguments with earnest, sincerely democratic Cubans who sought to explain the basis for the invasion psychology that gripped Cuba, I can see now how right they were, in this respect, and how wrong I was to accept the solemn commitment of American officials who hooted at the very thought that we, through our CIA, were planning the military overthrow of the Castro regime.

Where do we go from here? The pressures are great for inflicting a total embargo of trade on Cuba—to starve her out if we can. There are equally disturbing pressures to embark on full-scale military invasion, with American forces. There is tragically little evidence that either our country or its leadership is prepared to pursue the only road that offers a measure of long-range hope—serious negotiation of the differences that divide us.

I have sought earlier to relate some of the steps in the disastrous game of tit-for-tat played by both sides on the economic front. I want now to discuss the mutual recriminations on the subject of negotiation.

Each side has accused the other of refusing to negotiate differences. The Cuban government has charged that it offered to launch bilateral negotiations in February, 1960, but the United States refused. "The government of the United States," said Castro at the United Nations last September, "does not deign to discuss matters with the small country of Cuba on Cuban problems." In January this year Fidel Castro announced that Cuba was ready to "begin anew" working out a pattern of relations with the United States. In February Castro again held out an olive branch, saying he wanted to establish friendly relations with the United States—on condition that we cease supporting the enemies of his revolution. Che Guevara said last July that the United States and Cuba "could settle their differences tomorrow" if Washington would only recognize that "Cuban sovereignty was the basis and spirit of the revolution," and in January this year he hinted that Castro "is ready at any time for a man-to-man talk with the new Administration." And only last month, *after* the April invasion attempt, the State Department coldly rebuffed a new Cuban offer of negotiation—this one proposed by President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado.

For its part, the U.S. government has abandoned its earlier claims that it is seeking negotiation with Castro's Cuba. There was a time, however, when the State Department emphasized that it had expressed a willingness to negotiate matters on more than twenty-five separate occasions; that it did not decline to negotiate in February, 1960, but merely declined to accept the conditions laid down by Cuba—that the United States would not take any "unilateral" action affecting the Cuban economy and its people while the negotiations were going on.

Official American enthusiasm for negotiation in response to Cuba's February proposal may be judged by this pertinent passage in the U.S. note of February 29, 1960: "The United States cannot accept the con-

dition for the negotiation . . . [because] the government of the United States must remain free . . . to take whatever steps it deems necessary . . . in the defense of the legitimate rights and interests of its people," which have been "adversely affected by the unilateral acts" of Cuba. The U.S. note also specified that before embarking on any negotiations it would want to "explore" through normal diplomatic channels the subjects to be discussed and "manner and place" of negotiations.

When attempts at bilateral negotiations collapsed, both sides began to jockey for position before international bodies. The United States wanted the dispute aired before the Organization of American States, contending that this type of regional handling would be in conformance with the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the OAS charter. But Cuba mistrusted the OAS, arguing that it was a tool of the United States. Cuban Foreign Minister Roa called the OAS the "Ministry of Colonies" of the United States. He demanded that the United Nations handle the controversy.

Cuba's fears of shabby treatment before the OAS may have been premature and exaggerated, but few objective students of the OAS doubt the pervasive influence of the United States in its deliberations. A task force at Northwestern University, in a report prepared for a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, contended after exhaustive investigation little more than a year ago—just before the issue came to a climax—that the "OAS takes as its objective, in large measure, the restoration of peace and the *status quo ante,* not the resolution of underlying conflict. . . . In the main, the OAS has been a conservative organ providing little support for significant political change. . . . In the background, *the colossal power of the United States looms as the fundamental reality.*" (Emphasis added.)

The United States had its way, in part, when the OAS called a Foreign Ministers Conference in San Jose, Costa Rica, last summer. It was not a spectacularly successful conference. The United States failed to get a clear-cut condemnation of Soviet interference in hemisphere affairs, but was obliged to content itself with a declaration that reaffirmed "faith in the regional system" and condemned in a general way extra-continental intervention and the acceptance of extra-continental intervention by any American state.

Many Latin Americans were bitterly disappointed at the outcome of the conference. They had hoped there might be direct talks between the Americans and Cubans, but U.S. officials spurned the proposal on the grounds that we would not negotiate outstanding differences with Castro's regime until Cuba renounced Soviet military protection. The Cuban government refused, but Foreign Minister Roa told the conference that Cuba stood ready to negotiate "in a bilateral way, on a footing of equality . . . her grave differences" with the United States.

Walter Lippmann, who had earlier suggested that the United States ask its Latin neighbors to help resolve the quarrel with Castro, reaffirmed after the San Jose declaration that "it would have been better to shrug off the phony military deal between Castro and the Soviet Union and to put our main emphasis on appealing to the American states to mediate actively the useless and senseless quarrel which Castro provokes."

Apparently some of the participants agreed. According to Tad Szulc, who covered the conference for the New York *Times,* the foreign ministers of Venezuela and Peru did not sign even the watered-down resolution because they were personally opposed to it. The Mexican delegation added a caveat that the declaration was in no way "a condemnation or threat against Cuba," whose aspirations for economic improvement and social justice have deepest sympathy in the government and the people of Mexico."

In subsequent debates at the United Nations, and on other occasions, several Latin American diplomats expressed the hope that negotiations between Cuba and the United States might be resumed. During the United Nations discussions last summer, the Argentinian representative observed that the continuing dispute between the United States and Cuba "harms all the other countries of the continent." It "constitutes for us not merely a source of sorrow, but also and equally a danger," he said as he urged "conciliation." The representative of Ecuador expressed the view that if the dispute continued, the long-run victim would be ". . . the Cuban people . . . and subsequently the other American peoples." He added that ". . . the Cuban government has shown a legitimate insistence that in regard to Cuba there should be respect for the central principles of international co-existence, such as the principle that negotiation should be based on the legal equality of states and on respect for their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence."

When the United States-Cuban dispute came back to the Security Council in January, 1961, United Nations delegate Benites Vinueza of Ecuador said that his delegation was taking part in the debate "with an obvious feeling of sadness" since both states "are linked to my country by ties of close friendship."

The Chilean delegate made much the same point: "For us this is a most painful moment which we deplore more than most because we are linked to those countries by ties of all kinds, by a tradition that has never been interrupted and by bonds that we have always endeavored to strengthen." Brazil, too, has indicated she views our position as dangerously intransigent.

Again, earlier this year, President Arturo Frondizi of Argentina appealed to President Kennedy to negotiate American-Cuban differences, saying that such a course would be looked on with favor by Latin America. Later on, when Argentina made a tentative offer to mediate the dispute, State Department officials said it was "quite obvious" that the United States would reject it. This frigid response created consternation in a number of Latin American capitals. Although Castro's stock has slumped sharply throughout the portions of Latin America I visited, I found in some responsible quarters the uneasy feeling that the United States has been too headstrong, that if it was at all willing to negotiate, which they doubted, it was willing to proceed only on terms that would deny Cuba her sovereign right to make political

and economic deals with whomever she chose.

This, of course, is the heart of our concern—the fear held in the United States that what Walter Lippmann called "a phony military deal between Castro and the Soviet Union" will endanger our security. It is not altogether an idle fear. It is held by many Americans of good will and undoubted conviction that Cuba has needed a social revolution—democratic style. President Kennedy expressed this concern with great clarity when he said in his State of the Union message: "Questions of economic and trade policy can always be negotiated. But Communist domination in this hemisphere can never be negotiated."

I would say several things about this concern:

One—The Russian-Cuban alliance is purely defensive, involving only a situation in which the United States would first attack Cuba.

Two—The enormous Soviet capability to deliver thermonuclear weapons from Russia with pin-point accuracy greatly lessens Cuba's importance as a military base "only ninety miles from our shores."

Three—I could discover no evidence, and our government has never charged, that the Cubans are allowing the Soviets to build missile or any other kind of bases in Cuba, although, to be sure, the Soviets have supplied Castro with arms—after we refused.

Four—If it is complained that while Cuba might not be used as a military but rather as a propaganda base against the United States for all Latin America, I would argue that we have a far greater capability, if we would only use it, to influence the course of events in Latin America along democratic lines, than have Castro and the Communists to influence it along totalitarian lines.

Five—We know from everything that has happened up to now that our negative approach of reprisals, non-intercourse, and encouragement of invasion has tended to solidify the relationship between the Cubans and the Communists. Is it not logical to hope that a more creative approach, based on mutual respect and genuine negotiation, might loosen the Soviet-Cuban hug?

Six—Cuba, as James Reston, chief Washington correspondent for the New York *Times*, pointed out recently, "is not a present danger to the United States. Even if and when it gets the 150 Communist MIG fighter planes . . . there is no serious menace to [our] security." After all, he added, "the mere presence of military force in a weak country is not necessarily a threat to a strong country. Turkey, for example, [right on Russia's border] has been getting from the United States far more power than Castro ever dreamed of getting from the Russians. The U.S. power, including even rockets with nuclear warheads, has been situated in Turkey for a long time, but the Russians, while annoyed by this fact, have not felt obliged to use their power to invade Turkey."

But beyond all these considerations is the rarely expressed fact that the United States is prohibited by the charter of the OAS, in whose preparation we played a decisive role, from directly or *indirectly* intervening in Cuba's revolution. It seems clear to me, as it does to many of our friends around the world that, in encouraging and assisting the April invasion attempt, we violated both the letter and spirit of Articles Fifteen to Seventeen of the Charter which say:

"No state or group of states has the right to intervene, *directly or indirectly*, for any reason whatever, *in the internal or external affairs of any other state.* The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force, *but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the state or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.* . . . No state may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of *an economic or political* character in order to force the sovereign will of another state. The territory of a state is inviolable." (Emphasis added.)

Obviously we wrote this language into the OAS charter to protect

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

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Latin America from Communist infiltration, but can any honest American doubt that our policy toward Cuba has violated both the letter and spirit of our own creation? Can anyone now doubt that we have given aid, direct and indirect, against "the personality" of the Cuban state and against its "political, economic, and cultural elements?"

The only alternative to forbidden intervention, it seems to me, is genuine negotiation, or, at the very least, the hands-off policy inflexibly required by the OAS Charter. Anything else, it seems clear, would result in a resumption of the perilous game of tit-for-tat which can only widen the gulf and magnify the crisis. Certainly it would never diminish Castro's dependence on the Communists or bring him an inch closer to us.

A year ago, Joseph Alsop, who has never been accused, however faintly, of appeasement, warned where our game would lead us: "The people at home who have begun to talk loudly about Cuba will do well to remember how the Suez crisis started. It started, in effect, because the late John Foster Dulles began a game of tit-for-tat with Gamal Abdel Nasser. . . . The temptation to begin a game of tit-for-tat with Fidel Castro is already strong, and it is likely to grow stronger. . . . Cut the quota, and Castro will seize the American investments still untouched in Cuba. Increase the pressure, and he will demand the evacuation of Guantanamo naval base. Break diplomatic relations and he will make Cuba into a Soviet base in our hemisphere. . . . Compared to Castro, Nasser is humble, sluggish. . . . If Nasser reacted violently to the beginning of a game of tit-for-tat, Castro can be expected to react ten times more violently. He can in fact be expected to play out the game of tit-for-tat to the limit of his resources."

Alsop's prophecy of March, 1960, has been borne out with startling completeness—and yet there are men high in the Kennedy Administration, not excluding the President, who are playing around with a further extension of the game of tit-for-tat that can lead nowhere except down the same dead-end street of reprisal and recrimination. Said Senator Mike Mansfield to his colleagues in the Senate: "We had better face the fact that there will be no victory for one side or the other. The fact is that the dispute has already caused serious damage to Cuba, to the United States, and to the Western Hemisphere."

In his State of the Union message to Congress earlier this year, President Kennedy won the hearts of democratic men of good will everywhere when he said, "If freedom and Communism were to compete for man's allegiance in a world of peace, I would look to the future with ever increasing confidence." Why are we unwilling to compete in Cuba? The United States has vast reserves of good will among the people of Cuba and the Communists do not. Why not, then, compete by embarking on a program of creative negotiations designed to reach, if nothing more, a live-and-let-live agreement? Castro has stated his willingness to cease efforts to export the Cuban revolution to the rest of Latin America if we will end our encouragement of and assistance for the Cuban rebels in the United States.

We reject the ideology of Soviet Russia, but we recognize her, trade with her, and exchange cultural relations. We say we despise the corrupt dictatorships of Latin America, but we recognize them, trade with them, and aid them. We do not even recognize Communist China, but its envoy and ours meet regularly in Warsaw to haggle over differences. But Cuba we have cut dead.

If we decide not to negotiate with Castro's Cuba—and I am aware that there is powerful public opinion, based on distorted press reports, hostile to the notion of negotiation—we ought at least do two things—or, rather, not do two things.

One—We must not be lured again by the CIA and other adventurers into embarking on further military action against Cuba. We must emphatically not be stampeded by jingoists into invading Cuba. Such a course would be morally reprehensible and legally wrong. But more than that, it would recreate, all over Latin America, the image of Yankee imperialism and gunboat diplomacy. It would destroy Cuba's sovereignty in violation of our solemn commitments under the OAS. And most of all, it would fatally impair one of our most treasured concepts, one stemming from the Declaration of Independence, that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, for it is clear that Castro still retains the support of a majority of his people.

Two—We must do nothing to encourage the restoration of the *status quo ante,* for this could only pave the way for new violence and bloodshed in that tragic island. There has been much disturbing evidence that some of the counter-revolutionary forces we are encouraging and assisting are bent on sweeping out much of the good as well as the ill of Castro's revolution. The April invasion attempt showed how closely our CIA works with the conservative crowd among the exiles.

These two "don'ts" represent the minimum requirements of a wait-and-see policy. Far from resting on these two negative concepts, the United States, I believe, should begin to explore the possibilities of a *modus vivendi,* perhaps to propose the establishment of the kind of informal committee the psychologist in Havana suggested—a committee that would probe for roads to understanding and agreements without at first committing anyone. After all, we have left them only the Communists to talk to. It is conceivable that if we met and talked, and they listened to our side of the story and we to theirs, we might find a spot of common ground. We have tried almost everything else.

Everywhere in the world, said James Reston of the New York *Times* recently, the United States is "trying to defend or establish a simple overriding principle: that force shall not be used, directly or indirectly, to achieve political ends, and that all international disputes shall be settled by negotiation." The United States will be fouling its own concept of world order unless it ends its sullen refusal to negotiate with Castro's Cuba. We are different from the Communists in that we believe, or say we believe, that law must prevail over power. Here, with a powerful giant opposed to a tiny island, is our chance to prove we mean what we say.



VENEZUELA and COLOMBIA

New Outposts of Democracy

MY PRINCIPAL purpose when I left Cuba for parts of South and Central America was to determine what other Latin American societies were doing to prevent the rise of Castroism and Communism by responding to the relentless pressure for reform rolling up from the wretched countryside and the city slums. "Are you moving fast enough, democratically, to prevent totalitarian solutions?" This, in essence, was the question I asked everywhere I went.

I sought my answer first in the two countries that command the northern rim of South America—Venezuela and Colombia. Both countries are new democracies nursing infant reform programs. Both countries are caught between the powerful and persistent pressures of the far right and the far left. Both countries are struggling with coalition governments because of factional strife that attended their birth as democracies.

My overriding impression, as I left both countries, was the same: While Venezuela and Colombia are moving in a hopeful direction, the pace of reform is far too slow, perhaps even fatally so—especially when compared with the push-button speed with which Castro's Cuba is demolishing the old order and bridging the gulf between the very rich and the very poor. I want to report on Venezuela first.

In understanding Venezuela, the salient ingredient is the fact that she vaulted from ancient feudalism to modern democracy and achieved a fabulous rate of growth in a remarkably brief period. For a century violence and dictatorship—the former as frequent and the latter as brutal as in any country in the world—dominated the Venezuelan scene. Except for one or two fleeting periods, Venezuela had had no exposure to constitutional traditions and no experience in the practices of democracy until the present regime of Romulo Betancourt came to power in February, 1959, after a swift revolution.

Under the dictatorship that preceded the revolution, that of Marcos Perez Jimenez, the people of Venezuela lived in the grip of sadistic terror. The dictator's lust for power and wealth—he was reported by the New York *Times* to have stashed away more than a quarter of a billion dollars by the time he was driven from office—overrode every need of the Venezuelan people. The country was a colossally corrupt police state, with total suppression of freedom, wholesale public and private immorality, police brutality, torture, an elaborate spying network, and a medieval concentration camp in the swamps of the Orinoco River.

Dictator Jimenez squandered millions of dollars on luxury hotels and handsome boulevards to impress visitors to Caracas, blasted tunnels through the mountains for showy highways, and generally erected an expensive facade to conceal the nightmare of oppression and poverty that gripped the country. He spent millions on a dazzling new hotel atop the mountain that rims Caracas, a building of luxurious splendor reached by expensive cable-car, while two-thirds of the population in the countryside lived on the edge of starvation.

And yet when revolution came, the United States remained remarkably aloof, here as elsewhere in Latin America. We had not only supported the regime of Perez Jimenez because we thought it was fighting Communism—which it was not—but we also decorated the dictator, under the Eisenhower Administration, with the Order of Merit. Meanwhile, American businessmen in Venezuela, as they piled up staggering fortunes in the artificial boom, praised the "accomplishments" of the dictator's rule.

Some indication of the kind of representation we had in Latin American embassies at that time may be gleaned from this episode: In January, 1958, when the revolution against the bloody tyrant was raging in Venezuela, our former ambassador to that country, Fletcher Warren, then in Turkey, wrote Pedro Estrada, head of the hated secret police and the dictator's number one butcher and torturer, wishing him success in putting down the people's revolt. Few developments in Latin America have cost us so dearly as our friendship for and decoration of Perez Jimenez, who is now living in luxury in Florida. The resentment in Venezuela itself boiled over in the violence which attended Vice President Richard M. Nixon's tragic visit to that country. The U. S.

government and the press charged off the affair, as usual, to Communist propaganda, but the bitterness of the Venezuelans ran much deeper and was more genuine and widespread than could be explained by a sham political show.

When the revolutionary government of Romulo Betancourt came to power in February, 1959, it took over a country that was riddled with poverty, bursting with pressures for extreme and immediate solutions, and saddled with a short-term debt of a billion-and-a-half dollars as a result of the waste, graft, and plundering by the Perez Jimenez regime.

Venezuela's staggering wealth in petroleum—she is the second largest producer in the world—and in other resources, notably iron ore, has produced the highest rate of economic growth and per capita income in Latin America. The tax revenues from Venezuela's immense oil production might have made the country a model of healthy, promising development, but Betancourt inherited a society in which explosive tensions were as deep and the gulf between the fabulously wealthy and the desperately poor was as great as in any country in Latin America. The country was broke when Betancourt took over, and it is tottering on the edge of bankruptcy even today.

Venezuela's history of violence, directed at itself, has not come to an end with the birth of democracy. Plots from the right and the left have rocked the country during the past year. A right-wing bombing plot, said to have been inspired by the reactionary Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic, nearly killed President Betancourt last June. His hands are still red and raw from the bombing, and his face bears some of its marks. Last December and January it was the leftists' turn to stage a series of bloody riots and bus burnings which shook the nation and brought a suspension, still largely in effect, of several basic constitutional liberties designed to keep the terrorists in check.

The tensions, confusion, and drop in confidence produced by these disorders have done much to slow the progress of the fledgling democracy.

In many ways, Venezuela is widely regarded as the most important test of democracy in Latin America, but its course is impeded not only by violent pressure from left and right, but by the resistance of the business community, including a number of American investors, to the only course of social reform that would enable Venezuela to stand on its own feet as a stable democracy.

"We are in the midst of a great

dilemma," said President Betancourt. "Either the Cuban method will prevail, or we will do it the Venezuelan way—a legal, evolutionary revolution. To do it the Venezuelan way, we shall have to forge steadily forward with a program of social progress that helps redress the grievances which our people legitimately hold against society as it functions now."

The grievances are great. Consider these:

¶ Unemployment stands at twelve to fifteen per cent of the working populace. Illiteracy blights the lives of fifty to sixty per cent of the people.

¶ Half a million children of school age are unable to attend school because of the chronic shortage of teachers and educational facilities.

¶ Some two per cent of the landowners hold seventy-five per cent of the land.

¶ Half the nation suffers from disease and malnutrition.

¶ Housing is desperately short; more than one-third of the population lives in blighted hovels.

¶ Throughout the country, most people have inadequate food, clothing, and shelter.

¶ In Caracas alone, some three to four hundred thousand persons, half of them unemployed and hungry, live in ramshackle huts made of cardboard, mud, and tincans on hillsides that run with sewage.

¶ Down in the valley and on hills across the city are the great mansions of the multi-millionaires. In Caracas, too, are 120,000 boys under twelve years of age who have no home. They are called the *abanonados*.

These are but a few of the grim statistics that may help reveal the outlines of the challenge that confronts Betancourt and his regime. They are struggling on every front to relieve tension by multiplying opportunity, but the pace is painfully slow. The disheartening slowness results from a variety of causes:

One—The regime itself is a moderate one, committed to acting democratically, and thus slowly.

Two—When it does move forward on a reform front, it encounters crippling resistance from the still powerful oligarchy and a certain group of American business interests, and sabotaging interference from far leftist forces.

Three—It is a coalition government that must secure its left and right flanks—in other words, compromise—before it goes into action.

Four—It is woefully short of funds, partly as the result of the plundering of the dictatorship.

Five—As an infant democracy, with no reserve of trained manpower, the Betancourt government is everywhere seriously hampered by a lack of administrative, managerial, and technical personnel to staff the many number two and three spots in government and on major public projects.

Another problem, which deserves separate treatment, arises from President Betancourt's passionate commitment to maintaining a constitutional democracy. This is a demanding commitment in terms of his time and energy because the foundations of Venezuelan freedom are so fragile. He must work and scheme endlessly to prevent coups from left and right—so much so that he seems sometimes not to have the time and energy he needs to build the solid social underpinnings of political democracy. Betancourt, once a Communist, is now a true believer in democracy and democratic reform. He almost seems to count each day that constitutional government survives as a miracle. The two years and three months of his stewardship represent the longest period of constitutional democracy

in the history of his country—and he is rightly proud of this achievement. But it drains his strength for other equally compelling tasks.

In the critical field of housing, the Betancourt regime is making steady if slow progress—nothing that approximates the pace in Cuba. Many people in Venezuela, Betancourt observed one day, are still living in huts as primitive as those that Christopher Columbus found when he discovered Venezuela on his third journey to the New World, but with the "additional burdens of microbes and diseases unknown at the time of Columbus."

The Betancourt government is moving on two fronts in housing. It is providing free water and electricity for those who live in the shabby hill-side slums, and it has embarked on a program of building new homes —a program whose goal is 70,000 new dwellings a year, a modest enough beginning considering the rapidly growing population and the present backlog of demand for some 800,000 new units. Betancourt and his colleagues are seeking to close the gap with a self-help housing scheme under which families are given credit to buy materials and finance supervision but do much of the work themselves.

To combat unemployment, the government is seeking to attract new industries to Venezuela and to develop a program of public works. Both programs are functioning fitfully. New industries, especially in the consumer field, are being established by American and other foreign enterprise, but there has been little new heavy industry in the past two years, largely because foreign capital is so skittish about the political stability of the country. As for public works, the program is limited by the lack of adequate funds, the absence of meaningful foreign aid, and by the demand of the foreign and domestic business communities for "fiscal responsibility," which means a balanced budget and lower expenditures for job-creating projects.

In the all-important field of agrarian reform, the government is making diligent if desultory progress. The problem is simply too big for the moderate program on which it is embarked. The pressures are enormous. Not only do two per cent of the landowners own seventy-five per cent of the land; among the small landowners, two-thirds own less than twelve and-a-half acres, and fourteen per cent own less than two-and-a-half acres. The multitude who own nothing is unnumbered, as far as I could determine. But I was told officially that three-quarters of the agricultural land is in 6,700 units of 2,500 acres or more. The average annual income of the peasant family, on the other hand, is $240.

The agrarian reform law is designed to get parcels of land into the hands of these *campesinos* now living on a barely subsistence level. The government is distributing government-owned lands, idle lands, inefficiently used lands, illicitly acquired lands, and, where necessary, private holdings. Unlike the practice in Castro's Cuba, lands confiscated from private holders are paid for partly in cash and partly in long-term bonds. Some 25,000 to 30,000 families are being settled on their own land each year.

Aside from making the land available, the government has a program designed to provide funds for farm homes on twenty-year loans at low interest rates, and to provide comparably long-term loans for feed, seed, and equipment. Side by side go rural

programs for road building, schools, sanitation, and housing facilities.

"I have made two-and-a-half million acres of land available for distribution to small farmers in two years," said President Betancourt recently. "That is more than Castro has done. Moreover, we pay for it. We are not seizing the land of foreigners. We are buying it."

This is doubtless true, but I do not think Betancourt would insist that his program ranges as widely or runs as deeply as the agrarian reform in Castro's Cuba. I confess I did not see Venezuela's program at close range as I did Cuba's. Some of my most trusted informants, both among Americans and Venezuelans, reported to me that the Venezuelan program, while fine in concept and fair in operation, was not meeting the challenge as forcefully as it might. There is some grumbling that the holdings are too small. There is a woeful lack of coordination of government agencies in the field. There are many complaints over the slowness in processing government loans. And here, as everywhere else, there is a dismaying absence of adequate technical and supervisory personnel.

All in all, the conclusion I came away with was that the program is working tolerably well but does not move fast enough or go deeply enough to satisfy the hunger for land ownership and the pressure for reform. While it lags behind Cuba's agarian reform in scope and depth, it does have the happy advantage of providing land, however small a parcel, for the land-hungry peasantry. In Cuba, many of those who work on the land share only a theoretical ownership and are, in reality, workers for wages arbitrarily fixed by the state.

Venezuela harbors what is widely regarded as the strongest labor movement in Latin America outside Mexico—and yet it is only three years old. Nearly half of the total working force of two-and-a-half million is enrolled in unions. This is a politically motivated labor movement down to its shoestrings—with the unions tied tightly to political parties. It has signed thousands of contracts providing for wage scales and fringe benefits almost unheard of in the rest of Latin America, but many of the benefits are eaten up by the staggering cost of living.

Betancourt's Democratic Action Party (AD) dominates the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV), but it is constantly required to fight rearguard actions against the Communists. The Democratic Action Party wing of the CTV still includes

a fair number of relatively extreme leftists who are not Communists, but mostly Betancourt has succeeded in shaping it in his own image of democratic, moderate, middle-of-the-road reform.

Castroism represented a powerful force in the Venezuelan labor movement a year or more ago, but its hold on the workers has dropped decisively. For example, back in early 1960, the Venezuelan labor movement signed a pact of friendship and collaboration with Castro's Communist-dominated labor movement. More recently, however, the council of the CTV voted thirty-seven to twenty-three to put the pact in a deep freeze and leave it that way indefinitely. The twenty-three votes of the minority came from the Communist unions and those which had been expelled from the AD for taking a far leftist position on a number of domestic and foreign policy issues.

Communists have been denied a role in the national government by President Betancourt, but they are represented in both houses of the legislature and, fairly widely, in municipal government.

In the elections which sent Betancourt to the presidency and his AD party to coalition power in congress, the Communists polled three per cent of the vote for president and six per cent for congressional seats. Claiming only 30,000 members in a total population of 7,000,000, they are a small but tightly organized group that makes no secret of its hopes to destroy the Betancourt government. They oppose as too weaseling and conservative the same reform laws resisted by the wealthy oligarchy as too radical and confiscatory. They would not be greatly disturbed if a right-wing army coup overthrew the democratic Betancourt regime, for this would simplify things for them. It would be much easier, for example, to fire away at the uncomplicatedly reactionary position of the right than to try to undermine the social democracy which is the heart of the Betancourt administration.

Venezuela's Communist spokesmen make occasional pilgrimages to the shrines in Moscow and Peking, but insist they are "absolutely independent" of both—a claim no one takes

seriously. They are aided in their domestic efforts by a considerable flow of written materials from Soviet Russia and Communist China and by Communist short wave radio programs in Spanish beamed to Latin America from the mother countries —programs, incidentally, which are more numerous and longer-lasting than those beamed that way in Spanish by the Voice of America.

On the far right, the dominant oligarchy of banking, commercial, industrial, and landowning interests seeks to keep a tight rein on reform. It regards Betancourt's regime as radical, but so ultra-conservative an American as Republican Senator Homer Capehart of Indiana concluded after a personal tour of inspection that "the coalition government is attempting to put into effect moderate economic and social policies which are quite necessary for the future development of the nation."

Many of the Venezuelan oligarchy, and more than a few American business men, yearn for a return of the times of Perez Jimenez when they could be sure of their special concessions, tax favors, and police-state stability. They show their distaste for the moderate regime of Romulo Betancourt by holding back on expansion and promoting a flight of capital from Venezuela.

Most of the keenest observers with whom I talked are convinced that Venezuela's crisis is based more on fear than fact, that it is psychological and political rather than economic. The declining confidence is based on the presposterous fear that Betancourt is going too far too fast, and on the more tenable concern over riots, disorders, and a lack of clear-cut direction by the government.

One forward-looking American business man put it to me this way: "Betancourt is a great man, a true democratic liberal, but he is so tied down by the coalition and so harassed by the pressures from left and right that he has not been able to produce a clear-cut program that commands confidence. Moreover, those of us who believe in reform are disturbed that there are elements in Betancourt's AD party that want to go too far toward the left—to include schemes of nationalization in their program—and this dismays us. That is why there is a lack of confidence and a flight of capital. I am personally optimistic about the future, but the government has a long, hard road to travel."

I was to hear again and again that Betancourt's Venezuela is a major testing ground for all Latin America in the struggle between the extremism of Castroism and Communism and the middle-of-the-road course of democratic reform. Many of those with whom I talked were hopeful but few were optimistic about the outcome.

"It is a race between two alternatives," said one highly placed American observer, "a race between greatly accelerated social revolution and bloody revolution. Venezuela is enormously wealthy. If she cannot, with all her vast resources, make the moderate, democratic turn, I would despair for all Latin America. There is a fighting chance for success here, but it will take greater effort, more sacrifice, and a measure of U. S. aid to achieve the social and economic progress on which political democracy must rest. Time is not on Venezuela's side."

This judgment expressed the mood of many another American, Venezuelan, and United Nations official I interviewed. It was the mood in which I left Venezuela for Colombia.

Many of Colombia's internal problems are quite different from Venezuela's, but they add up to the same challenge—a race against time and tyranny. Fourth largest country in South America, as large as Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico combined, Colombia's climate includes extreme tropical heat and steady biting cold. The lofty Andes enter

Colombia in the southwest part of the country and fan out in three mountain ranges—a fact which colors the political life of the country.

Like its eastern neighbor, Venezuela, Colombia only recently, in 1958, threw out a brutal dictatorship and acquired a democratic government, but one with a unique constitutional form.

Unlike Venezuela, Colombia had prided itself on a long tradition of constitutional government. More than a decade ago, however, it succumbed to dictatorship, the last phase of which was under the brutal rule of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, a cruel, strutting, power-hungry tyrant whose regime was marked by wholesale graft and corruption and by numerous arrests and murders. Colombia was prosperous then because of the high price of coffee, far and away Colombia's most important crop, but Rojas Pinilla and his associates piled up such enormous personal fortunes that when the dictator was driven from power he left the country deeply in debt. When Rojas Pinilla fell in a brief revolution, the rejoicing was unparalleled in the history of Colombia.

The end of a decade of suppression and terror was followed by the re-establishment of a constitutional democracy, but along curious lines. Colombia had been torn for a century between two parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals, not in the usual sense of political conflict, but along violent, bloody lines—actual civil war. When the Conservatives were in power, as they were for a considerable time, they embarked on a program of violent persecution which resulted in the murder of thousands of Liberals by the Conservative police and soldiery.

With the overthrow of the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla, the big question was which party could rule without creating a new chaos and violence that might overthrow democracy and re-establish dictatorship. Given the bitter, century-old division, it was clear that neither could. The ruling *junta* which took charge after the collapse of the dictatorship brought both parties together to achieve an extraordinary solution: Each party would take a turn at the presidency, and both parties would share control of the legislative branch.

The exact details of the peace settlement, after a false start or two, were these: No matter what the political mood of the country, the Liberals were to have the first president, for four years; then the Conservatives would have the presidency, and so on for sixteen years. In addition, seats in Congress, provincial governorships, and other key posts were to be divided equally between the two parties for the sixteen-year period. Both parties agreed to this because they felt it represented the only hope for a peaceful resolution of their bitter differences.

At best, of course, this peculiar arrangement makes for a precarious balance that requires a great deal of tact and tolerance on both sides. It is designed to serve only as a holding device for the eventual restoration of genuine democracy. At worst, it is, in effect, a negation of the basic principle of democracy, for it denies the voters, for sixteen years, the right to choose the party and the leaders to govern them. But both Liberals and Conservatives agreed it was the only way they could live together in peace under a constitutional system.

The Liberals captured an impressive majority of the votes in the first election, but it does them little good; they must share control equally with the Conservatives. Some of the more fiery spokesmen of the Liberal Party, leftists all, are chafing under the rigid arrangement and are demanding a change. But change, if it is to come constitutionally, cannot come until after 1962, not until after a Conservative president is elected and a new congress convened, because a constitutional amendment requires the affirmative vote of two successive sessions of the congress.

Fortunately for Colombia, its fragile political system was reinforced somewhat by the election to the presidency of Alberto Lleras Camargo, a leader of considerable ability, progressive vision, and hemispheric stature, who came to office in August, 1958, and will serve until August, 1962, when he will be automatically succeeded by a Conservative. President Lleras' hands have been tied on occasion by the peculiar composition of the congress, but he has used his gifts for affirmative leadership to break through the fifty-fifty stalemate to achieve a measure of encouraging progress.

One of the significant advances of the past few years has been a sharp reduction in "the violence"—a sort of unceasing guerrilla warfare that rages through the mountain passes in certain areas of Colombia. This warfare, a remnant of the large-scale civil war between Liberals and Conservatives for so many years, has claimed about 300,000 lives in the past thirteen years. Daily fatalities have now been reduced from an average of one hundred a day to seven a day. Still, the toll was 2,600 in 1960, including hundreds of women and children who were ambushed and slaughtered by roving gangs of hoodlums. Some of the bands are composed of Communists who conduct an unceasing struggle, but most of them are just plain outlaws. Their ranks include a considerable number of young men who are the sons of subsistence farmers who have no place for them on their tiny farms.

Lleras' government has conducted a militant police action against the roaming guerrilla forces, but it is a long way from wiping them out altogether. Lack of adequate roads and the division of the country by towering mountain ranges have made it difficult for government troops to penetrate the last pockets of gangster violence.

But the major struggle of the Lleras regime is being waged against poverty, disease, and illiteracy. Here, too, success is modified by many reverses. The evenly divided character of the government often prevents decisive action, and the power of the ancient oligarchy provides a constant brake on more rapid social progress. The result has been delayed starts,

fitful progress, and a considerable accumulation of unfinished business.

In public housing, for example, the government is helping to build low-cost homes at the rate of about 15,000 a year, but this is not nearly fast enough. The present need is for at least 275,000 new homes. New requirements are growing at the rate of 25,000 a year, or 10,000 more than are being built to meet old needs. From all I could learn, the government agency in charge is doing an excellent job as far as it goes in helping to provide modest homes on twenty-year payment plans, but it doesn't go far enough. It is hampered by lack of funds but the agency is now hopeful the United States will make a loan available to meet this pressing need.

Agrarian reform is a major concern of the Lleras government. Much has been done under existing legislation, but a new measure designed to speed progress and provide the tools for better management was still alive in the congress, although blocked by conservative forces, when I was in Colombia this spring. Colombian agriculture was revolutionized after World War II by new scientific developments. The discovery of DDT and other insecticides has made it possible to control much disease in the tropics and open vast new lands to cultivation. The introduction of a new breed of cattle that prospers in the lowlands has added significantly to Colombia's meat-producing capacity, as has the use of new grazing grasses that grow well in the tropics.

The two principal ingredients of Colombian land reform are parcelization, under which the government sells plots of land to farmers under favorable terms, and colonization of the public domain, under which farmers are given a piece of land and the credit to begin operations. As the country's principal landowner, holding seventy-five per cent of the land, this government is able to move much more rapidly than are those elsewhere in Latin America where so much of the land is held in large estates by private landowners.

Most Colombian farmers today have precious little land—one to four acres—on which they raise coffee or sugar. They are hampered in improving their lot by ignorance of modern methods—seventy-five per cent of the rural population, for example, is illiterate. A Colombian who understands the farm problem pleaded eloquently with me for the establishment of farm machinery centers, with U. S. funds, that would lend out equipment to farmers without charge.

"Such a plan," he argued, "would bring direct assistance to the farmers, who would know that this is an American operation and would respond accordingly." He told me how widely and favorably the Rockefellers are known for their experimental work in Colombian agriculture. I heard much the same about the Rockefellers in Venezuela.

Where it is functioning effectively, the agrarian reform program does much to contain the rising pressure for a better life and check the demand for more extreme solutions. I was told, for example, of one Communist-dominated area of violence where the government went in with its parcelization program, offering title to land and agricultural credit. The Communist leaders opposed the plan as "capitalistic subterfuge." But government agents talked directly to the people. They held out the papers and said, "Here are the titles to the land. Do you want them, or would you prefer to listen to Communist promises?" The landless peasants broke away from their Communist leadership, accepted the titles, and today till their own land with great satisfaction.

But there is much more to the problem than the distribution of land to the landless. There is the urgent need to provide technical assistance and extension services, to build schools and medical facilities, and to construct access roads from the farms to the main arteries of traffic. The Lleras government is moving ahead on all these fronts, but the pace is not rapid enough. The present plan calls for placing some 60,000 families on their own land through parcelization and colonization, but the number of farm families urgently needing help is estimated to be six or seven times that total. The building of rural schools and medical centers is an even slower process. The compelling need for crop diversification—coffee now provides nearly eighty per cent of foreign exchange—is much in the mind of the government, but progress has been slow.

In the field of education, the government is achieving modest progress, but nothing resembling the results of the crash program in Cuba. The country as a whole is more than fifty per cent illiterate. To combat this condition, the Lleras regime has embarked on a four-year plan to construct 8,600 classrooms for primary schools to serve 364,000 pupils. This would reduce the present classroom deficit by thirty-five per cent in four years, but would not resolve the whole problem until 1972, at the earliest.

Symbolic of the Lleras regime's approach to the challenge in Colombia is the development of a TVA-type of program on the Cauca River, at Cali, a city of 600,000 inhabitants, many of them living on the edge of starvation. The integrated project calls for the production and distribution of hydroelectric power, flood control, and irrigation for more than a million acres of land. Financing of the program has come in part from the United States, in part from the World Bank, and in part from a special tax on the wealthier landowners. It is far from completed, but it is achieving affirmative results even now. A group of civic leaders, for example, enticed some 3,000 persons from a local pro-Castro leader by showing them how the project would help them to help themselves to a better life.

Castroism, as elsewhere in Latin America, has followed an up-and-down course in Colombia. A year or more ago the bearded Cuban and his program commanded more than ninety per cent of Colombian public opinion, but it has skidded to a small fraction of that proportion now. A recent representative poll showed that sixty-six per cent of urban Colombians and seventy-four per cent of rural residents felt that Castro's was not a good example for Colombia to follow. On the other hand, there is persuasive evidence that failure of the government to solve the country's pressing problems could lead to a considerable revival of Castroism.

The Communists are not numerically potent—most students of the party, legalized by Lleras, estimate its strength at 5,000 to 6,000. But its influence is far greater than these numbers imply because of the party's massive production and distribution of Communist literature. In barber shops, restaurants, and other places where people are chair-ridden for a time, they are sandbagged with Communist and Castroist publications. One Colombian told me that the Communists do a much better job than the Americans in making their propaganda available to the people of Colombia. "The Americans," he said, "are over-confident. They need to do a lot more than they are now doing to present the democratic point of view to people who are still not sure what direction is best."

This same Colombian, a petroleum technician with considerable understanding of his country's mood, pleaded for a more extended program of American scholarships for Colombian students, a far more expansive program of sending American professors to Colombian universities, and a greatly enlarged American-financed program of teaching English to Colombians.

"There is an incredible hunger to know English," he said. "You are doing some things now to make this possible, but there is much more you can do by way of extending the program and making it available to those who cannot afford to pay the present fees. When people learn English, they learn the ways of democracy. It would cost you so little to expand your present operation. And as for scholarships, it is important to remember that much of the Castro and Communist sentiment is lodged with students. If you would make more scholarships available, and make them available early enough so the potential recipients could learn English before they got to the States, you could do a great deal to impress the younger generation with what American-style democracy has to offer them."

This Colombian, and several others, all of them devout Catholics, were remarkably candid in expressing their judgments regarding the Church's role in almost completely Catholic Colombia.

"The Church," said the petroleum technician, "has been a thoroughly reactionary force until recently. It worked closely with the Conservative Party, often condoning liquidation of liberals by violence. In every community the Church owned much of the best land, and the priests in some cases were the richest men in town. They aligned themselves with the oligarchy in combating social reform and keeping the poor in their place."

But this has now changed, at least in part, he said. "Cardinal Concha is an enlightened, forward-looking leader who has been seeking to make the Church a great force for social reform. There are still many reactionary priests, but those at the top of the hierarchy are working hard to achieve countrywide improvement. The direction is definitely hopeful."

I was to hear this all through Latin America. In Venezuela, for instance, the official Church is now arrayed on the side of social progress. This is vastly important because the democratic forces in both Venezuela and Colombia need every ally they can get. Both cling to democracy, each in its own way, and both are committed to reform programs. Both are battered relentlessly by the extreme forces of right and left. And both must move more swiftly and resolutely to put their houses in order if they are to keep from dropping off the deep end to the dictatorships from which they only recently escaped.

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HAITI and DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Two Dictators Share an Island

THE ISLAND of Hispaniola, discovered by Christopher Columbus December 6, 1492, is shared by two countries, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, both of which are corrupt tyrannies. There are significant differences between the two nations. Haiti is a black country whose people speak French and Creole, while the Dominican Republic is white and Indian, whose people speak Spanish. The Dominican Republic is wealthier and more industrialized than Haiti, which is dominated by rural slums. But both countries are alike in being governed by bribe-infested dictatorships.

Haiti, which occupies the westernmost third of the island lying in the Caribbean Sea between Puerto Rico and Cuba, is frequently described as an exotic land where the ancient folkways of Africa, including voodooism, combine with a renaissance in native art to provide a distinctive flavor that separates Haiti from her neighbors in the Caribbean. I saw only little of this side of Haitian life, for most of my time there was spent exploring the politics and economics of the country.

I did see some of the most beautiful women in the world. While Haitian women, by our standards, are beasts of burden who bear farm produce and handicraft goods to market on their heads, it is a joy to watch them on the streets and in the marketplace — tall, black, colorfully dressed, with heads proudly erect as they balance their baskets heavy-laden with the stuff they hope to sell. They walk like queens. Sometimes they will walk several days and nights from farm to market while their husbands, if they have them, stay home to work the field. There are so many sellers in the marketplace and so few customers that one almost gets the impression that they are playing store, as children will, selling to each other. The women, incidentally, are duty-bound by tradition to bring home to their men every penny earned in the market.

Haiti is a country of green mountains and blue-green water, of magnificent foliage and beautiful beaches, but it is also a country of some of the most squalid slums in the world. There are many streets in Port-au-Prince which have an intolerable stench because there are no toilet and sewage facilities, indoors or out, in whole blocks of the capital city.

Corruption, tyranny, and violence are no strangers to the people of Haiti. Haitian history is replete with bloody struggles for power. From 1804 to 1915, Haiti had only two rulers who served their full terms. The other twenty-three were overthrown or died in office, five of them violently. From 1915 to 1934, the country was occupied by U. S. Marines dispatched there to "preserve order" and "safeguard our interests." The present president, Dr. Francois Duvalier, came to power in 1957 after nine months of turbulence during which five transitory regimes followed one another in rapid succession after the peaceful overthrow of Paul E. Magloire in December, 1956.

Tourist literature in Haiti describes the present government as "a republic — independent and self-governed." This is far from the truth, as I discovered from talks with thoughtful Haitians and Americans resident in Haiti. Dr. Duvalier maintains a tight rein on the people, permitting them no freedom of the press, assembly, or right to petition for redress of grievances. His civil guard, a gestapo-like organization that terrorizes the populace and keeps the army under its thumb, is the most powerful force in Haiti — and it is tightly under the president's personal control. Opposition to the regime is widespread, but disorganized and leaderless. All the leaders have either fled the country, or they rot in jail where the system of refined torture is said to have produced many cases of insanity.

Corruption is rampant. One middle-class Haitian, a man of superior education and community status, bitterly complained that "eighty per cent of the aid given Haiti by the United States is wasted, some of it the result of mismanagement and the rest of outright corruption." This Haitian suggested that if the United States continued its aid program, it should openly "siphon off ten per

cent, give it to government officials as their share of the booty, and make the rest directly available to the people."

Another Haitian, who spoke to me only after receiving my firm assurance that his identity would not be revealed, blamed much of Haiti's plight on the United States. "It is your government's help that has kept this crooked crowd in power. It might have fallen if you had not rushed to its assistance, but you kept it alive and now it may be too late to do anything to save our people from this tyrannical gang."

The Duvalier regime, said another Haitian in furtive conversation with me, "has not done one damned thing for the people in its three years in power. Illiteracy is growing worse instead of better. The poverty is unbelievable until you see it close up. The president is doing little if anything to relieve these desperate conditions."

The average annual income in Haiti is $65 to $70, one of the lowest in the world. Population density is higher than in India and China. Illiteracy runs to ninety per cent of the population, and helps explain why Duvalier's own paper, the Haiti *Journal*, has only 800 subscribers in this land of three and a half million people. Haiti is worse off than she was in the 1950's, mostly because the price of coffee is down. Nearly seventy per cent of the economy is dependent on the coffee trade.

Budget figures are not available; the government simply refuses to publish them. But semi-official estimates place the cost of maintaining the country's military and police establishment at thirty to forty per cent of the total. Haiti, of course, has little or no use for an army, except to keep the populace under control.

Spokesmen for the Duvalier regime contend that a substantial portion of the budget and most of American aid go to relieve poverty by providing jobs on public projects. Some of the money doubtless goes into job-creating ventures, but it is highly doubtful if the amount is considerable. The evidence of mere subsistence living and unemployment and underemployment is everywhere too great.

Despite the unsavory record of the Duvalier government, the United States has poured an impressive amount of money into its coffers. During the past decade the United States has made more than $40,000,000 available in grants and economic assistance to the Haitian government, much of it during the past three years. The reason for this aid, I was told, is Pentagon-inspired. Our military planners regard Haiti, with her location between Cuba and the Dominican Republic, as occupying a strategic position in the Caribbean.

"We are helping Haiti because of its significance to us," a State Department official told me, "but we do not approve of its government." He went on to say that Duvalier has threatened on occasion to run eastward — to the Kremlin — for help if U.S. aid were lessened or discontinued. "We can't let that happen," he concluded.

But both Haitians and Americans in Haiti with whom I talked were bitter in their rejection of this explanation. "You pretend," said one, "to treasure freedom and espouse democracy, and yet you are helping

to keep alive one of the foulest and most arrogant tyrannies in Latin America. Everyone knows this regime would have fallen if it had not been for your help.

"You say you must help in order to prevent the Communists from moving in, but bad as they are, the Communists could do no worse. Your help is not reaching the people. There must be ways you could administer your aid programs so that some of the help would trickle down to the people who need it so much. You are content to go on as you do because it is what the dictator wants. If he gets what he wants, you will be left alone to 'stop Communism.' But why can't you see that by going on this way, you are creating the very conditions on which Communism, or a domestic variety of it, feeds and flourishes?"

With those bitter words ringing in my ears, I moved on to the island's other dictatorship.

From the moment my plane arrived in Ciudad Trujillo, the capital city, I knew I was in a dictatorship more grimly policed than Haiti's police state. My luggage was searched relentlessly, and a copy of the Latin American edition of *Time* confiscated for ten minutes by government agents who took it away to determine if there were any language that might offend the man who rules, and in large measure owns, this curious country. In the taxi to my hotel, the driver chatted amiably enough as long as our conversation was bounded by the weather and the scenery, but he froze into total silence when I approached the forbidden territory of political and economic conditions in the country.

As we rode to the hotel, and later when I walked the streets of the city, I was struck by the significant improvement over Haiti's Port-au-Prince. The streets were cleaner and tidier, the shop windows filled with a wider variety of goods, and the people better dressed and seemingly more content than those I saw in Port-au-Prince. I was soon to discover that the great mass of Dominicans are apolitical or non-political and are largely left alone if they do and say nothing to offend the ruling family. It is only those who speak up or fight back who are subjected to pitiless persecution and often torture.

For all its lavish public buildings, wide streets, and a four-lane high-

way that goes nowhere in both directions, the Dominican Republic is a poor country with enormous extremes of wealth and poverty. Eighty per cent of the people are peasants living on the land, growing sugar, cacao, or coffee. Sixty per cent of the populace is illiterate. There is considerable under-employment in the urban areas. Per capita income runs less than $245 per year. The average worker earns $1.50 per day in the sugar fields if he is doing well; he works less than half the year. Social security consists largely of breadlines and handouts. Labor unions are the stooges of the ruling family. The small middle class in the cities is relatively well off, but it must share its bounty with the greedy Trujillos who control the country.

The Trujillos are everywhere and everything in the Dominican Republic. Two brothers have held the presidency for more than thirty years. Elections are held without opposition. In 1930, the senior member of the firm, Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, rose to power and has held it ever since. He served four terms as president and then gave way to his brother, General (now Generalissimo) Hector B. Trujillo Molina, in 1952, but he retained the post of commander-in-chief of the armed forces and continues to wield the supreme executive power in the Dominican Republic. Thus, the "old man," as the senior Trujillo is known without affection, has ruled arbitrarily for three decades.

It is worth noting that the United States has interfered actively in the affairs of the Dominican Republic for some thirty-five years before and during the dictatorship — hardly a recommendation for the kind of government our intervention produces. In 1905 the United States established a receivership over the Dominican customs in behalf of American bondholders. U. S. financial tutelage over the country continued in one form or another until 1940. From 1916 to 1924, U. S. Marines occupied the island to make certain our bondholders got theirs.

The Trujillo dictatorship was spawned in this setting. It has become increasingly more brutal and corrupt through the years, levying a vast tribute on virtually all business and enterprise of any consequence in order to fill the family coffers. It cuts itself in as a partner in any venture that has any prospect for profit. The way it works, said one informant with first-hand knowledge, is this:

"You are asked to fork over part of the earnings of your business. If you are slow in responding, you are dazzled with a bribe. If you don't respond then, you are threatened with reprisals. If you still don't respond to the suggestion that you make the Trujillos your partners, you are arrested on trumped up charges and jailed. Death is your final verdict if you have not surrendered before then."

In general, no graft is tolerated in the country — except that practiced by the reigning family, which has a complete monopoly. The entire country is a vast prison. The reins are relaxed now and then but pulled in again by "the old man" when it suits his fancy. Dominicans, however, are not terrorized in their daily lives unless they dare speak critically of the regime.

The Trujillos have some concrete achievements to show for their tenure — new roads, hospitals, sanitation, and a modest housing program. But as one American observed, "The tragedy, of course, is that what little good has been accomplished has been nullified by the terror and violence of the police state. In the early stages of the old man's reign, the Dominican Republic made some phenomenal progress in improving the economic situation of the people, but now there is too much siphoned off by the Trujillo family's graft and too little left for the people."

There is a widespread feeling that the "old man" and his regime are deteriorating, that he is becoming insane and his rule is cracking up. The men around him, however, hesitate to take steps to hasten the departure of the elder Trujillo—much as they might like to. They feel that they hitched their wagon to his star thirty years ago and somehow have to hang on, for it would mean their death if they were caught in a conspiracy against him. Through the years, Trujillo has shown an extraordinary capacity for keeping his opponents divided and for ferreting out and destroying plots against him before they could be hatched. The opposition today is divided, disorganized, and leaderless. There are various forces committed clandestinely to reform, but they are united only in their opposition to the hated Trujillo tyranny.

The most important source of opposition today is the Catholic Church. The Trujillos have contributed handsomely to the church, and in return, the "old man" sought to have himself designated Benefactor of the Catholic Church. The church refused, in diplomatic fashion, and Trujillo opened war against the bishops. The church, which had long played along with Trujillo, returned the fire, and today the two are locked in combat. Church officials constantly denounce the excesses of the police terror and call for social reform. Trujillo retaliated only recently by sacking the diocesan residence of Bishop Thomas F. Riley and placing him under "protective custody" for a time. It is widely believed in the Dominican Republic that Trujillo committed a serious strategic blunder by bringing the church into the opposition fold. The church's stature, I was told, is at an all-time high because it has chosen to fight back and, in effect, assume the moral leadership of the struggle against what is doubtless one of the most corrupt regimes on earth.

The stock of the United States is higher today with reform elements in the Dominican Republic than at any time in recent years because we have indicated that our ardor for Trujillo is cooling somewhat. For a long time we had maintained cordial relations with the Dominican despot, and even as late as last year, when we wiped out the Cuban sugar quota, we tripled the amount the Dominican Republic could export to the United States—and thus greatly contributed to the Trujillo treasury, for the Trujillos are the largest owners of Dominican sugar fields, too.

Our action shocked liberal Latin Americans who know the Dominican dictatorship for what it is. "How," demanded one leading democrat in Central America, "can you justify rewarding this despicable despot by tripling his sugar quota when there are democratic regimes in Latin America that desperately need that kind of help?" He wondered, too, "How can you tolerate Trujillo for thirty years and rebel at Castro in two years? I reject Castro's ways, but I reject Trujillo's too. You don't. You have double standards, and it is hurting you seriously throughout all of Latin America."

I heard much the same comment among thoughtful officials, all of them anti-Castro, in most of the eleven countries I visited—wonderment and shock at how we had played ball with the Trujillo tyranny. This year, the Dominican Republic's sugar quota is being restored to its normal level, but there is a firm conviction among reform elements in that country and elsewhere in Latin America that the United States must go further than that and embargo all trade with the Dominican Republic until the present dictatorship yields to a more democratic succession.

Happily for the cause of freedom, the relations of the Dominican Republic with the United States and Latin America are at their lowest ebb right now. The Organization of American States concluded an investigation last year which resulted in the accusation that the Dominican Republic has resorted to repeated and continuing violations of human rights, including "cruel and inhuman treatment of political prisoners" and "the use of intimidation and terror as political weapons." From all I heard, it would be difficult to conceive a judgment more clothed with restraint.



PUERTO RICO

The Rise of the Stricken Land

Puerto Rico is today the gathering place for students of social planning the world over. They come to admire and study "Operation Bootstrap," this beautiful island's all-pervading program of democratic planning, and they take home the lessons they have learned from a startling story of industrial growth and social progress. And yet little more than a decade ago, Puerto Rico was widely known as the "poorhouse of the Caribbean;" Rexford Guy Tugwell, once our appointed governor of the island who did so much to launch it on its progressive way, called it the "stricken land."

Dedicated social planning, a burning determination to lift the country up by its bootstrap, militant political leadership, and the fortunes that attended an economy that had free access to the mass American market a thousand miles away—all these contributed to the transformation of Puerto Rico in one of the most successful peaceful revolutions of our time. Consider some of the statistics:

¶ Puerto Rican per capita income is now $571 a year, compared with $151 in 1951. The present rate is the second highest in Latin America.

¶ Life expectancy has increased from forty-six to nearly seventy-one years. Infant mortality has declined from 113 deaths per thousand live births to fifty-four.

¶ During the past twelve years more than 600 new factories have begun operations. They employ 46,000 workers. The present rate of growth is one hundred factories a year, most of them small.

¶ Operation Bootstrap has raised the gross national product from $250 million to $1.5 billion in a score of years. The rate of economic growth last year was 9.4 per cent, highest in the world.

¶ In 1950, more than one-half of Puerto Rican family incomes were

under $1,000. Now, a decade later, seventy-five per cent are above $1,000 and fifty-four per cent above $2,000.

¶ Puerto Rico has developed a broad free medical service program for sixty per cent of its poorest families.

¶ In 1940, the output of electric energy totaled 130,000,000 kilowatt hours. Today it reaches 1,600,000,000 kwh in the publicly owned system of the Water Resources Authority, a growth of 1,230 per cent.

¶ Schools and homes have been built at a rate that greatly exceeds anything in all the history of Puerto Rico.

This is an impressive record for this once stricken land, but it would be a grave mistake to assume that all goes well for Puerto Rico. As her brilliant governor, Luis Munoz Marin, told me, "We still have a long pull ahead to reach our goals." And so they have. For all the new factories and jobs, unemployment persists at thirteen per cent. Overpopulation is still a critical problem—Puerto Rico has a population density greater than Japan's. More than sixty per cent of the people continue to live in sub-standard housing, some of them in tiny hovels thrown together with boards, boxes, Coca Cola signs, and old tin cans. There is a grave educational shortage; although thirty per cent of the budget goes for schools, classes are crowded, and more than sixty per cent of the pupils attending elementary schools go for only half a day. Agrarian reform has achieved much, but there is still widespread rural poverty.

These entries in red ink represent the challenge with which the Puerto Rican government is wrestling today. "We are redoubling our efforts on every front," said Governor Munoz, "with special emphasis on putting more muscle into our educational program."

The agencies for action are readily at hand. Three of them—the Planning Board, the Water Resources Authority, and the Government Development Bank—have made prodigious contributions to recent achievements. But the soul of Operation Bootstrap—and its custodian—is the Economic Development Administration, known to most Puerto Ricans as simply Fomento. Fomento is Spanish for development, promotion, "stirring-up." Fomento is the principal fuel of the Operation Bootstrap reactor, the key agency in the development, promotion, and encouragement of manufacturing, tourism, and trade.

Fomento works in many ways on many fronts. It attracts new industry to the island by such inducements as tax incentives, its own capital for pump-priming, research and promotion, and programs for recruiting and training personnel. Fomento doesn't wait for investors to come to Puerto Rico. It maintains a network of offices in mainland United States whose personnel goes out, facts in hand, to sell potential investors. Its agents have developed a new plan for low-cost rural housing under which rural families pay $350 for materials and the services of a foreman and proceed, through cooperatives, to build their own modest homes.

When it first embarked on its wide-ranging career, Fomento built its own plants for government operation under public service corporations. "This was socialism," Governor Munoz cheerfully concedes, "but when we gave it up, it wasn't because we were afraid of the word. We soon realized that it would take too long to get the job done and require too much in taxes. We found, at the outset of our revolution, that we were placing too much emphasis on distributing what there was. But there was not enough to go around. So we shifted the emphasis to expansion, largely through private investment. The government still owns factories, notably two large sugar mills, but our emphasis now is toward private investment and expansion."

I asked Governor Munoz a number of questions about the impact of Castroism on Puerto Rico in particular and Latin America in general. His replies constituted a mixed bag. "I was myself in support of the Castro revolution," he said in response to one question, "but I am skeptical now and will remain so until the Communists are driven out of power in Cuba." Castro's original following has declined greatly in Puerto Rico, he said, but there "are some here, as elsewhere in Latin America, who believe that he is still headed down the right road of revolution."

Much that Castro has done, he argued, "can be justified on the ground that a revolution is not business as usual. But this cannot begin to justify Castro's deepening reliance on and association with the Kremlin in Soviet Russia and the Communists at home. This is the heart of the problem." And yet, the governor added, much of Latin America cannot understand why the United States has been so helpful and friendly toward the corrupt tyranny of the Dominican Republic for so long—"and actually gave her part of Cuba's sugar quota last year"—in view of our solemn commitment to oppose dictatorship and support democracy.

The United States, the governor said, cannot live with Castro's Cuba "so long as it is so pro-Soviet and anti-United States. But there is not much the United States can do unless it can prove that the Soviet Union dominates Castro, and then it becomes a Western Hemisphere problem which should be resolved by all American countries acting in concert through the Organization of American States."

Governor Munoz is a big, hulking, handsome man, with more than his share of both charm and nervous tension. Poet, philosopher, and politician, he has brought a rich background to his post. He seems genuinely to love his people and in turn is loved by them. A one-time socialist, Munoz has mellowed and moderated with the years. He is far less doctrinaire than in earlier days, and is counted today as a practical, pragmatic reformer who will borrow anywhere or initiate anything that will give his people a greater stake in their society. He is forever working on new plans, and he keeps notebook and

pen by his bedside to jot down the essence of nocturnal brainstorms that assail him from time to time.

The governor came by his passion for politics naturally. His father, Luis Munoz Rivera, was Puerto Rico's "George Washington" who helped win autonomy for the island from Spain. For a time Governor Munoz was a battler for independence for Puerto Rico from U.S. rule, but he changed his position with characteristic decisiveness and became a fiery supporter of what was to become Commonwealth status. He has fought powerful economic interests on the island, bent always on depriving them of their political power, not their economic independence. Thus, he says of his successful struggle against the once all-powerful sugar industry: "We threw it out of power completely, but, by God, the sugar industry is also an industry and has the same rights as any industry. I killed it politically—not economically." The governor has made his peace with modified capitalism that goes along with a program of democratic social reform, but free enterprise, he insists, must serve the community. A favorite expression of his runs like this: "Private enterprise is not to be considered a sacred cow, but as a contented cow—to be used to provide for the people."

The poet and philosopher in Governor Munoz show up in his concept of "Operation Serenity," advanced to accompany Operation Bootstrap. He is disturbed by the possibility of distorted emphasis on the mere accumulation of material things and by the prospect that Puerto Rico may lose too much of its Latin flavor, culture, and traditions in its close ties with the United States. Operation Serenity emphasizes "the cultural goals of a good civilization." There must be, said Governor Munoz, "conscious leadership by the state to direct increased income away from just increased consumption of goods, and toward greater cultural activities and educational programs. This I regard as a valid function of the state no less than its encouragement of economic development."

Governor Munoz' position on issues and his personal popularity have swept him to the governorship for four consecutive terms of four years each. His vehicle has been the Popular Democratic Party, which he helped to establish. In the 1960 elections he did better than ever, capturing fifty-eight per cent of the vote, partly, perhaps, because some voters who were wearying of him decided to support him in order to repudiate the

bitter opposition to his candidacy expressed by the Catholic bishops of Puerto Rico.

The action of the Catholic hierarchy doubtless sprang from its resentment over laws permitting the dissemination of birth control information and the refusal of the regime to permit "released time" for religious instruction in the schools. The government contended, on the first count, that population pressure had reached explosive proportions in Puerto Rico, and, on the second, that there was altogether too much released time, with most children attending school only half a day because of inadequate educational facilities.

The controversy between church and state boiled over into a raging row. Archbishop James P. Davis said the absolute separation of church and state was an "absolute insult to Catholics. That would be like separating body and spirit." He went on to say that except for U.S. influence, Munoz would be a "Trujillo who doesn't carry a revolver."

The Catholic hierarchy proceeded to form its own political organization, the Christian Action Party. In the closing days of the campaign, Archbishop Davis and the island's two other Catholic bishops released a pastoral letter which "prohibited" Catholics from voting for Governor Munoz or his Popular Democratic Party. "The philosophy of the PDP," the letter said, "is anti-Christian and anti-Catholic and . . . is based on the modern heresy that the popular will, and not the divine law, decides what is moral and right." It would be "a sin," said the bishops, to vote for Munoz and the PDP.

Governor Munoz and his party fought back, charging the hierarchy with "medieval interference." "How the devil will Congress admit a state in which the bishops tell the people what to do?" he asked. Munoz was fearful that the controversy would hurt Senator John F. Kennedy's chances for the Presidency. "They threw a cold potato at me and missed," he said afterwards, "but when it bounced on the mainland, it was a hot potato." (U.S. bishops were quick to rebuke their Puerto Rican colleagues for their extreme position.)

In overwhelmingly Catholic Puerto Rico, the Christian Action Party polled only seven per cent of the vote—short of the ten per cent required to stay on the ballot for the next election. The Independence Party, which believes in a Puerto Rican republic completely independent of the United States, polled only three per cent. But the Statehood Republican Party, which is conservative in outlook and dedicated to the early attainment of federated statehood with the establishment of Puerto Rico as the fifty-first state, captured thirty-two per cent of the vote.

This is the heart of the political struggle in Puerto Rico today: Should Puerto Rico seek statehood, complete independence, or should it put the issue aside for the time being and remain a Commonwealth? The forces seeking independence represent a small group, but they are vociferous and unusually dedicated souls. I spent the better part of an afternoon with Juan Mari-Bras, secretary-general of the independence movement, and I found him most eloquent in presenting his case.

"The core of the problem," he said, "is that our poor country must

buy in the richest market in the world. Eighty-five to ninety per cent of our exports come from the tariff-protected American market. This pushes up the cost of many foodstuffs and decreases our standard of living. We are paying back-breaking tribute to American producers and to the American merchant marine, which is the most costly in the world."

Mari-Bras complained that his independence movement was doing well "until Munoz schemed and maneuvered to break our party into fragments. Munoz turned more conservative. He is working with North American capital to take over everything on our island." The spokesman for the independence movement also protested the extent to which the U.S. military establishment has taken over in Puerto Rico. "They control ten per cent of the arable land," he said. "In some areas where fishing is the only source of livelihood for Puerto Ricans, they are forbidden to fish because it might interfere with the operations of the U.S. Navy."

If the independence cause has not caught on, the drive for statehood has won a considerable following. Its electoral strength has climbed from thirteen per cent in 1952 to thirty-two per cent in 1960. The forces favoring statehood are painfully aware that Puerto Rico will lose many of the fiscal advantages it now enjoys under Commonwealth status, but they are nonetheless convinced that statehood must come—and the sooner the better. They respect Governor Munoz, but they are fearful that if he dies, or is defeated, or retires from office, he might be succeeded by someone less stable who would try to lead the country down what they regard as the disastrous road to independence. Some of the statehood spokesmen with whom I talked felt that while Puerto Rico might initially lose some advantages with statehood, it would regain much ground by qualifying as a "disaster area" under President Kennedy's program of special assistance to depressed areas in the United States.

But Governor Munoz is convinced that statehood today would mean "suicide" for Puerto Rico. It would mean, at the very least, he argues, the doubling of taxes, "which could destroy so much that we have done to promote the economy under Operation Bootstrap. Perhaps in time statehood will be the answer, but it could only prove disastrous in this stage of Puerto Rico's development." The time for statehood might come, he believes, when Puerto Rico's per capita income is equal to that of the poorest state in the United States, Mississippi, whose per capita income of $1,190 is still roughly double that of Puerto Rico.

Puerto Rico is a unique political establishment. It is a Commonwealth by virtue of a "compact" between the U.S. Congress and the Puerto Rican people—a compact that makes the island an "associated" rather than a "federated" state. Under this status, the Puerto Ricans are citizens of the United States, but they cannot vote for President or members of Congress —only for a delegate who has a voice but no vote. Puerto Ricans pay no federal taxes, for, as Munoz explained, "The principle prevails of no taxation, no representation, and no representation, no taxation." Puerto Rico pays nothing in money for its own defense, but its youth is subject to the U.S. draft. Most Federal laws apply to Puerto Rico, as does Federal authority in matters of defense, foreign policy, customs, and postal service, but the government of Puerto Rico has wide latitude in the control of its own domestic affairs. Puerto Rico's underprivileged can go to the mainland without restriction—and some 800,000 have—and qualify for unemployment and Social Security benefits that are not available to those who remain at home.

For the most part, this arrangement has proved a great advantage for Puerto Rico; this is especially true in the fiscal benefits which eliminate the payment of Federal taxes and provide for mainland financing of defense, foreign policy, and postal services. But there is a deepening concern that Puerto Rico is becoming too "Americanized" under Commonwealth status and is losing her individual flavor as a Latin American nation. There is concern, too, even among admirers of Governor Munoz like Rexford Tugwell, that the plan is basically a "parasitical" one, under which there is a one-way flow of benefits that is hardly "partnership" and cannot endure indefinitely.

Puerto Rico's special advantages tend to dilute her role as an example for all Latin America; no one has yet urged that we duplicate these fiscal and economic benefits for other Latin American peoples, who, we wish, would follow in Puerto Rico's progressive democratic path. Nevertheless, it is my concluding judgment that Puerto Rico does have much to offer other Latin American countries searching for the right road to social progress. It has demonstrated that those rarities in Latin American life —honest elections and clean government—can provide the indispensable foundation for investor confidence and capital investment so necessary to social progress and economic expansion. It has shown how much can be done by bold government planning and skillful promotion. If it be argued that Puerto Rico does not have to finance an elaborate military establishment, the same can be said of most Latin American nations whose armed forces are primarily intended for domestic purposes, and which, in the last analysis, would be dependent for protection in case of Communist military threat on the same forces on which Puerto Rico depends—those of the United States.

The rest of Latin America can learn much from Puerto Rico, but the road the other countries travel will necessarily be different in some respects because conditions and circumstances are different.



PANAMA

A Race Against Time

VERMONT'S Republican Senator George D. Aiken, a man given to spare, simple prose, summed up the condition of the Republic of Panama in a single sentence: "Panama has about one million people who are very poor and about fifty families who are very rich." Senator Aiken then proceeded to summarize, again in a single sentence, the tension between our Canal Zone and Panama: "Panama also has the Canal Zone, with about 3,500 Americans, all of whom are rich, relative to Panamanians, and many of whom obviously feel themselves the social superiors of all Panamanians."

Tension between the United States and Panama reached the boiling point last fall when riots broke out over the attempted raising of the Panamanian flag on the territory of the Canal Zone. Many Panamanians, including those friendly to the United States, felt their flag should fly side by side with the Stars and Stripes even though the territory of the Zone is described by treaty as being "as if sovereign."

Grievances had been building up for a long time. Panamanians, for example, resented the fact that they were obliged to have special license plates to drive into the Zone while Americans needed no Panamanian license plates to cross into the Republic of Panama. They resented, too, the arrogance of many of the Americans living in luxury in the Zone while Panamanians working in the Zone received far lower wages and lived in substandard housing.

The contrast between the Zone and the Republic is overpowering. Panama City has a grim, dirty, down-on-its-heel look. Its people are shabby, its store windows dingy, and its homes dilapidated—except for the luxurious estates of the wealthy. There is an air of quiet desperation about its people as if hope had long since left them.

In the Zone, on the other hand, all is spic-and-span splendor. This is a model welfare village where everything is provided by U.S. taxpayers. The streets are spotlessly clean, the lawns spacious, the roads wide and tree-lined. There are beautiful schools and homes and hospitals, and there are golf courses, tennis courts, bathing beaches, and fishing facilities—all for the exclusive use of Americans living in the Zone. Although the painful hardships of building the Canal have long since become a part of history, the Americans in the Zone still receive a twenty-five per cent additional allowance for "hardship pay."

When the bloody disorders broke out last fall, U.S. officials handled the situation badly. To begin with, command was divided, for American control was a three-headed monstrosity—an ambassador to Panama under the State Department, a Canal commander-in-chief responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a Zone governor beholden to the Department of Defense. The result in a crisis was either paralysis or a profusion of clashing orders. The latter developed last fall.

When peace was restored, President Eisenhower acted with unaccustomed speed and vigor to institute long-needed reforms. He proclaimed a nine-point program which provided, among other things:

One—The flying of a Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone.

Two—The elimination of the requirement that Panamanians must have special license plates to travel in the Zone.

Three—A ten per cent increase in the wages of unskilled and semi-skilled Panamanians working in the Zone.

Four—The replacement of substandard housing by modern construction.

Five—Expansion of the apprenticeship program for Panamanian workers.

Equally important, President Eisenhower shook up the American command in Panama and consolidated political decisions in the hands of the ambassador responsible to the State Department. Mr. Eisenhower appointed a new governor for the Canal Zone, a new commander-in-chief for the Caribbean command, and, most important of all, a new ambassador, Joseph S. Farland. Un-

like his predecessor, Farland mingles with the Panamanians, travels through the countryside inspecting distress areas, and generally, with his able wife, takes a keen interest in all Panamanian affairs.

The results of the new program and personnel have been striking. The high tide of bitterness last fall has receded greatly. The people love it when the ambassador comes visiting and shows genuine concern for their plight. Until Farland's arrival, this was largely the monopoly of the Cuban ambassador, who traveled widely through Panama offering encouragement to reform and revolution and holding out the promise of aid from Castro's Cuba. It is good news that President Kennedy has decided to retain Farland in the Panama post, for much remains to be done in the field of American-Panamanian relations, especially in rectifying the situation which finds the Canal Zone a snobbish little island of luxury in a sea of Panamanian poverty.

If this is done, there would still remain the wider and deeper problem of social and economic rehabilitation of Panama itself. The need is urgent and the hour is late. I was told repeatedly by informed Americans and Panamanians that Castro and the Kremlin are lighting many new fires in the demand for reform. "We have to run scared here," said one thoughtful American. "There isn't too much time."

The new administration of President Roberto F. Chiari seems aware of this. "We intend to move forward on every front as fast as we can," he said. "Our eyes are open to the menace of Castroism and Communism." And one Panamanian intellectual expressed what was in the minds of many Latin Americans I met when he said: "The hour is late, but at last the United States is coming around to understanding our problems. It took a Castro to shake you out of your indifference to us. We are still sitting on a powder keg, but there is no reason why, with our self-help and your assistance, we cannot embark on a massive program of social reform that will meet the people's hunger for a better life. If we of democratic faith do not give them this opportunity, they will seek it elsewhere."

Panama is partly a tropical jungle punctuated by urban slums, but it has vast reserves of unused agricultural land which, if roads were built and modern methods of agriculture introduced, could provide a decent living for many of the Panamanians who now barely survive. Two-thirds of the people of Panama live on the land, often a pitiful plot that barely yields enough for the essentials of survival. Only eight per cent of the farmers own the land they work. Per capita income on the land is $200 a year as compared with the hardly more impressive $318 for the country as a whole. The $318 a year figure does not tell the whole story for it is inflated by the concentration of wealth in a few hands.

Agrarian reform is Panama's most compelling need. There has been much talk but little action on land reform legislation. A comprehensive measure that might go far toward alleviating rural distress was prepared earlier this year, but the legislature adjourned without action, promising to deal with the measure when it reconvenes in the fall. The proposed five-year program is based on the hope of substantial American assistance, as is the self-help program for home building.

Meanwhile, on a more modest but meaningful scale, our Point Four program is doing an excellent job of educating Panamanian farmers. Working with the Ministry of Agriculture, Point Four technicians have roamed the countryside teaching farmers how to grow superior produce on smaller plots and at lower cost, and how to improve their marketing of perishable foodstuffs.

A striking example is the case of the Canal Zone market. Until recently, our government imported from home and from other Latin American countries all the high-quality fruits and vegetables required by the 3,500 American families in the Zone. None of the Zone market was open to Panamanians because of the low quality of the produce they could supply. Now, as a result of an intensive program of introducing better seeds and fertilizer, teaching improved methods of cultivation, and launching a program of grading, the Canal Zone buys a wide variety of fruits and vegetables from Panamanian producers.

I was enormously impressed when Point Four officials took me to a warehouse where they had just installed equipment to sort, grade, clean, wax, pack, and label fresh produce. This was their first day of operation and the Point Four group, a dedicated band of earnest, hard-working officials, proudly showed me the process by which Panamanian produce now qualifies for the first time for the quality market. Similar sheds and grading systems are going up elsewhere in Panama.

I left Panama with three major impressions:

One—Relations between the United States and Panama are decisively better than they were a year ago, but much still needs to be done.

Two—The present government of Panama is deeply aware of the social pressures and the need for action, and is prepared to meet the challenge if the United States provides desperately needed capital.

Three—Unless there is action soon, time will run out for Panama —and for us—because the people will not much longer be content to live their miserable lives while Castroism and Communism dangle the hope of a more abundant life.



The Struggling Midgets of Central America

THE NARROW NECK of land that begins with Panama and runs northwestward to Mexico contains five other tiny, independent countries. Together they constitute what we know as Central America. I have visted three of the five countries—Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. The first is a democracy, the second a dictatorship with the outward forms of democracy, and the third a democracy with some of the trappings of dictatorship.

To the naked eye of a wholly inexperienced student of Latin America like myself it would seem that it might have been the better part of common sense to have consolidated these five midgets into a single full-grown country. This is, in fact, what was attempted more than a century ago when the Captaincy General of Guatemala became, in 1823, the United Provinces of Central America —"free and independent of old Spain, of Mexico, and every other power." But this lasted only until 1838 when the five present states began life as independent nations. Some semblance of unity is sought today through the Organization of Central American States, with headquarters in San Salvador, but its efforts are not very impressive.

The five Central American countries combined have a total population of fewer than eleven million—smaller than that of metropolitan New York City. They range from Guatemala's three and a half million to Costa Rica's population of little more than a million. "The only conclusion one can draw from the demographic pattern of the area," said one student of Central America, "is that there are just not enough people to create the resources needed by a modern state." Even if these nations separately spent all their income for roads, schools, homes, hospitals, and economic development, they would still fall short of meeting the demands of their hungry, reform-conscious people.

The five countries are predominantly rural, the percentage of rural population ranging from sixty-eight per cent in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Costa Rica, through seventy-two per cent in Guatemala, to seventy-seven per cent in Honduras. These people live on the border of bankruptcy every day of their lives. Average net income in Nicaragua, for example, is $186 a year, which is much more than most Nicaraguans make because the overall figure, of course, includes the handsome earnings of the oligarchy. A privileged elite dominates the economic and political life of all five Central American nations.

Except in the few cases where modest agrarian reform has taken hold, Central Americans live under a long-outmoded land tenure system which developed during colonial days and was expanded in more modern times by the introduction of the type of capitalist agriculture represented by the United Fruit Company.

Some notion of the magnitude of the problem confronting these little countries can be gleaned from these representative examples: In Costa Rica, relatively the most advanced of Central American nations in other ways, one per cent of the farms encompass nearly fifty per cent of the country's total farm land. In Guatemala, only 516 of the country's 348,687 farms, or fourteen-hundredths of one per cent, include within their area more than forty per cent of the nation's farm land. Here, clearly, is a modified form of feudalism which leaves the great majority of people in poverty, illiteracy, and despair—the ingredients that could enable the Communists or Castroists to blow the system sky-high unless something is done and done soon.

Costa Rica has made greater progress toward achieving some of the goals and developing most of the methods of social democracy than any of its Central American neighbors. Its literacy rate, for example, is eighty-eight per cent of the population more than ten years old—perhaps the best showing of any country in all Latin America. And yet Costa Rica still has a hard road to follow in wiping out widespread inequities in social and economic life.

Present developments in Costa Rica date from 1948, when the country's democratic traditions experienced great strain because of the efforts of former President Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia and President Teodoro Picado to put Calderon back in power again, although he had been clearly defeated at the polls by Otilio Ulate. Calderon, by the way, had the support of Costa Rican Communists who joined forces with the oligarchy

in a struggle to preserve the status quo.

Six months of bitter civil war followed, ending in the defeat of the Calderon-Picado forces. Leader and hero of the democratic elements was Jose Figueres, who was to become one of the most distinguished democratic spokesmen for all Latin America. After eight months of a *junta* government and four years Presidential tenure by Otilio Ulate, Figueres was elected President in 1953, receiving sixty-four per cent of the vote.

Costa Rica forged ahead under Figueres' moderate program of social reform. A democratic constitution was promulgated, the army was abolished as a permanent body, the banking system was nationalized, a career merit system for recruiting government employes was instituted, and new strength was given an existing program which provides for autonomous public institutions to control certain important economic activities.

The constitution prohibited Figueres from seeking reelection, and his party lost the Presidency in 1958 to Mario Echandi, a far more conservative figure who has emphasized more reliance on free enterprise, although he was elected, in part, through the help of the Communists. Echandi's triumph was partly the result of depressed economic conditions flowing from a sharp drop in the world price of coffee, Costa Rica's principal product, and a serious split in Figueres' National Liberation Party. The latter, however, succeeded in capturing control of the legislative Assembly. The result has been deadlocked government, with the Assembly passing reform legislation and the President piling up a record number of vetoes—more, in fact, than all other presidents of Costa Rica combined. The country is drifting without much affirmative action, hoping that something will happen soon to bring a rise in the market price of coffee and bananas.

One of the most hopeful developments I encountered in Costa Rica was the Institute of Political Education. Founded by a group of Latin American spokesmen for democratic progressivism, including Venezuela's President Betancourt and Costa Rica's former President Figueres, the Institute provides the teaching staff and facilities for the training of young men and women of Latin America sent there by their political parties. When their training is completed, the graduates return to their countries to provide effective social democratic leadership in the liberal parties which sent them to the Institute. Director of the Institute is an able, indefatigable priest, Dr. Benjamin Nunez, formerly Costa Rica's minister of labor and recently its representative to the United Nations.

An Institute of the kind that flourishes in Costa Rica would be destroyed in Nicaragua before it opened its doors, unless it were a school for the training of tyrants. For Nicaragua, with the blessing of the United States, is a police-state tyranny that censors press and radio, arrests its opponents, maintains tight military control of all political activities, hounds even moderate critics into silence, and, more often than not, is under a state of siege.

The ruling dynasty, which came to power nearly thirty years ago after a long period of control of the country by U.S. marines, is the Somoza family. "Papa," officially known during his lifetime as General Anastasio (Tacho) Somoza, captured power in 1936 and held it, unchallenged, until he was gunned down by an assassin in September, 1956. At one point in his career, near the end, the General did step aside to allow his puppet, Dr. Leonardo Arguello, win a "free election" without opposition, but the

General wasn't satisfied with the way things were going and simply took back the Presidency.

His death, unmourned by the multitude, brought his two young sons to power. Luis Somoza Debayle, then 34, picked up the Presidency, and his younger brother, Anastasio (Tachito) Somoza Debayle, West Point trained, became commander of the all-powerful *Guardia Nacional*, the best organized military force in Central America. Luis won the Presidency virtually by default, for the opposition groups abstained from participation on the plausible assumption that the outcome was rigged.

The brothers have ruled Nicaragua with an iron fist—and have managed, on the side, to build handsomely on the nest egg Papa left them. Critics of the regime, and this includes, as nearly as I could determine, almost everyone not a member of the family, charge that the Somoza family has accumulated a fortune of half a billion dollars—in a country of grinding poverty. They are said to own the national airline, a shipping company, ranches, coffee plantations, textile mills, radio stations, a newspaper, Florida real estate, buildings around the world, the Nicaraguan embassy in Washington, some of the schools in Nicaragua, and even the Foreign Ministry, which pays rent to the family.

When I saw Luis Somoza, a big, handsome man with considerable capacity for turning on charm when he wants to, I asked him about his family's wealth, citing the charges leveled against him by his opponents. He modestly disclaimed being a multimillionaire.

"Of course we own some properties," he said quite amiably. "Much of it was left us by our father, who worked hard for it before he became President. We have invested carefully and expanded our holdings, but it is nonsense to assume that we have piled up a quarter of a billion dollars."

"How much would you say you have accumulated?" I asked.

"That would be hard to say. It is far short of what my enemies claim."

Luis Somoza takes embarrassing questions in stride. He is used to them. When I asked him if he were, as charged, running a tight little dictatorship, he grinned and said:

"That's an old one. The answer is, of course not. The courts function normally here. Congress is independent. The press is free. I can't see how you can call this a dictatorship."

Somoza pointed proudly to the fact that the Nicaraguan constitution, at

his request, forbids him or any member of his family from seeking the Presidency when his term ends two years hence. But nobody with whom I talked in Nicaragua thought the end would come that soon or that easily. They expect he will either amend the constitution before his term expires, or find himself a puppet and then step into a new post, as the Dominican Republic's Trujillo did when he made himself a generalissimo, in command of all the armed forces while retaining executive control of the government.

Somoza urged me to look at "the great achievements of my administration and my father's before me. We are running a clean show. Some ninety-five per cent of the budget money goes where it is supposed to go. When my father became President, there were only 250 schools, and half of them were private. Now there are 4,000 schools and about 3,800 are public. There were practically no roads when my father became President. Today there are 5,000 kilometers of gravel roads and 2,000 kilometers of paved roads. We used to export $4,000,000 a year, now it is $70,000,000."

Some of Somoza's claims do not stand up on investigation. Only two hours before he insisted to me there was a free press in his country, I had visited the office of *La Prensa,* an opposition daily which is allowed to function for window-dressing purposes. There I saw first-hand the process of censorship in action. Later I was shown public proclamations forbidding the holding of political meetings. An educator charged that Somoza's school statistics were grossly exaggerated, that there was a desperate shortage of educational facilities, and that, by United Nations count, sixty-seven per cent of the nation was illiterate. As for the highways, I was told that they were built for military maneuvers and that their construction was honeycombed with graft and corruption.

All the Nicaraguans with whom I talked, with one exception, extracted a prior promise not to divulge their identity. The lone exception was a remarkably courageous man, Pedro Joaquien Chamorro, editor of *La Prensa,* who has spent three-and-a half years in jail and two years in exile during the past seven years.

"During the past five years," he told me, "we have had martial law

for four of them. This bottles up all dissent and results in the arbitrary arrest of anyone who dares criticize anything. There have been some window-dressing reforms, but they exist largely on paper. Most of the people are terribly poor and have absolutely no hope that conditions will improve under the present system."

This able young editor expressed a conviction that I heard from many Nicaraguans—the bitter judgment that the United States, by aiding the Somoza regime economically and militarily, was in considerable measure responsible for the country's plight.

"Why don't you differentiate between democracies and dictatorships?" he asked. "You say you believe in freedom, but you rush to the aid of this tyranny. How can we believe you when you say you are against Castro, as I am, because he is a dictator, and yet maintain cordial relations and hold out a helping hand to the dictatorship in Nicaragua?"

The editor pleaded with me to "go home and tell your Mr. Kennedy, in whom we have confidence, that it is time to stop helping these dictatorships. They cannot survive without your help and the democratic people of my country and all Latin America know this. Do something before it is too late!"

The educator with whom I talked made much the same appeal—to end all assistance at once. "With your connivance," he said, "some sixty per cent of the budget here in Nicaragua goes to the military. This is supposed to help stop Communism, but you are making Communists by cooperating in this program. The best thing you can do is to refuse to help this regime. That will make it clear to us and to the rest of Latin America that you mean what you say when you insist you are against dictatorships. Nothing less than this will prove it to the people of my country."

A devout Catholic, this educator complained that the Church has provided no meaningful opposition to the Somoza regime. "Ninety per cent of the priests, those who have to work with the people and see their hopeless condition first-hand, are opposed to the Somozas. But the bishops refuse to take a clear-cut stand because they fear the Somoza family will retaliate by persecuting the Church. It is up to you of North America to help by disproving the belief that a majority of us hold, that your help is decisive in saddling us with this tyranny."

Perhaps the principal architect of the recent and current cordiality between democratic America and dictatorial Nicaragua is a tough-talking American who used to run a grain and potato warehouse business back home in Pembina County, North Dakota. His name is Thomas E. Whelan and he dotes on dictator Somoza as a fond father would a son. A political freak, Whelan was appointed U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua by former President Harry S. Truman simply because the late Senator William Langer threatened to block every appointment of a Federal judge until somebody from North Dakota got something by way of a political plum.

In the ten years he served as ambassador—until President Kennedy relieved him, happily, earlier this year—Whelan built up the Somozas as statesmen and defied the State Department to get tough with them. In his ten years in Managua, Whelan

THE HIGH COST OF DYING

by RUTH MULVEY HARMER

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The Progressive
Madison, Wisconsin

never bothered to learn Spanish or the history and culture of the country, contenting himself with serving as a backstop for the brothers Somoza and making himself, next to the brothers, the most cordially detested man in all Nicaragua. Some indication of this Truman appointee's predilections in domestic politics may be gleaned from the fact that he proudly had hung on his wall the portraits of the late Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin and former Senator William E. Jenner of Indiana, both of whom symbolized Know-Nothingness at its worst in the recent history of the United States.

"You have insulted us by sending such an ass to be your ambassador to our country," one Nicaraguan exploded. "Worse than that, because of his presence for ten years you made it impossible for us to get word to your government on how frightful conditions are here. How can such a great democracy as the United States send out as its representative a man who loves dictatorship? The reason you know so little in the States about what is going on here is because all but one of the American correspondents here is on Somoza's payroll."

Whelan has been photographed frequently embracing the Somoza brothers, one at a time, and being embraced by them. Just before he was summoned home this year, he was feted handsomely by the brothers. The people, however, applauded his going. It would be difficult to evaluate how much a man like Whelan—and there have been others like him elsewhere in Latin America—has done to blight America's image as a freedom-loving land and to instill a scornful attitude toward us on the part of Latin Americans who genuinely cherish democracy.

Guatemala, the last of the Latin American countries of which I write, is the northernmost and most populous of the Central American nations. Of its population of 3,700,000, more than 2,000,000 are full-blooded Indians who speak a variety of Indian tongues but little or no Spanish. Like its neighbors, Guatemala is an agricultural country, specializing in coffee, bananas, and cotton. Again like its neighbors, the country has what seems like a never-the-twain-shall-meet gulf between the wealthy and powerful oligarchy and the poverty-stricken and voiceless peasants.

Castroism found a haven in Guatemala during its first year, as it did in other Latin American countries. Support for the Cuban revolution ran high until the wave of Castro's excesses turned public opinion against the bearded revolutionary and his cause. I do not know what has happened in Guatemala since the ill-fated invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles this April, but I suspect, from what I have read, that there has been a renewed wave of anti-American feeling among students, left-wing elements, and even some of the moderates because of what they regard as Yankee intervention.

Guatemala is a democracy in form, and to a considerable extent, in practice, although it has a tendency to put its democratic principles in cold storage from time to time as crises develop. President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, for example, became greatly agitated earlier this year when Ramon Blanco, publisher of *El Imparcial*, mocked as comic opera the President's spending of a million dollars to put down a small army revolt that might have been suppressed with a couple of truckloads of soldiers. Ydigoras suspended the daily for twenty days, closed a radio station that criticized his action, and generally invoked a cloak of secrecy and censorship. But democracy reasserted itself when the supreme court voided the suspension of the newspaper.

Ydigoras came to power in a relatively free election in March, 1958, after a characteristically stormy period in Guatemalan history. In 1944 a popular revolution swept out the brutal dictatorship of General Jorge Ubico. He was succeeded by a new regime headed by an exiled schoolteacher, Juan Jose Arevalo, who preached reform and nationalism—and opened the door to Communist infiltration. The Communists exploited every opening, including the hard facts of misery, hunger, and hopelessness among the poor, and captured control of the labor and agrarian reform movements.

The leftist forces, including Communists and non-Communists alike, succeeded in 1951 in electing Jacobo Arbenz to the presidency. Branded by our State Department as pro-Communist, Arbenz proceeded to provide his foes with ammunition by turning to the Soviet bloc for arms and ammunition—after being refused by the United States and its allies.

This was too much for Castillo Armas, the Guatemalan anti-Communist exiled leader. With the abundant help of our Central Intelligence Agency—a charge frequently made and never repudiated—Castillo raised his banner of liberation in the eastern region of Guatemala on June 18, 1954. A few days later the Arbenz government collapsed. Castillo quickly became president of the governing *junta*, and proceeded to govern Guatemala with lavish assistance by the United States, which was determined to show how more responsive to the needs of the people he was than Arbenz. Castillo was assassinated in July, 1957, by a fanatic who had managed to penetrate the palace guard. After a period of uncertainty and insecurity, during which there were two elections, one of which was annulled, General Ydigoras was elected President and assumed office March 2, 1958.

Under his regime Guatemala has done tolerably well, by fits and starts. A reform program, looking toward land distribution, school construction, home building, and the development of new industries has taken modest shape. The December, 1959, elections gave President Ydigoras his first workable majority in congress and he has since moved ahead with greater dispatch on his reform program. There is now a growing middle class and a widening circle of lower-income families proud of their homes built with government assistance. Our Point Four program has yielded mounting dividends in the form of

better farming methods and diversification of crops.

Is the pace of improvement fast enough? I talked with several knowledgeable Americans and Guatemalans who do not think so. The process of breaking down the oligarchic system moves slowly. Eighty cents a day is still the best return most peasants can command. Disease is still rampant and illiteracy stands at sixty-seven per cent. Every measure for reform must run the fire of the wealthy elite, and often a promising measure emerges from the legislative process almost completely shorn of its hopeful passages.

President Ydigoras, who can best be described as a domineering democrat who wants his people to love him even if he expects them to think he knows best, is more hopeful. I spent a day with him traveling the countryside as he dedicated schools and power installations. I found him a shrewd, affable character. I could see why some of his opponents thought he was a bit touched in the the head and some of his friends thought he was crazy, all right—but crazy like a fox.

"As long as there is hope in this land," he told me, "as long as we are moving forward, we can defeat Castroism and Communism. Our progress is slow, but we are setting up pilot plants in the various fields to show the people they can look forward to housing, education, agrarian reform, farm-to-market roads, and progress in health. It will take time."

But is there enough time, I brooded as I headed homeward.

The Road Ahead for Latin America

TIME IS RUNNING OUT in Latin America. The pressure for social reform has become an irresistible force. The struggle of the moderate middle to find a democratic road to reform between the bitter opposition of the oligarchy and the sabotaging strategy of the far left has taken on a compelling urgency. "It is too late now for a slow-paced revolution," said Costa Rica's indefatigable democrat, former President Jose Figueres. "The forces for freedom must move swiftly or it may soon be too late."

Most of the leaders of Latin America with whom I talked are painfully aware of the fact that much that needs doing must be done by the people of Latin America themselves. They desperately want assistance from the United States, but they understand and accept President Kennedy's concept of self-help. They agree with the American they admire most, Adlai Stevenson, who wrote in *Look* after his extended swing through the hemisphere:

"The problems that present themselves can be tackled only by Latin Americans. *They* will have to take the bold, brave, difficult steps to achieve better land use and distribution, better housing and better education at all levels. *They* will have to clear away the ghastly slums that surround every city. *They* will have to reform tax collection, cut corruption, reduce the waste on arms, and increase the rate of savings, and *they* will have to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor."

But, Adlai Stevenson was quick to add, while *they* of Latin America must do it, there is much that *we* of the United States can do to help. In this closing fragment of my report on Latin America, I want to explore some of these possibilities.

Our first task is psychological, not financial. It will not cost us a penny. It involves the revival of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy and its extension through John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. It means the end of neglect of Latin America and the resumption of respect for her peoples and understanding of her problems. It means forthright talks with her leaders as equals. It involves the appointment to the various embassies of able, respected Americans who will work closely with democratic governments, and not, as in the past, of business tycoons whose only claim to appointment was their campaign contributions to the successful candidate for President, and who, when they arrived in the country to which they were accredited, played and associated with only the social elite.

What is needed, fundamentally, is the *identification* of the United States with the revolution of rising expectations now surging through all Latin America. This means backing, not bucking, that revolution. This means, negatively, an unequivocal policy of refusing to support dictatorships, and, affirmatively, an equally unequivocal policy of encouraging, by word and deed, the democratic forces struggling to strengthen individual freedom while embarking on social programs of reform.

The affirmative theme was expressed with great clarity recently by Thomas J. Watson, Jr., president of the International Business Machines Corporation, when he said of Latin America:

"In the past we have leaned over backwards so as not to interfere in the internal affairs of any nation with whom we had relations. We may have even used this policy as an excuse for doing nothing when we should have moved. . . . I think we have a duty wherever we are assisting an ally or friend to assure ourselves that the government of that ally is dedicated to improving the lot of the average citizen. The government should represent the will of the people and should be chosen, wherever feasible, by popular and secret ballot. If we do not work towards these things, we are not playing fairly with the concept of freedom upon which our country was founded."

Frequently in the past, as Watson pointed out, our government has worked with dictatorships on the ostensible theory that we could not interfere in the internal affairs of the Latin American countries. But far too often the course of non-interference served to cloak the absence of any policy at all, and sometimes served as an excuse for a policy of downright support of tyranny because our business community preferred it or our planners in the Pentagon felt brutal dictators made good allies against Communism.

Non-interference does not mean the total absence of leadership, inspiration, and example. On the contrary, it was during the golden age of our relations with Latin America, under the Good Neighbor Policy, that we most effectively offered counsel and direction to our smaller and younger neighbors and thereby won their devotion and cooperation. They knew then from the nature of our progressive leadership that we were interested in their plight, that we were treating them as friends and partners, and that we were determined to help them help themselves.

If it is interference to require, as a condition of our assistance, that Latin America put her own house in order by embarking on reform programs in the fields of health, housing, education, taxation, and land distribution, it is the kind of interference that would be warmly welcomed by the overwhelming majority of Latin Americans who hunger for a better life. The oligarchies, of course, would resist, but the democratic governments, like those in Venezuela and Colombia, would be happy to be armed with a new and powerful weapon against the elite—the requirement of basic internal reform as a condition of U.S. assistance.

Once the Latin American countries have launched their own housecleaning of corruption and tax evasion and once they have presented plans for social reform and economic expansion, Latin American nations should qualify for U.S. help, both through financing on a long-term basis of sound projects broad enough to assure progress, and through a generous measure of technical assistance. The liberalization of loan policy and the extension of credit facilities are vital in any program for the development of Latin America. "Our files are filled with plans and blueprints," one head of government told me. "What we need now is the capital to effectuate them."

Equally vital is the need to find ways to stabilize market prices for Latin America's raw materials. The skidding price of coffee, for example, has caused untold hardship to countless Latin American individuals and depleted the treasuries of their governments. The United States, until recently, has resisted adoption of a price stabilization program. Latin Americans were therefore overjoyed when President Kennedy emphasized the need for action in this field in the ten-point program for Latin America he submitted to hemisphere diplomats earlier this year.

Carmack in The Christian Science Monitor

A Boat Built for Two

There are other areas in which we can be decisively helpful. We can, for example, lend encouragement to the concept of a common market for Latin America. We can offer a helping hand to countries struggling to industrialize. We can, for a pittance, do wonders to improve higher education in Latin America by providing, through private and public sources, a greatly expanded program of scholarships and visiting professorships. We can do much to replenish the treasuries of near-bankrupt countries by encouraging them to take the lead in disarmament. The United States, as William Benton has pointed out, "now assumes responsibility for defense in the hemisphere and the Organization of American States takes responsibility for defense against aggression within the hemisphere. Yet some countries spend as much as fifty per cent of their national budgets on armaments"—largely, I add, at the urging of our Pentagon planners.

I have sought to distill in this conclusion the best of the countless suggestions to which I was exposed in my travels. There is no magic in any of them, but together they add up to a purposeful approach to the insistent challenge of Latin America. They recognize that the threats of Communism and Castroism do not spring from some sinister plot in Moscow or Havana, but from fundamental, home-grown weaknesses which neither Latin American nor U.S. policies have yet been able to solve. Embargoes, blockades, and invasions of Cuba will do nothing to resolve the plight of Latin America.

The time has come for an end of speeches, however fine their phrasing, and the beginning of affirmative action. The only meaningful defense against Communism in the Western Hemisphere is a great offensive for social justice and democracy supported by the United States. Only a creative program of social reform, economic expansion and political freedom—*now*—can prevent the dynamite that is Latin America from exploding on our doorstep.

THE PEOPLE'S FORUM

Mayer on Eichmann

Dear Sirs:

Milton Mayer's article, "Eichmann in Israel" in the April *Progressive* was extremely disturbing and confusing.

The confusion is a result of the hodge-podge attempt to include in one brief, contrived dialogue all the ramifications raised by the Eichmann trial—Israel's seizure of Eichmann in Argentina; the guilt of America and Britain, plus an innuendo that Israel does not have a legitimate claim to Israel; an attempt to equate Ben-Gurion and Hitler, the Israelis and the Nazis; and the legitimate and pertinent question as to whether the trial of Eichmann will "persuade people not to be anti-Semitic." Even this list is incomplete.

What is disturbing is that such confusion should appear in *The Progressive*. Surely the Editor of *The Progressive* does not mean to equate the fascist orientation of the Nazi party or the aggressive ambitions of Soviet-equipped Nasser-dominated Arab countries with the progressive social system and outlook of a democracy like Israel. There was sufficient purpose in questioning the validity of the "goals" of the Eichmann trial as set forth by Israel; it was unnecessary, unfair, and insulting to equate Israelis and Nazis.

RABBI LEON KRONISH
Miami Beach, Florida

Israel's Moral Right

Dear Sirs:

Never in history has anything resembled the Eichmann case. Eichmann's deeds, and those of Nazi Germany, are unique; no precedent exists. Consequently, many public statements made by politicians and writers enter the realm of the fantastic. I maintain that Milton Mayer's article is in this category of fantastic and irresponsible writing.

Mayer implies that the Nazi case, exemplified by Eichmann, is defensible and that the case of Israel needs justification. Mayer commits an even worse crime. He distorts many facts and much of the philosophy of both the Nazis and the Jews.

World War II ended sixteen years ago and Eichmann was captured only within the last year. All of the major Allied powers long ago gave up hunting for Eichmann; they cared nothing about putting the facts of the Nazi slaughter against the Jews before the world. A relentless search by citizens of Israel and Jews all over the world finally found Eichmann. He was kidnapped and brought to Israel to face trial.

Does Mayer contend that the rest of the world has any right to put Eichmann on trial when they gave up pursuing him years ago? Does Mayer contend that Argentina, which is still a home for many escaped Nazis, would have ever let Eichmann out of its jurisdiction to Israel, the United Nations, or anyone else? Does Mayer contend there is something immoral about using force to bring Eichmann before the bar of justice?

I contend that Israel has a greater moral and ethical right to put Eichmann on trial than any group of Christian nations. Israel is the conscience of the world goading all other nations to accept some responsibility for the Nazi disaster by putting Eichmann on trial.

NEIL MCLAUGHLIN
New York City

Beyond Human Decency

Dear Sirs:

Frequently Milton Mayer's articles have left me troubled and confused. In our attempts to be fair to the wrong-doer is one completely to ignore the innocent victim?

His article on the Eichmann trial appears to go beyond human decency. Mayer will save the wrong-doer's rights with the very last blood of the victim and with the last blood of all opposed to the wrong-doer.

How much sacrifice has he personally made to help his poor misguided wrong-doers from the wrath of their victim's sympathizers?

I am beginning to feel a moral obligation to cancel my subscription if Milton Mayer continues to hold forth.

REBECCA ALTSCHULER
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Justice Abandoned

Dear Sirs:

Milton Mayer's solution to the "Eichmann problem" is astonishingly childish when you consider where his logic leads us. The whole concept of justice has been obliterated, twisted grotesquely, and thrown before his reading public as primitive vengeance. Mayer seems to think that because a crime is so huge and implicates so many people, that justice is thereby totally inaccessible through the court of law, and therefore must be abandoned altogether.

It is true that everyone is guilty of one crime or another, legal or moral. Presuming that everyone bears some guilt for the evil in the world, does Mayer presume that all people are disqualified to judge another of a crime, particularly a capital offense of the magnitude of Herr Eichmann's?

Probably the most fantastic statement in this absurd fantasy by Mayer is the quote: "EICHMANN: But when the world sees that you [the Jews] no longer wish to do harm—even in retribution for harm done you—it will let you alone. ISRAELI: It never has. EICHMANN: You have never tried. ISRAELI: We're not taking any chances."

If Mayer is fatuous enough to believe that Hitler and Eichmann would not have slain a Jew, if only they could have really accepted the fact that the Jews "no longer wish to do harm—even in retribution for harm done," he is so divorced from reality that a basis for discussion disintegrates.

Milton Mayer has written creditable articles in your magazine in the past. I hope that in my mind and the minds of other readers, this one does not shatter completely the impression that Mayer might have something more intelligent to say on other topics.

RABBI PAUL H. LEVENSON
Fort Hood, Texas

Crude Sophistry

Dear Sirs:

Milton Mayer's dialogue on the Eichmann case raises important moral issues: the use of unjust means to accomplish justice, the morality or usefulness of retributive justice, our mutual involvement in and responsibility for what takes place in our time, our common finiteness and sinfulness, and the whole question of our dealings with former Nazis and our relation to the German people—which is especially acute for those of us who are Jews.

Unfortunately, Mayer reduces his case to absurdity by resorting to the crudest kind of sophistry and the most shameless distortion of historical facts. He makes use of dishonest and questionable devices "in a good cause": to persuade us that we should not make use of evil means to deal with evil. Striking a magnanimous pose of forgiveness, understanding, and fellow-feeling with the ex-Nazis, he is himself guilty of the most uncharitable and "pharasaical" attitude towards his neighbors, such as the unnamed historian who wanted to "bash in" the Nazis' heads.

One of Mayer's main ploys is the "identification" device, whereby innocent and helpless Jews are identified with the Nazis who shoved them into the gas chambers and incinerators. Hence, it follows, says Mayer, that if it was wrong to hunt down and execute the Jews, it is equally wrong to hunt down and prosecute the Nazis who tortured and butchered them. The illegal apprehension of a Nazi outlaw, then, is the moral equivalent of the capture and deliberate extermination of six million Jewish innocents. In Mayer's abstract identification schema, one important qualification is conveniently omitted: that the Nazis are being pursued and condemned *for their deeds*, while the Jews were pursued and exterminated merely *for being born*.

It is, of course, intellectually illuminating and morally edifying to bring out all the

factors involved in and all the groups responsible for an act of historic injustice and iniquity. But if we are to do this honestly and effectively we must be a bit more inclusive and less partisan and self-protective than Mayer has been. We would have to include the Arabs as well as the British and Americans among the peoples who refused egress to the Jews from Nazi Germany. We would have to take account of the pacifists, isolationists, and a lot of people Mayer considers "good guys" as well as those he considers "bad guys," for making Nazi Germany strong, World War II inevitable, and sealing up the Jews in *Festung Europa*.

If we are to be honest, we must at least explore the role of British pacifism and disarmament, the failure of Britain and France to resist the German occupation of the Rhineland in 1935, the Western "nonintervention" policy in the Spanish Civil War, and the "peace in our time" wrought at Munich in 1938. Of course, such an honest, inclusive exploration might prove embarrassing and painful for Mayer and his politico-spiritual comrades, but it would not only be more enlightening and edifying—it would also be more concordant with the moral sincerity which Mayer so constantly proclaims.

SEYMOUR CAIN
Pacifica, California

Mayer's Diatribe

Dear Sirs:

By having an anonymous Israeli quote his Prime Minister as saying things Ben-Gurion never said and having Eichmann quote Der Führer saying things Hitler never said, Milton Mayer in his diatribe is able to equate Ben-Gurion with Hitler. It is the same type of reasoning by which Dwight D. Eisenhower can be shown to be a Communist or the late Senator Joseph McCarthy to have been a liberal. It will fool the ignorant and possibly the uninformed, but it brings only disgust to the mind of anyone having some knowledge of the situation.

I consider this article an insult to the intelligence, a defamation of my kinsfolk, and a disgrace to the tradition and reputation *The Progressive* has had in the past.

I hope that *The Progressive* will not follow the aberrant path upon which you seem to have embarked and will speedily return to the liberal, humanistic way.

SAMUEL Z. SCHAEFLER
New York City

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Placing Responsibility

Dear Sirs:

Evidently Milton Mayer is trying to show that all the Nazis, all the Germans, and even all of the world, must bear responsibility for the extermination of the Jews. While it may appear to follow from this that it is futile to exact responsibility for these crimes from one individual, it just as easily follows that no man need bear responsibility for any of his actions. Without too much effort, some aspect of the "family," "culture," "society," "early influences," can seemingly be found to be the cause of our present woes; why should we then, this reasoning would go, use poor Eichmann and his ilk as scapegoats for guilt all of us must share? As a product of the cultural and psychological forces acting upon him, he is as much determined as he is a determinant.

But even if logically we must accept the tremendous role these forces play in making us what we are, to say that we are completely bound by them is to completely abrogate individual responsibility for our actions. A society must function on the premise that an individual is a responsible agent. Eichmann was. He clearly chose a path which afforded him preference and prestige in return for being the ultimate agent in a regime dedicated to genocide. His actions were direct and unequivocal; he is responsible for them.

The issue is evaded when we place responsibility upon a culture, a regime, or just humanity. There are too many exceptions. There are too many individuals who fought against it and died or were imprisoned, who disbelieved but who were too frightened to act, or who were self-deluders or incompetent. So maybe we educate a people, or make them feel shame and guilt, or teach them the necessities of individual participation in the events of our times—but the guilt and responsibility of the man who knowingly, willingly, and even joyfully pulls the trigger is nonetheless pertinent.

Assessing responsibility, however, is not the same as desiring vengeance. Execution of the guilty one does not necessarily have to follow. What does have to follow is the judgment of law, a law which must protect the weak and helpless against the perversion of power. Ideally such a law would prevent such crimes from occurring; failing this the law must analyze the why and how of the crime, and it does this through the median of individual responsibility, so that safeguards can be erected against future occurrence.

MARK ROSS
Stanford, California

Mayer's Double Standard

Dear Sirs:

Milton Mayer's dialogue with "Eichmann" appears to be a masterpiece of logic and Christian forbearance. Yet upon closer analysis there appears a serious flaw in this skillful display of logic in defense of Eichmann. Beneath this brilliant sophistry lies the utter distortion of reason, whereby not Eichmann is placed on trial, but Israel, and an abstraction called "the human race." We may not punish Eichmann—or even the German people, unless we can bring to trial the whole human race, for they are the guilty.

We caution the Israelis to conduct themselves with meticulous correctness. *They* must not overstep or subvert the laws of humanity. We tremble lest *they* be lacking in Christian forgiveness and gentle mercy—not the Eichmanns, or the Nazis, or the German Reich.

To suggest that Israel seeks vengeance or retribution for six million victims from this miserable specimen of inhumanity is utterly incredible. One feels that such generous, liberal impulses ought to be invested in some worthier cause.

IRVING TANENBAUM
Chicago, Illinois

Mayer's Straw Man

Dear Sirs:

Milton Mayer's "Eichmann in Israel" is a lopsided dialogue in which Eichmann is given the role of an intellectual Goliath battling a David without a slingshot.

Mayer's discourse is often wise and logical, but he makes certain that the Israeli rebuttals are hardly more than the petulant rejoinders of an emotionally retarded child.

Using a specious and trite straw-man technique, he asks of the Jews what centuries of attempted genocide have not accomplished, that they renounce their God of vengeance, accept Jesus, and become the true Christians of the world.

In short, he asks of the Jew what the racist asks of the Negro: Become better than we and we will accept you.

VERNON BENDER
Carmel, California

The Mark of Cain

Dear Sirs:

The crime of Eichmann is the crime of Cain, and the Lord has spoken His judgment:

"And it came to pass . . . that Cain rose us against Abel his brother, and slew him. . .

"And the Lord said unto Cain . . . What hast thou done? the voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto me from the ground.

"And now art thou cursed from the earth, which hath opened her mouth to receive thy brother's blood from thy hand; . . . a fugitive and a vagabond shalt thou be in the earth.

"And Cain said unto the Lord, My punishment is greater than I can bear.

"Behold, thou hast driven me out this day from the face of the earth; and from thy face shall I be hid; and I shall be a fugitive and a vagabond in the earth; and it shall come to pass that every one that findeth me shall slay me.

"And the Lord said unto him, Therefore whosoever slayeth Cain, vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold. And the Lord set a mark upon Cain, lest any finding him should kill him.

"And Cain went out from the presence of the Lord . . ."

Eichmann should be released to wander

in Israel till he dies among those he tried to destroy. He should be fully protected by the laws of the state and by its people's obedience to the word of God.

He should be marked with the mark of Cain—a suitable "leper's bell" to proclaim the comings and goings of this monster who is beneath human "justice." He should sleep unmolested in the hills and fields of Israel. A daily concentration-camp ration of bread and water should be given him by any citizen of whom he begs it. He should know the punishment that is "more than man can bear": to live out his life abandoned by mankind.

To prevent his being kidnapped, and to stay the hand of anyone bent on "vengeance," I suggest that he be kept under surveillance from a distance great enough to avoid direct contact. In effect, the whole Israeli people will be his "guards."

In no other way can the divine sentence on Cain-Eichmann be fulfilled.

Leaders of American Jewry must take a stand on this issue, lest a wave of anti-Semitism and contempt for Israel emerge from this show-trial that will be a timeless agony. Remember the warning: "Whosoever slayeth Cain, vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold."

WILLIAM E. LERNER
Los Angeles, California

Mayer Refreshing

Dear Sirs:

The tone of Milton Mayer's dialogue between an Israeli and Eichmann was refreshing; its points well taken. It was written without the self-righteousness that usually obscures a Jewish author's reason when he writes about Nazis.

Eichmann's death would be a small loss. But the possible consequences of his trial would be grievous. They would only serve men like Eichmann himself. In the past, the bending of justice to suit national emotions has led to the perversion of the concept entirely. As Mayer points out, Hitler was a master of this demagogic tactic.

If Zionists persist in fighting Nazi fire with Israeli fire, only the cause of justice will be significantly burnt.

CHRIS VASILLOPULOS
Geneva, New York

Pornography Defended

Dear Sirs:

In reading David Fellman's review of *The Smut Peddlers*, by James Jackson Kilpatrick, I was stopped cold by the sentence: "To my knowledge no responsible or sensible civil libertarian defends hard-core pornography."

Solely to increase Mr. Fellman's knowledge, I wish to inform him that I am a responsible and sensible civil libertarian who defends hard-core pornography. I am not alone, but he will have to do a little more reading in the field if he wishes to expand his knowledge further.

David Fellman and James Jackson Kilpatrick not only do not defend hard-core pornography, they attack it. This, smacks of infanticide. The pornography of an era is a qualitative and quantitative measure of the repressions of that era. The facing and accepting of erotic reality (pornography to many) minimizes the need for pornographic fantasy to the point that it must have artistic merit in order to survive in the marketplace.

EMERSON SYMONDS
San Bernardino, California

Dear Sirs:

In a review of *The Smut Peddlers* in your April issue, David Fellman says, "To my knowledge no responsible or sensible civil libertarian defends hard-core pornography." Fellman has labelled in advance anyone who disagrees with him, but I feel I must do so in the interest of maintaining the First Amendment and in the interest of common sense.

I assume Fellman refers to the defense of "hard-core pornography" on its legal, rather than its artistic merits. I believe it has long been the position of the American Civil Liberties Union, as well as of a minority of the Supreme Court, that no clear and present danger has been demonstrated in connection with the sale, distribution, or enjoyment of works which Fellman would probably label "hard-core pornography."

I know of no studies which show a correlation between the reading of pornography and a participation in criminal activities, especially in sexual crimes. A sick person could be incited to lust by Mark Twain's conscious pornography (and this I will defend on artistic merits) or by Rembrandt's deliberately lewd drawings. For that matter, a sick person could be incited to lust by Winnie the Pooh, and a reasonably curious adolescent could get his kicks from a list of Bowdler's deletions.

There may be clear and present danger in the possession of a kitchen knife, just as in democracy itself we take an enormous risk. But the kitchen knife and democracy are both tools which we consider indispensable to our way of life.

ETTA LINTON
San Diego, California

Frankfurter's Record

Dear Sirs:

Now that Fred Rodell has done such a masterful job on Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, (March issue), why not have him examine the miserable record of Justice Felix Frankfurter? Here is a man who was denounced by the reactionary press when Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed him to office, yet now we find Frankfurter an ultra-conservative.

RAY MOSTEK
Lombard, Illinois

Questions for Humphrey

Dear Sirs:

I have just read Senator Hubert Humphrey's article, "High Noon at Geneva," in the May *Progressive*. I fail to see that he has mentioned any disarmament proposal put forth by the United States. Are we still limiting our aims to controls only?

As I understand it, Russia has long since been willing to accept our proposals for inspection if we will only declare ourselves in favor of total disarmament. So far, to my knowledge, the United States has made not one single proposal for disarmament, whereas the U.S.S.R. has proposed total world disarmament within a period of four years, I believe.

As I see it *we* are the government holding up negotiations. Cessation of nuclear testing is one, and only one, phase of disarmament.

Why does the United States not declare itself in favor of worldwide disarmament?

GLADYS B. HARGER
Lansing, Michigan

Opposes Kennedy on Cuba

Dear Sirs:

I have sent the following letter to President John F. Kennedy:

I disapprove of our threatening policy toward Castro's Cuba. You speak of Cuba's "fundamental rights," yet what of our fundamental rights to a peaceful existence? Our government secretly abetted the anti-Castro forces through the Central Intelligence Agency. Such un-democratic shenanigans imply the immoral attitude that the end justifies the means.

If Cuba goes Communist we have no right to interfere unless she invades the United States (*not* Guantanamo).

I sincerely regret that you have not seen fit to attempt more vigorously a rapprochement with the Communist world. I am certain that over the years the Communists will become more democratic just as we will become more socialistic. If you would only realize that our approach should be one of cooperation with them rather than petulant rivalry, ours might become a far better world.

I do *not* stand with you as long as your actions are so unjustifiably threatening toward Cuba and the Communists. At times they have clearly been in the wrong, but now we are. Let us honestly admit it and work toward reconciliation.

PETER D. KING, M.D.
Encino, California

Sick at Heart

Dear Sirs:

There was a time when the statement could be made (without pre-assurance of refutation) that the people of Cuba wanted to be rid of the Castro government. This statement presumably was offered in justification of U.S. attempts to overthrow that government by force, or at least, to assist that attempt.

It would now seem clear that the failure of the great majority of Cubans to join in the invasion, clearly proved that, as of the present, *they* do not want to be rid of the Castro government.

If the United States were now to support revolutionary action in Cuba, or take violent action of any kind against Castro's government, would we not be just as guilty of imperialism as would any other government which would try, by violence, to force on

any people a government they do not want? Or destroy one they do want?

If we insist on this immoral act, how can we escape the label of imperialist? How could any repetitious claiming of innocence change the facts?

We treat as criminal anyone who attempts to overthrow our government by violence. How then can there be any moral defense for the proposal that we attempt, by violence, to overthrow the government that the people of Cuba want, no matter how much we dislike it?

Can we as a nation completely ignore the laws of decency and morality? Are we beyond the law just because we are bigger and stronger?

It makes me sick at heart to think of our government putting itself in the position of violating those very laws of decent human conduct that we claim to uphold.

PATON B. CROUSE
San Francisco, California

Too Late in Cuba?

Dear Sirs:

It is disappointing to me that President Kennedy appears to follow the same policy on Cuba as his predecessor. I had hoped he would take a different course.

How can we expect the slightest change in attitude on Castro's side if we do not change ours first? President Kennedy should be in a better position than people like myself to know what caused Castro to lean toward Communism. What did the United States ever do to prevent this? Didn't we drive him to it?

Is it too late at this point to show a more understanding attitude toward Cuba?

BETTY FRIEDMANN
Kalamazoo, Michigan

Why Castro Changed

Dear Sirs:

I have just re-read the newspaper reports of Fidel Castro's visit to Washington in April, 1959. He asked for a modest loan and some "patience and understanding" in his efforts to clean up the mess left by his predecessor, Batista. I find nothing in these reports to indicate that Castro, in this early stage of his progress, had any idea of turning to the Leftists in his foreign policy. In fact, there were dispatches from Havana stating that the bearded boys who roared into power in 1959 gave the cold shoulder to the local Communist Party, a third-rate little group which certainly had nothing to do with the overthrow of Batista.

But instead of a loan and a little "patience and understanding" we denied assistance to Castro; we cut his sugar quota and refused to process his oil—acts which would have quickly strangled the Cuban economy. We left Castro no possible alternative, for sheer survival, but to turn to the Communist countries for help. We then severed relations with Cuba and began to arm and train large numbers of "counter-revolutionists" (including refugee Batista cut-throats) whose avowed purpose is to commit aggression on Cuban soil, cause a civil war, and thus bring about the downfall of Castro.

Is it any wonder that ideological changes took place in the Castro administration? Do we not ourselves demand that the satellite governments to whom we give aid profess at least lip-loyalty to our self-styled "free world" ideology?

I cannot help thinking that if "patience and understanding" had been given to the new, young head of state in Latin America who, two years ago, turned to the United States for financial aid and cooperation, things might be very different for us in Cuba today.

CHARLES PEMBERTON
New York City

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The Progressive
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Supports HUAC

Dear Sirs:

I saw the motion picture *Operation Abolition*. Will you please explain how a picture (with sounds) of the actual disorders in San Francisco could be "scandalously inaccurate," as you stated in an April editorial? Were the disorderly students hired by the House Un-American Activities Committee to put on an act—or were they the dupes of Communist agents shown in the picture? All honest people who saw the picture know the answer to that one. If the HUAC wanted to be unfair, they would have left out the parts where fire hoses were turned on the demonstrators and they were forcibly dragged down many steps. If there was no disorder, how did it happen that several policemen went to the hospital?

If the demonstrators had tried with all their might, they could have done nothing more to build up the HUAC than they did by their disorderly conduct. There was a good reason for that 412 to 6 vote in the House of Representatives to continue the HUAC: The majority of Americans believe in law and order—not in Communist hell-raising.

H. F. KOHL
Springfield, Ohio

Racial Characteristics

Dear Sirs:

Adah Maurer writes in the April People's Forum that she is "fed to nausea" with the plight of the Negro and that when "they become willing to stick their own necks out for the rights denied them . . . they will merit our respect."

One wonders where Mrs. Maurer has been, or what she has been reading, the past few years. Certainly not living in the United States (or even on this planet) or reading *The Progressive's* fine articles on issues such as the struggle for desegregation in both North and South, and for civil rights in countries all over the world. Hasn't Mrs. Maurer ever heard of Marian Anderson, Martin Luther King, Carl T. Rowan, Robert Weaver, and many, many others?

Mrs. Maurer expresses disgust with the "excessive sexuality . . . lack of personal pride and the hysterical fear of everything and nothing" which she ascribes to Negroes. It is ridiculous to say that these are characteristics peculiar to one race, just as it is ridiculous to maintain that the qualities of ignorance, bigotry, and race hatred are exclusive qualities of whites.

SARAH P. GOLDSTEIN
Madison, Wisconsin

Meyer's Goldwater 'Fine'

Dear Sirs:

Karl E. Meyer's article in the April *Progressive* on "Barry Goldwater: Radical of the Right" is a fine portrayal—with balance, perception, insight, and objectivity—of a man some of us fear and others look upon as a new deliverer.

This image of Barry Goldwater should be seen by many. Thank you for the privilege of reading such magnificently organized material on a subject of such widespread interest.

MIGNON E. ROTHSTEIN
Los Angeles, California

JFK Reappraisal

Dear Sirs:

I have said this before election and after election and I repeat it again. The time will come when the Editors of *The Progressive* will have to make an "agonizing reappraisal" of their hero, John F. Kennedy, or forfeit their right ever to call themselves liberals again. Unless, of course, you can equate war mongering with liberalism.

WILLIAM RYBARCZYK
Rice Lake, Wisconsin

Bodies for Medicine

Dear Sirs:

Ruth M. Harmer's "The High Cost of Dying" in the March *Progressive* gives welcome news of a needed fight against undertakers' vicious practices. There are solutions other than the cooperative associations of which Miss Harmer writes.

One person left her body to the medical school of the University of California. It was called for within two hours. Another has willed her eyes to an eye bank. She asked her doctor if any other part of her body could be used. He spoke of a bone bank. Her children will be saved the emotional experience of a funeral, and all expense for one will be saved. The thought of enabling a blind person to see is a happy one.

CLARA STURGES JOHNSON
Claremont, California

BOOKS

Paperback Paradise

by William McCann

When Mae West, long ago, proclaimed her happy discovery that "too much of a good thing can be wonderful," she expressed the delight of many book buyers with today's profusion of high-quality paperbacks. What began eight years ago as a refreshing light shower (Doubleday's Anchor books were the first welcome drops) has increased to an incessant downpour. And there are few cries of dissatisfaction. Probably those readers who feel that Henry James, in his novels, chews much more than he bites off are not boundlessly grateful that *The Old Pretender* is available in forty paperbound editions. But the same readers may be glad that D. H. Lawrence is available in twenty editions, or Jack Kerouac in ten. Most of us, I think, can agree with Mark Von Doren's statement on the paperback era: "We are lucky to live when we do, at least so far as good books are concerned."

"The paperback," says Marchette Chute, "is the greatest achievement in portability since the invention of the sandwich." This seems to be true. My daughter came home from college on a recent week-end with these books in her lugggage: *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, by Jacob Burckhardt (Mentor. 75 cents), Marvin Meyers' *The Jacksonian Persuasion* (Vintage. $1.25), and Basil Willey's *The Eighteenth Century Background* (Beacon. $1.75). Oh yes, and James Thurber's *Thurber Country* (Simon and Schuster. $1.45). What's more, she had been reading them. No wonder teachers are as pleased about this as the students and their parents.

Professor Mason Gross says, "For over twenty years I have taught the history of philosophy and now for the first time I feel that my students and I have the material available to us for doing the job right." Says Professor Frank Freidel, "Never before has it been possible to purchase so many excellent books in the field of American history for so little money." And Professor Gordon Ray: "It is not too much to say that the emergence of paperback books as a major factor in the publishing scene has revolutionized the study of literature, so greatly has it increased the availability both of literary works and of comments on these works."

Is everybody happy? Well, not quite everybody. Dealers in second-hand books are generally not. New York's famed Fourth Avenue shops, they say, have been hard hit. Book buyers are obliged no longer to search for hours in dark, dusty stores for works long out of print. Hundreds of these volumes have now appeared in paperbound reprints. For years I abused my eyes in used-book stores looking for a modestly priced copy of Arthur O. Lovejoy's *The Great Chain of Being*. Not long ago, Harpers Torchbooks, praise be, brought out an attractive soft-cover edition at $1.85. There is, of course, another aspect of this. No joy is unalloyed. My wife, who hasn't had a new hat, she says, since the cold war began, noticed that Richard M. Dorson's interesting *American Folklore*, for which I paid $4.50 a year or so ago, is out (University of Chicago Press) as a bright, new paperback at $1.75. Why, she asks, didn't I wait?

Many of us now in middle-life who were raised on farms or in small towns had our first exposure to serious literature from the five-cent Little Blue Books published by the fabulous E. Haldeman-Julius. We can not be told that cheap, paperback reprints of important, exciting books are a recent publishing idea. They aren't, of course. There were paperbound editions of good books in America in the Nineteenth Century. One historian points out that the first paperback in this country was *The Bay Psalm Book* (1640). But it is true that the modern efflorescence of "quality" paperbacks, with prices ranging from, say 65 cents to $3.25, began in the spring of 1953. The person credited with starting the whole blooming business is Jacob Epstein, a young man fresh out of Columbia University. Epstein persuaded Doubleday to launch its Anchor Books, a series which had, among its first publications, such works as Edmund Wilson's *To the Finland Station* and Constance Rourke's *American Humor*.

At first, other publishers seemed to view the Anchor venture with much skepticism. But in time, they came into the paperback field. Now there are scores of competitors, university presses among them, in a fierce scramble for distribution and sales. Paperbacks are bringing the book industry one-fifth of its total income. A selective catalog of currently available books lists more than 10,000 titles. During the past five years, *The Progressive* has listed nearly 1,000 books thought to be especially worthy of its readers' notice.

There have been impressive improvements in the appearance and durability of paperbacks. Much skill and artistry now go into the preparation of their covers, which are, for the most part, more sprightly and diverting than the dust-jackets of hard-cover books. The Signet Classics

(published by New American Library) for example, which sell at 50 cents a volume, are a handsomely designed, sturdily bound series, with excellent typography. For the price, these volumes are marvels of paperback publication.

It is not unusual this spring to see paperbacks priced as high as $3.25. In many cases, though not invariably, the buyer gets his money's worth, a book of significance and substance which sold for, say, $7.50 in hard covers or was difficult to obtain at any price. Two recently issued reprints well worth their cost are Ernest Crawley's *The Mystic Rose* (Meridian. $2.25) and Russell Kirk's *The Conservative Mind* (Gateway. $2.45). Kirk's book sold for $6.50 when it came out in 1953. Fortunately, however, for students and scholars with restricted budgets it is still possible to buy a good book at 95 cents or less. The New American Library has done a particularly praiseworthy job of publishing important works at remarkably reasonable prices. Henry Adams' *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres* and William Graham Sumner's *Folkways*, for examples, are available in the Mentor Series (N.A.L.) at 75 cents each volume.

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THE Crossroads OF Liberalism

Croly, Weyl, Lippmann, and the Progressive Era, 1900-1925

By CHARLES FORCEY

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What are authors' reactions to the Paperback Revolution? Jerome Weidman, for one, generally approves. "It is," he says, "one of the more rewarding aspects of the paperback phenomenon—and as phenomenons go, this one is studded with aspects as a baked ham is studded with cloves—that it provides the writer with that extraordinary thing for which every human being yearns but, the hard facts of life being as hard as they are, seldom gets: a second chance, or, more accurately, perhaps, in the case of a writer, a second hearing." It is surely true that certain works of fiction which sold modestly in hard covers have sold at a prodigious rate in cheap, paper editions. Thus the author, though he may not earn a proportionately larger income from his work, has the satisfaction of being much more widely and appreciatively read. And to the writer this is important. "I can only hope," wrote Henry James to Howells in 1878, "that some day my buried prose will kick off its various tombstones at once." Eighty years later, in paperbacks, James' hope has been abundantly realized.

Some creative writers, of course, are dubious about paperbacks. They fear that the more first-rate books there are at low prices, the harder it will be to persuade people to buy a young writer's interesting first novel. Critics of the paperback era have charged that excessive emphasis on the reprinting of previously published books has discouraged creative work by new writers and scholars and is an "enemy of promise." Perhaps to answer this criticism, a number of publishers are bringing out good "originals" in nonfiction as well as in fiction and verse.

Two of the largest paperback sellers dealing with the subject of social and economic change (each has sold more than 450,000 copies) are David Riesman's *The Lonely Crowd* (Anchor. 95 cents) and *The Organization Man*, by William H. Whyte, Jr. (Anchor. $1.45). Eric F. Goldman has pointed out that both books "argue that the new America is one in which people are undergoing a fundamental change in character and the change is hardly presented as an improvement." However, one notably encouraging aspect of this change, it seems to me, is reflected in the surprising volume of sales of the two books—serious, penetrating, and sophisticated as they both are.

America's reading habits are changing, too. And this is an improvement. It is undeniable, of course, that westerns, mysteries, historical novels, and tales of sex and violence still make up a large proportion of our paperbacks. "Four out of five on the newsstands are by writers with little academic or critical prestige," says a publisher, "and their books continue to outsell the 'quality' paperback by a large margin." True. Nevertheless, high-quality paperbacks are appearing this spring in such astonishing numbers that even one whose avocation it is to keep track of them finds it difficult, though fun, to try. This is wonderful. We *are* "lucky to live when we do," as Mark Van Doren said, "at least so far as good books are concerned."

African Realities

TROPICAL AFRICA, by George H. T. Kimble. Two Volumes. The Twentieth Century Fund. $15.

PROFILES OF AFRICAN LEADERS, by Thomas P. Melady. Macmillan. 186 pp. $4.95.

INDEPENDENCE FOR AFRICA, by Gwendolen Carter. Praeger. 170 pp. Hard cover, $4.50. Paper, $1.65.

Reviewed by

George W. Shepherd, Jr.

THE COLD WAR in the Congo has brought Africa to the forefront of American consciousness. Stanley and Schweitzer could not arouse America's concerned interest, but Lumumba has. We suddenly have come to realize that explosive conflict in the Congo could mean the beginning of the final war.

Fortunately, there is pouring from our presses much more than sensational headlines. American scholars who have made a serious study of Africa are turning out material of the utmost importance to the thoughtful American who wants to understand and participate in the foreign policy decision-making process. These publications offer contrasting interpretations of the developing

African scene, because even experts do not agree on what they see in Africa or what outsiders should try to do in this emergent area.

George H. T. Kimble's work, *Tropical Africa,* has received a great deal of attention from American specialists on Africa, although its interest and value should by no means be confined to this group. A great deal of careful research over several years has gone into these two volumes. Kimble clearly aspires to be America's Lord Hailey, and nothing has been produced in the United States to equal it in terms of comprehensive research since Raymond Buell's 1926 book, *The Native Problem in Africa.* Also, there is a closer similarity between Lord Hailey and Kimble than simply comprehensive coverage. This is perhaps best defined as the colonial mood. Despite the author's great respect and sympathy for Africa's new societies and leaders, he can never quite free the interpretation from a sense of regret that the colonial period has been so little understood or appreciated by Africans.

Kimble's first volume, *Land and Livelihood,* is unquestionably the better, although it may not be found to be so interesting as the second, *Society and Polity.* Since Kimble is a geographer, his work reflects a magnificent zest for the interesting and unusual in the African terrain. He demonstrates well the simultaneous limitations of life under harsh economic conditions in certain regions and the immense possibilities of other areas.

Society and Polity contains several unfortunate statements and omissions. Our historic knowledge of what Africa was like at the time Western man first arrived there in the Fifteenth Century has developed to the point where we know that many Africans were not living in "the stone age" and that there were several "central governments." Also, it is strange that a discussion of Portuguese policy should leave out any reference to those basic points which are under primary dispute at the United Nations, namely, the forced labor system and the policy of "Identity" in which the Portuguese assume their overseas regions to be an integral part of Portugal, and refuse to recognize them as colonies.

Thomas P. Melady's *Profiles of African Leaders* goes to the other extreme in its mood of breezy praise for the accomplishments of Africa's new leaders. He summarizes the history and contemporary problems of a number of the new African states and their leaders and offers a great deal of interesting material, much of it through first-hand interviews. His sketches of men like Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika and Leopold Sedar-Senghor of Senegal demonstrate the high caliber of character and ability that have emerged among Africa's leaders. Like many admirers of African nationalism, Melady has great respect for the new leaders. However, he has little to say about some of the immense difficulties and the frustrating failures that have plagued these new states.

Gwendolen Carter's perceptive account of her travels and researches in *Independence for Africa* captures the spirit of a great continent on the move toward what most of her people, perhaps over-confidently, assume will be a brighter future. Professor Carter personally knows many of the leaders of the new states, and her account is plainly stated as a broad sweep of impressions. As a trained social scientist, she brings the analytical perspective needed to cut through to the essence of issues.

Miss Carter's accounts of conditions in the regions influenced by white settlers are particularly good. She is quite right that the areas from Nairobi down through Salisbury to Capetown present the most difficult of all African problems. Many new and hopeful developments in Tanganyika have brought a "wind of change" to East Africa. Settlers appear to have reluctantly accepted the inevitability of African predominance in government. In the Rhodesias, the issue of who shall rule has not yet been resolved. As Miss Carter so well demonstrates, economic growth in the Central African Federation cannot save it unless there is a corresponding rapid growth in equality of political and economic opportunity for Africans. The Kariba scheme can be no substitute for African majorities in the legislative assemblies of the Rhodesias. Yet at the same time Africans benefit from European confidence in schemes like Kariba, which is, in part, based on an assumption of non-violent transition.

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South Africa remains the baffling, unsolvable enigma. Miss Carter, one of America's leading authorities on South Africa, finds little new or encouraging there since the time she wrote *The Politics of Inequality*. The same inflexible racialist policies of the Afrikaner government continue. Perhaps the most striking development has been the emergence of the Pan-Africanist movement under Sobukwe. This militant movement advocates direct action tactics to achieve full African control in the Union. There is little of the balanced moderation in the newer movement to compare with the older African National Congress, which it has now ominously surpassed in strength and numbers.

In discussing the character of new West African governments, Miss Carter's warning to refrain from hasty judgments about their non-democratic character comes as a welcome voice of detached reasoning at a time when many condemnatory conclusions are easily hurled about. We are going to need to understand Africa and her leaders far better than we do. These governments are determined to set their own independent course. In the process, some of their interests conflict with particular interests of the United States and our Western allies. Their judgments are not always similar to ours, as the Congo case has well demonstrated. Yet to condemn them and to label their leaders Communists or Russian stooges and to grow angry in the face of anti-Western criticism will not serve us well in Africa.

All of these authors agree that a much greater respect for the integrity and the ability of new African leaders should be an integral part of America's response to Africa. With knowledge based upon a close study of Africa and an attitude of patient helpfulness, the United States can be the most important nation in the future development and well-being of Africans.

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Bill of Indictment

A NATION OF SHEEP, by William J. Lederer. Norton. 194 pp. $3.75.

Reviewed by

Ralph K. Huitt

THIS BOOK hits a sensitive nerve. American foreign policy recently has taken a series of very public pratfalls. We are second best in Cuba and Laos and outer space. Since World War II we have turned up with disconcerting regularity on the side of the status quo, shoveling out dollars to corrupt politicians or soldiers who won't fight. It seems highly probable that a lot of Americans are asking who should be blamed.

William J. Lederer is here to help them. He is not new to the task of assessing blame; with Professor Eugene Burdick he wrote a novel called *The Ugly American* which took the hide off American diplomats abroad. In this roving inventory of American inadequacies, he broadens the scope of his criticism to take in nearly everybody. His theme is that "our great national failure is our lack of information." Everybody is ignorant of what is going on in the world—the President, the foreign policy establishment, Congress, the press, and the rest of us.

Americans abroad are suckers for wily natives who can feed us their propaganda line because we won't learn their language or get out and live with the real people. Translators and local politicians lie to us. To most of us, that is. Lederer himself usually manages to find the One Good Indian Who Tells Truth to White Man.

Our personal observations can't be trusted when we go abroad. Most newspapermen are incompetent or take pay to puff foreign tyrants. The few good ones who tell the truth catch hell from American officials. It is good to bring foreign students here but we choose the wrong ones and mistreat them after they get here.

At home, public officials seek publicity but use national security as an excuse to keep their failures secret. Congressional investigators frame hearings to get headlines. Newspapers print what people say without telling us whether it is true or not.

The result of all this is that our foreign policy stumbles from one disaster to another because public officials and the public alike are too ignorant to do any better.

Without doubt there is much truth in what Lederer says, and there may be some good in telling it again, although more of us have heard it already than the author thinks. What is lacking in Lederer's statement is balance and fair play. More than additional information we need understanding—which we will not get without an attempt, at least, to keep things in proportion.

It is easy to say that a policy was a mistake when it seems to turn out badly. What cannot be told ahead of time or afterward is the consequence of a different course of action. What happens in the world depends, too, on what other nations do in reacting to our initiative as we do to theirs. We will never know precisely what their reactions will be nor what they plan to do. No amount of information will ever free the responsible official of the fearful necessity of taking calculated risks.

In the interaction of nations, old and new, the results have been mixed, some favorable to us, others unfavorable. On occasion our officials have acted with foresight and courage and this, too, should be told. It is no service to minimize their difficulties nor to tell us that they are boobs who must be compelled by an aroused public to develop competence.

With so sweeping a bill of indictment, Lederer's suggestions for reform are startlingly slight. He would improve the Central Intelligence Agency and foreign service personnel and make the foreign student program more effective. He endorses the Peace Corps idea uncritically. But the heart of his book, I think, is his insistence that the "nation of sheep" inform themselves and *make* their leaders do better.

For one thing, he would appeal to the women's clubs of America. "If the pressure and common sense of millions of clubwomen is applied to the problem of keeping the nation informed, nothing could resist them. Not only will citizens become more knowledgeable, but also our elected officials and governmental agencies will be forced to become expert in the fulfilling of their difficult duties."

Other ideas for increasing knowledge are public affairs games for families at the dinner table and scrapbooks on foreign countries kept by school children. For information, of course, they would have to rely on the sources which we have already been told are shamefully undependable.

Encouraging people to know more about foreign affairs is, most would agree, a good thing. But assuring them that fifteen minutes a day with that old thinking cap will greatly enhance our prospect of success only fosters, I think, a cruel delusion. We could do with a bit more awareness of the magnitude of our difficulties, a measure of modesty about what each of us can do, and a hint of compassion for the frail human vessels who bear the burden of decision.

Art for Life's Sake

by Alfred Werner

CIVILIZATION, as we know it, began on the banks of the Nile six thousand years ago, and all art of the Western world is, to some extent at least, indebted to the Pharaohs and the painters and sculptors they employed. *Ancient Egypt*, by William Stevenson Smith (Beacon Press. $7.50), a handbook on the Egyptian collections in Boston's Museum of Fine Arts, offers an excellent general introduction, not only to wall paintings and sculptures, but also to everyday utensils, tools, weapons, jewelry, tiles, faience, and pottery of the Pharaonic age.

Ancient Egypt, by Christiane Desroches Noblecourt (New York Graphic Society. $6.95), which is volume one of the "Acanthus History of Sculpture," consists of a brief text plus large photographs of New Kingdom sculpture (1580-1090 B.C.) in the Louvre, Holland's Leyden Museum, and the State Museum in Berlin (which owns the celebrated bust of Queen Nefertiti). Identical in format is the second volume in the series, *Classical Greece*, by Nicholas Yalouris (also $6.95) which limits itself to the famous marbles from the Parthenon, that pride of the Periclean age which Lord Elgin removed from Athens and, which, for the past one hundred and fifty years, have been the main attraction of the British Museum.

Those who seek a comprehensive guide through all of Greek sculpture, from the archaic beginnings in pre-Hellenic Mycenae to the sophisticated works of Hellenistic masters, will want to consult *Greek Sculpture* by Pierre Devambez (Tudor. $5.95); it explores from the crude, yet powerful creations of warfaring tribes to the slightly decadent expressions of city dwellers who had substituted grace and charm for fervor and vigor.

The Middle Ages of Christian Europe are well represented by Jean Porcher's *Medieval French Miniatures* (Abrams. $25). Whereas in the Romanesque period French miniaturists imitated the achievements of neighboring countries, in the subsequent Gothic period France, artistically come of age, set its own pattern and even exported the finest specimens of its craftsmen's output. Most of the superb color photographs are based on the originals kept at the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris. While medieval art, essentially religious, endeavored to "express the invisible by means of the visible," later periods often had less lofty aims. Though several cathedrals are in the volume *Renaissance Europe*, edited by Harold Busch and Bernd Lohse (Macmillan. $10), a good number of the buildings reproduced are castles, town halls, private mansions, and other secular structures. The countries covered are Italy, France,

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New York Times Book Review

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RUTGERS UNIVERSITY PRESS
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England, and Germany. These edifices mirror Humanism's "predominant interest in the affairs of the individual as opposed to the medieval concern with abstract theological argument." We are also told that with that era "for the first time in the annals of Christianity religion ceased to be the exclusive inspiration of artists and architects."

While the Catholic church regained some of its power through the counter-reformation, the domes built by Jesuits and other orders are characterized by theatricality verging on the melodramatic. In *The Age of Grandeur* (Grove Press. $12. 50) Victor Tapie does not confine himself to ecclesiastic architecture, but takes us on a grand tour of the ostentatious and rich fountains and facades of Bernini's and Borromini's Rome, and the spacious palaces of which Versailles is the most glamorous and impressive.

We must not think, though, that the Baroque age was devoid of inwardness. It had Rembrandt, who is the subject of several new volumes. The largest, *Rembrandt,* by Claude Roger-Marx (Universe Books. $20) earnestly deplores that, while we still pay respectful homage to his name, we avoid looking him in the face. *Rembrandt,* with an introduction by Henri Focillon (Phaidon. $9.50) is most valuable because, apart from giving us fine reproductions of the master's paintings, drawings, and etchings, it contains the full texts of the three earliest biographies of this unusual man. In his short text for *Rembrandt* (Yoseloff. $5.95), E. R. Meijer makes an eloquent statement about the portraitist: "The everyday mask behind which his subjects hid themselves is stripped away, and their naked humanity is revealed."


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THE REVIEWERS

WILLIAM McCANN makes an avocation of paperbacks and reviews them regularly for The Progressive. He edited "Ambrose Bierce's America" (a paperback). GEORGE W. SHEPHERD, JR., visiting assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, has made several trips to Africa. His new book, "The Patterns of African Politics," will be published later this year. RALPH K. HUITT, professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, has worked on the staffs of two U.S. Senators. ALFRED WERNER is the well-known art critic.

More than a hundred drawings are reproduced in *Rembrandt as a Draughtsman* (Phaidon. $5.95) in which author Otto Benesch lovingly talks about the wisdom of the master "grown old and forsaken in his struggle against the tragic fate of genius unrecognized by his time and surroundings."

Like Rembrandt a tragic figure, but tragic for different reasons, was Toulouse-Lautrec, whose biography by Henri Perruchot, simply titled *Toulouse-Lautrec* (World. $6) is deeply touching. The author interviewed people who knew the painter, and he has pieced together a life story unmatched in power by many a work of fiction. Unlike Rembrandt, Lautrec never knew financial worry nor hostility of the art world, and also unlike him the crippled and deformed genius was totally deprived of a woman's genuine love. He died wretchedly at the age of thirty-seven. *Edward Munch,* who is the subject of the volume by Otto Benesch (Phaidon. $3.95), reached the age of eighty-one, but all his life and work were haunted by visions of sickness and death.

By contrast, Diego Rivera, whose autobiography, *My Art, My Life* (Citadel Press. $6) appears posthumously, was a cheerful, lustful braggart whose story—as told to the American journalist Gladys March—is highly entertaining, though one is advised not to trust him completely. Diego's youth in pre-revolutionary Mexico, his participation in the anti-Diaz conspiracy, his Parisian interlude, and his amours, artistic ventures, and political escapades during the last thirty-odd years of his tempestuous life are described with the zest of a real showman. A totally different individual is Georges Braque, who is several years older and still quite active. He is the subject of a large volume, *G. Braque,* by John Richardson (New York Graphic Society. $12.50) and a smaller one, *Braque,* by Jean Leymarie (Skira. $6.75). Richardson calls him "subtle" and "reticent," while Leymarie sees him as a spiritual poet who "molds space in his workman's hands and renders the infinite tangible."

Braque plays a leading role in the volume *Fauves and Cubists,* by Umberto Apollonio (Crown Publishers. $7.95), as he first took part, with Matisse, Vlaminck, Derain, and others, in the "Wild Beasts" revolt against academism, and subsequently helped his friend Picasso develop the most important movement in our century—Cubism. While Apollonio's book, well illustrated though it is, fails to go beneath the surface, Robert Rosenblum, in *Cubism and 20th Century Art* (Abrams. $25) gives us a thoroughly documented study of the 1906-1925 period, and even examines more recent works of art that have been influenced by Cubism, among them paintings by such Americans as Charles Demuth and the still very active Stuart Davis.

Books on Cubism are numerous, but Marcel Jean's *History of Surrealist Painting* (Grove Press. $17.50) may be considered the first authoritative treatment of a chapter in art that still puzzles and even irritates the ordinary museum-goer. Jean first discusses surrealist painting before surrealism, and then deals with Dali, Tanguy, Picabia and others who believe in the "omnipotence of the dream."

Fauvism, Cubism, and Surrealism were born and nurtured in Paris, but we should never forget that great art was, at all times, produced outside France as well and, for that matter, outside Europe. This is well pointed out by Basil Gray's *Persian Painting* (Skira. $22.50) which takes us to the Iranian plateau and reveals to us lushly colored illuminated manuscripts produced in Tabriz, Herat, and other cities between 1300 and 1630. We are proud that some of the finest specimens of this branch of Persian art can be found in libraries and museums of New York, Boston, Washington, and Baltimore. As for *Icelandic Art,* by Kristjan Eldjarn (Abrams. $8.50) it is safe to say that this is the first work on the subject

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accessible to American art lovers. There is much to admire in the talent of anonymous farmers on an isolated cold island who presented the world with wood carvings, metal work, and embroideries that are deeply convincing in their decorative charm.

Not sufficiently known either are the arts and crafts of the people who roamed North America before the white man's arrival. Now we have, at last, *Indian Art in America*, by F. J. Dockstader (New York Graphic Society. $25) which covers all territory north of the Rio Grande. While most of it is folk art, in the truest sense of the term, certain tribes trained artists to be professionals.

In the books mentioned so far, the emphasis is on large beautiful color reproductions, but volumes on art history and aesthetics must not be ignored simply because the stress is on the text, or carry only small black-and-white reproductions, or are altogether without illustrations. *The World of Art*, by Paul Weiss (Southern Illinois University Press. $4.50) is the work of a philosopher who tries "to make evident art's nature and reality, to indicate what it is that can be found in it, and to expose some of the principles which a sound criticism should use." *Art into Life*, by Frank Avray Wilson (Citadel Press. $6.95) was written by an abstract painter who demonstrates that non-figurative art, far from being a hoax, must be considered the inevitable and indispensable art of our industrial, scientific age.

A similar position is taken by Clement Greenberg who, in *Art and Culture* (Beacon Press. $6) collects his most important critical essays. Totally different is Selden Rodman's approach. In *The Insiders* (Louisiana State University Press. $6.95), he severely attacks the action-painters and other abstract artists such as those whom Greenberg discovered and praised. Rodman perceives a sharp distinction between the Outsider ("an artist who makes noncommittal statements") whom he deplores, and the Insider ("who feels drawn to values outside himself strongly enough to examine them in his work"). This reviewer maintains that there must be a middle ground between the extreme positions held by the two men: Art for life's sake, always with a capital A.

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

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